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This dissertation investigates the Federal Reserve Banks and their governance by boards
of directors. It brings to bear original data to address a longstanding blind spot in the
political science literature on the Fed. The first empirical chapter examines the political
ideologies of Reserve Bank directors since 1975 and shows that directors are more con-
servative than the average campaign donor in the United States. The second empirical
chapter analyzes one of the selection processes that generates this observed ideological
distribution, the election of directors by private banks. The analysis first describes the
contours of the electoral landscape, and then evaluates predictors of election outcomes.
The final empirical chapter presents the results of an original survey of sitting and former
directors, which provides first-hand accounts of what directors do, how Reserve Bank
policymakers are selected, and how directors perceive their own policy influence. Taken
together, the chapters shed light on the the Reserve Bank boards of directors and highlight
the critical but little-known role they play in shaping monetary and regulatory policy. In
doing so, this dissertation provides the first systematic inquiry into the Reserve Banks and
the individuals who oversee them, laying the groundwork for a new research agenda that
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“To the governor of this bank:
Never forget that it was created to serve the employer and the working
man, the producer and the consumer, the importer and the exporter, the
creditor and the debtor; all in the interest of the country as a whole.”
— Benjamin Strong Jr., first president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, in a letter to himself.1
The Federal Reserve is the most powerful economic policymaker in the United States.
But despite decades of intense scholarly interest in the institution, very little work has
examined a key component of its structure: the twelve Reserve Banks. As the regional
operating arms of the Fed, the Reserve Banks share responsibility with the Board of Gov-
ernors to make monetary policy in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and en-
force regulatory policy on the ground. Unlike the Board of Governors, however, which is
composed of seven political appointees, the Reserve Bank were designed by Congress to
be owned by and response to banking interests. Indeed, the influence of private banks is
in many ways built into the Reserve Banks’ institutional structure, most notably through
their oversight by boards of directors. Composed of nine private citizens—six elected by
local banks, and three appointed the Board of Governors—the Reserve Bank boards over-
see Reserve Bank operations, make recommendations on interest rate policy, and appoint
the Reserve Bank presidents who vote in the FOMC. This unusual system of governance
has long underpinned distrust of the Fed both in Congress and among the public. By
some accounts, it is unconstitutional.2
1 Quoted from Chandler (1958). Until 1935, Reserve Bank presidents were called governors. Strong
reportedly kept this letter in his desk drawer at the New York Fed, where he served from 1914 until
his death in 1928.
2 The appointment of Reserve Bank presidents by the boards of directors has a long history of litigation
in the courts. In the late 1970s, for example, Representative Henry Reuss (D-WI) brought a suit al-
leging he was personally injured by the unconstitutional appointment of the Reserve Bank presidents
and their participation in the FOMC (Reuss v. Balles et al. 1978). Reuss, after failing to pass legislation
that would make the Reserve Bank presidents political appointees, claimed the depreciation of a bond
1
This dissertation begins from the basic premise that the Reserve Banks and the in-
dividuals who govern them matter. It aims to address a substantive blind spot in the
political science literature on the Fed, which has focused almost exclusively—perhaps
quite naturally—on where politics is most evident: the Board of Governors and FOMC.
A consequence is that while we have accumulated a deep understanding of those institu-
tional structures and the policymakers within them, we know next to nothing about the
selection of Reserve Bank presidents, the internal politics of the Reserve Banks, and the
private citizens and special interests that oversee them. The dissertation consists of three
empirical chapters that aim to bring the Reserve Banks and their governance into the fold
of the study of the Fed and the politics of economic policymaking.
Beyond shedding light on the poorly understood “private” tier of the Fed, the dis-
sertation highlights a unique and powerful avenue through which organized interests
may influence the policymaking process. As is well documented in the study of Ameri-
can politics, organized interests have at their disposal a wide variety of strategies to am-
plify their voices in government. Groups can lobby legislators (Hall and Wayman 1990;
Hall and Deardorff 2006) and bureaucrats (Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty 2013; Drutman
and Hopkins 2013); donate to political campaigns (Kalla and Broockman 2016; Fouirnaies
and Hall 2018); submit comments during the administrative rulemaking process (Kerwin
2003; Yackee and Yackee 2006); and litigate policy in the courts (Kagan 1991; Coglianese
1996). They can also engage in more subterranean efforts, like circulating draft legisla-
tion (Hertel-Fernandez 2014); mobilizing the political participation of employees (Hertel-
Fernandez 2018); and “cultural capture” (Kwak 2013). I show that banks have another
option: they can govern. By having a formal seat at the table in the governance of the
Reserve Banks and the selection of key policymakers, financial interests can ensure their
preferences are represented throughout the Federal Reserve System.
The remainder of this chapter motivates the study of Reserve Bank governance and
reviews literature on the Federal Reserve and economic policymaking. It then puts forth
an argument highlighting the implications of the Reserve Banks’ system of governance
for interest group participation in Fed policymaking. The chapter then outlines the gen-
eral methodological approach pursued in the dissertation and summarizes the analyses
presented in subsequent chapters.
1.1 Why Study the Reserve Banks?
While much of the existing literature on the Fed overlooks the Reserve Banks, this disser-
tation makes the case they are worthy—and, indeed, critical—objects of inquiry. In this
section, I motivate the study of “one of the most important, least studied, and least de-
fensible” (Conti-Brown 2016) aspects of the Federal Reserve System and discuss several
he owned was due to presidents’ illegal voting on monetary policy. Similarly, in the 1980s, Senators
Donald Riegle (D-MI) and John Melcher (D-MT) each sought injunctions against presidents’ participa-
tion in the FOMC, arguing that it was in violation of the Constitution’s Appointments Clause (Riegle v.
FOMC, et al. 1981; Melcher v. FOMC, et al. 1987). Legal scholars continue to debate the Reserve Banks’
constitutionality (see, for example, Conti-Brown 2016).
2
reasons why the Reserve Banks and their governance should attract more attention from
scholars going forward.
1.1.1 Reserve Banks—and Their Directors—Make Policy
One simple potential explanation for the dearth of research on the Reserve Banks is that
they don’t matter. While the Reserve Banks initially operated with a degree of authority
that arguably trumped the Board—each Reserve Bank set their own discount rate, ef-
fectively conducting their own monetary policy—the Banking Act of 1935, coupled with
growing nationalization of economic policy, stripped the Banks of their policymaking in-
dependence and demoted them to a subordinate role.3 As a result, the Board subsumed
all of the Fed’s policymaking authority, while the Reserve Banks transformed into aca-
demic research centers with little influence on policy outcomes. This narrative is pop-
ular among many scholars of the Fed, perhaps leading to their dismissal as “harmless
anachronisms” (Melton 1985) or “collateral partners” (Binder and Spindel 2013).4 As
Melton (1985) writes: “For policy formation, the FOMC is usually all that matters; the
[B]anks (except for the fruits of their research) do not.”5
While it is true that the Reserve Banks are less powerful today than they were before
1935, they undeniably continue to play an instrumental role in monetary and regulatory
policymaking. Most notably, the Reserve Bank presidents vote on monetary policy in the
FOMC, making them among the most consequential policymakers in the United States.
Though the presidents compose a minority on the committee—five of the twelve pres-
idents may vote at each FOMC meeting, compared to all seven governors—all twelve
presidents participate in the deliberations.6 As discussed in greater detail below, five
voting presidents may be sufficient to move monetary policy in a more conservative di-
rection. The Reserve Banks’ minority representation on the FOMC also betrays their more
dominant position in recent years. Presidents compose a 5-3 majority on the FOMC as of
July 2018 and have held a majority with some regularity since at least 2014. This tracks
with a steady decline in the governors’ majority advantage since the late 1980s (Conti-
Brown 2016). Prior to George H.W. Bush’s term, governors held a majority close to 100%
of the time; by the end of the Obama administration, they composed a majority roughly
3 The discount rate is the interest rate at which banks may borrow money from their local Reserve Bank’s
“discount window” in order to meet reserve requirements.
4 This early account seems to capture the reasoning behind contemporary scholars’ willingness to ex-
clude the Reserve Banks from study: “It is no deprecation of the abilities and prestige of the other
eleven bank presidents to say that they rank well down the list of System power centers. The presi-
dents are in general gifted and articulate men, and their views will always be weighed by the board
and its chairman. Nevertheless, the last remaining power of the banks vanished when the original tool
of monetary management–changes in the discount rate–lost its money-market effectiveness” (Hastings
and Robertson 1962).
5 See, however, Shull (2005) and Conti-Brown (2016) for pushback against this narrative.
6 Reserve Bank presidents are also, quite simply, public figures. Presidents’ public statements may shape
popular opinion on monetary policy, and they may also move markets (Aizenman, Binici, and Hutchi-
son 2016). By virtue of their position, the presidents who lead the Reserve Banks play an influential
and unique role in the political economy that few other executives in or out of government enjoy.
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40%of the time. Delays in filling governor vacancies have shifted the normal balance of
power on the committee in the Reserve Banks’ favor.
Beyond monetary policy, Reserve Banks are responsible for implementing financial
regulations and supervising financial institutions, thereby ensuring the efficacy of the
federal government’s regulatory regime. While the Board of Governors is responsible for
bank regulation and supervision, the Reserve Banks have been delegated the authority
to conduct on-the-ground oversight of financial institutions within their districts. The
2010 Dodd-Frank Act further expanded the Fed’s regulatory portfolio to require more in-
tensive and comprehensive oversight of banks, non-bank financial institutions, and the
overall stability of the financial system, making supervision an increasingly important
component of the Reserve Banks’ workloads. Some of the recent controversies relating
to the Fed stem from concerns that the Reserve Banks have failed to meet their supervi-
sory responsibilities—or, even worse, that they have been “captured” by the banks they
supervise. The “secret Goldman Sachs” tapes released in 2014, for instance, depicted
New York Fed bank examiners deferring to Goldman Sachs on regulatory protocol, with
senior Fed regulators urging their more junior colleagues to back off.7 In another exam-
ple, the appointment of John Williams as president of the New York Fed in April 2018
was met with opposition in part because the Wells Fargo consumer abuse scandal—in
which millions of bank and credit card accounts were fraudulently opened in consumers’
names—happened under his watch as president of the San Francisco Fed.8 The Reserve
Banks’ supervisory responsibilities have consequences for the efficacy of financial regu-
lation and the safety and soundness of the financial system.
Given their proximity to local banks and businesses, Reserve Banks also support the
Fed’s monetary and regulatory policy activities by compiling and communicating infor-
mation about local economic conditions. This on-the-ground intelligence is formally syn-
thesized in macroeconomic forecasts and anecdotal accounts prepared by Reserve Bank
staff for use in FOMC deliberations, as well communicated in meetings with the Board
of Governors regarding bank supervision. By channeling information to the Board, the
Reserve Banks play a role in shaping the Board of Governors’ perception of the economy.
The boards of directors that oversee the Reserve Banks help facilitate Reserve Bank
policymaking. Directors are private citizens, but they appoint the presidents that vote on
monetary policy in the FOMC—their most direct, and arguably most potent, form of in-
fluence on Fed policymaking. They also oversee compensation for top officials, including
supervisory staff, and are key source of the local economic intelligence that is funneled
into the FOMC, not only regarding economic conditions but also the business and bank-
ing communities’ reactions to Fed policy (Miller 1961). In addition, directors continue to
weigh in on monetary policy by submitting recommendations on the discount rate to the
Board of Governors every two weeks.
7 See Jake Bernstein, “Inside the New York Fed: Secret Recordings and Culture Clash,” Pro Publica,
September 26, 2014, https://www.propublica.org/article/carmen-segarras-secret-recordings-from-
inside-new-york-fed. Goldman Sachs only recently came under the Fed’s regulatory purview, after
it elected to convert to a bank holding company in 2008.
8 See, for example, Kenneth H. Thomas, “N.Y. Fed doesn’t need a regulator who whiffed on Wells,”
American Banker, March 28, 2018, https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/ny-fed-doesnt-need-a-
regulator-who-whiffed-on-wells.
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As with the Reserve Banks themselves, however, the boards of directors have been
dismissed as largely ornamental bodies. As a congressional report put it: “the power
of the directors to direct is limited” (U.S. Congress 1952).9 In particular, scholars have
pointed to directors’ discount rate recommendations as emblematic of their triviality. The
Board of Governors has final authority over the discount rate—which has lessened in im-
portance as a tool of monetary policy in any case—and there is evidence that governors
and Reserve Bank presidents dictate the rate recommendation to the boards (Reagan 1961;
Jinushi and Kuttner 2008). Laurence Meyer, a former Fed governor, noted that he inter-
preted boards’ discount rate recommendations as signals of the Reserve Bank presidents’
policy preferences (Meyer 2004). Of course, directors choose these presidents. Tootell
(2000), moreover, finds that “the discount rate recommendation is not simply the district
president telegraphing his or her punch,” and there are examples of boards overruling
their presidents’ recommendations.10
Beyond the discount rate, anecdotal accounts provide other evidence of director in-
fluence. For one, directors appear to exercise their president appointment authority in-
dependently, despite the Board of Governors having veto power over their decisions.
Former Fed governor Kevin Warsh notes “it would be very difficult, and it would be rea-
sonably unprecedented in modern times, for the Reserve Bank’s preferred choice not to
ultimately be accepted by the Board of Governors” (Bordo 2016).11 Moreover, Reserve
Bank presidents themselves appear to think they matter. When taking over the New York
Fed in 2003, Timothy Geithner recruited big bankers—including JPMorgan Chase CEO
Jamie Dimon and former Goldman Sachs chairman Stephen Friedman—onto the board
of directors precisely because he felt the sitting directors were “weak on financial experi-
ence” (Geithner 2014). Even after being warned by former New York Fed president and
Fed chairman Paul Volcker that these recruitments would expose the New York Fed to
“reputational risk,” Geithner apparently felt the need for financial expertise on the board
was sufficiently critical to override these concerns.12
9 Hastings and Robertson (1962) express a similar view: “It is probably not unfair to say that the boards
of directors of the twelve banks have had their power reduced to that of nominating committees....their
positions are largely honorific; and though the [B]oard expresses public gratitude for the “economic
intelligence” furnished by bank and branch directors, the plain fact is that their monthly meetings are
simply genteel bull sessions.”
10 See, for instance, Chicago Fed president Charles Evans’ account during the August 2008 FOMC meet-
ing.https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080805meeting.pdf, pg. 106.
11 Accounts of the Board of Governors exercising its veto power over Reserve Bank appointments are
scarce. Between 1977 and 2016, no president candidate proposed by directors was rejected by the
Board; moreover, of the 32 presidents approved in that period, only four garnered any “no” votes
among governors (Boesler and Smialek 2017). Of course, it is possible that the threat of a veto is
sufficient for keeping directors’ appointments in line. Arthur Burns, for instance, chairman of the Fed
through the 1970s, reportedly tried to influence the selection of Reserve Bank presidents by threatening
to veto (Thoma 2017).
12 For reasons that will be made clear later in this section, however, Geithner came to regret this decision.
5
1.1.2 Reserve Bank Governance Has Implications for FOMC Politics
Beyond addressing a general gap in the existing literature, Reserve Bank governance
bears on a well-established empirical finding regarding presidents’ voting behavior in
the FOMC. As a large body of research shows, presidents tend to prefer more contrac-
tionary monetary policy relative to governors (e.g. Woolley 1984; Chappell, Havrilesky,
and McGregor 1993; Meade and Sheets 2005).13 That presidents behave as conservative
counterweights in the FOMC is consistent with a founding justification for the decen-
tralization of monetary policymaking. By giving privately owned Reserve Banks some
authority to make policy, they would be bulwarks against the easy-money proclivities of
big government (Meltzer 2010).14 Despite the centrality of this finding to the empirical
literature on the Fed, however, we do not have a clear sense of the foundations of this
conservative bias, or the mechanisms through which the bias may operate.
Focusing on Reserve Bank governance draws attention to the private citizens who ap-
point the presidents, and highlights the consequences of this system of governance on
FOMC politics. Reserve Bank presidents not only express more inflation-averse prefer-
ences than governors, but they are also more likely to vote as a unified bloc and to dissent
from policy decisions in favor of tighter policy. A consequence of presidents’ bloc voting
is that governors must exhibit unity in the FOMC in order to maintain their dominance
over the direction of monetary policy. In particular, they must be united in their dovish-
ness in order to push the FOMC’s ideal point beyond the most conservative median voter
(Morris 2002). Given that FOMC chairs mold policy consensus by weighting the views
of all FOMC members, the overall effect of having reliably conservative presidents is to
make monetary policy less expansionary than it otherwise would be (Havrilesky and
Gildea 1995; Havrilesky 1995). Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor (1995) estimate that
replacing a president on the FOMC with a governor would raise the steady-state inflation
rate by nearly 1 percentage point.
In addition to offering insight into the dynamics underlying these empirical regu-
larities, studying Reserve Bank governance also complements a rich body of work that
examines the appointment of the Board of Governors by elected officials (see for exam-
ple: Beck 1984; Morris 2002; Chang 2003; Meltzer 2011). Although many scholars have
alluded to the relationship between presidents’ conservativeness and their selection by
Reserve Bank directors (Woolley 1984; Havrilesky 1995; Shull 1995), there has been no
13 There are numerous demonstrations of this: for example, presidents as a group cast a larger percent-
age of contractionary policy votes than governors; presidents chosen under any Administration cast
votes for more contractionary monetary policy than governors appointed by the same Administration;
presidents are more likely to dissent in favor of higher interest rates.
14 The use of the term “conservative” to describe inflation aversion is standard in the literature and re-
flects the predominance of the unidimensional model of monetary policy preference. The convention is
perhaps best highlighted by the seminal model put forth by Rogoff (1985) in which society is made bet-
ter off through the appointment of a “conservative central banker”—one that is more inflation averse
than the population. Throughout the dissertation, I use the term “conservative” interchangeably with
“hawkish” to denote an individual’s relative inflation aversion. Hawks prefer “tight,” or contrac-
tionary, monetary policy via higher interest rates. In contrast, monetary “doves” are less averse to
inflation and prefer trading off higher inflation for lower unemployment. Doves prefer “loose,” or
expansionary, monetary policy via lower interest rates.
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effort to investigate the selection of Reserve Bank presidents comparable to that devoted
to the appointment of governors. Studying Reserve Bank governance can shed light on
the foundations of Reserve Bank presidents’ voting behavior in the FOMC and contribute
to a large literature that analyzes the monetary ideologies of FOMC participants.
1.1.3 Reserve Bank Governance is Politically Contentious
Calls for Reserve Bank governance reform date back to the Fed’s founding, but the drum-
beat has grown louder in recent years. Controversy surrounding the Fed’s activities
leading up to after the 2007-08 financial crisis has attracted a particularly intense level
scrutiny of the Reserve Bank boards, both in and out of Congress. In one of the most
significant legislative revisions to the Reserve Banks’ system of governance since 1935,
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act prohibits bankers serving on the boards from participating in
the process of selecting Reserve Bank presidents.15 Rather than quell criticism around the
Reserve Banks, however, momentum behind further reform of the processes by which
presidents and directors are selected has only grown since 2010. Existing literature is
unable to fully contextualize these developments, however.
In particular, the financial crisis cast a spotlight on potential conflicts of interest on
the Reserve Bank boards. At least 18 sitting and former directors at the time of the cri-
sis were affiliated with companies that accessed the Fed’s emergency lending programs
(GAO 2011). In a well-publicized example, JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon and Gen-
eral Electric CEO Jeff Immelt both served as directors of the New York Fed while their
companies received Fed loans. Stephen Friedman, the chairman of the New York Fed
at the time, was a former chairman of Goldman Sachs, held a large financial stake in
the company, and was concurrently serving on the Goldman and New York Fed boards,
even as Goldman borrowed billions from the Fed.16 New York Fed directors were also
consulted on the bailout of Bear Stearns and the creation of other emergency lending fa-
cilities. A 2011 GAO investigation into Reserve Bank governance—ordered by Congress
in the Dodd-Frank Act—concluded, “directors’ affiliations with financial firms and for-
mer directors’ business relationships with Reserve Banks continue to pose reputational
risks to the Federal Reserve System” (GAO 2011). Concerns that bankers have undue
influence in Fed policymaking, are able to secure preferential regulatory treatment, and
financially exploit the privileged information they obtain during their board service have
15 This provision was only included after a proposal to make the New York Fed president a political ap-
pointee was rejected. Making the Reserve Bank presidents public appointees continues to be a popular
reform proposal among progressives (see, for example, Haedtler, Levin, and Wilson 2016).
16 The full scale of the controversy surrounding Friedman stemmed from Goldman’s conversion from
an investment bank to a bank holding company in September 2008. The move allowed Goldman to
access additional emergency financing while also bringing it under the New York Fed’s regulatory
purview. However, because the Board of Governors prohibits “Class C” directors from owning stock
in or serving as directors of bank holding companies, Friedman’s Goldman affiliations were now in
violation of Fed policy. The New York Fed requested a waiver, arguing that Friedman was providing
critical leadership as head of the search committee for Timothy Geithner’s replacement as president
of the Reserve Bank. It was later revealed that Friedman purchased new shares in Goldman while
waiting for waiver approval, and as Goldman continued to borrow funds from the Fed. He resigned
from the New York Fed in May 2009 (see Kelly and Hilsenrath 2009).
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spurred proposals—including one adopted in the 2016 Democratic Party Platform—to
kick bankers of the Reserve Bank boards entirely.17 As Senator Bernie Sanders (D-VT)
opined while running for president, “We would not tolerate the head of Exxon Mobil
running the Environmental Protection Agency. We don’t allow the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to be dominated by Verizon executives. And we should not allow
big bank executives to serve on the boards of the main agency in charge of regulating
financial institutions” (Sanders 2015).
Grassroots organizations have also put the Reserve Banks in their crosshairs, a some-
what surprising development given the historic absence of interest group mobilization
around the Fed. The Center for Popular Democracy’s “Fed Up” campaign, led by a coali-
tion of progressive and labor groups, is illustrative. Since protesting the Fed’s annual
monetary policy conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming in 2014—the first time in recent
memory that activists attended the event—Fed Up leaders meet regularly with Board
governors, Reserve Bank presidents, and Reserve Bank directors to demand greater trans-
parency, accountability, and diversity throughout the Federal Reserve System (Dunsmuir
2016). 18 The coalition has been especially effective in pushing Reserve Banks to open the
selection processes for presidents and directors to the public.19 The Atlanta Fed’s search
for a new president in 2017, for instance, included a public recommendation period and
a public town hall. Similarly, directors of the San Francisco Fed are posting detailed logs
of their meetings with community, business, and financial groups during their search to
find a new president following John Williams’ departure in June 2018.
In addition to promoting efforts to democratize the Reserve Bank president and direc-
tor selection processes, Fed Up’s activism on this front has encouraged greater attention
to ethnic, gender, and occupational diversity in the Reserve Banks.20 For instance, Sena-
tor Kamala Harris (D-CA) introduced a bill in May 2018 requiring Reserve Bank president
search committees to interview at least one minority and one female candidate for each
vacancy. The bill came in response to backlash over the appointments of John Williams
and Thomas Barkin—both white men and Reserve Bank insiders—to lead the New York
and Richmond Feds, respectively. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), an outspoken pro-
ponent of Reserve Bank governance reform, later called on the directors of the New York
Fed to testify in front of the Senate Banking Committee to explain their decision (Warren
2018). As she wrote: “The Fed’s Board of Governors and the New York Fed should go
17 Republicans in Congress have proposed moves in the other direction. For example, Rep. Robert Pit-
tenger (R-NC) introduced a bill to reinstate banker directors’ participation in the Reserve Bank presi-
dent appointment process, while Rep. Scott Garrett’s (R-NJ) legislation would eliminate the Board of
Governors’ participation in director selection and give banks full appointment power over the boards.
18 Following Fed Up’s inaugural appearance at Jackson Hole, a right-leaning group, the American Prin-
ciples Project, held their own protest during the 2015 conference. The event, which advocated for a
return to the gold standard, was funded by conservative donor Robert Mercer (Midler 2016).
19 Beyond institutional reform, Fed Up also lobbies the Fed over its monetary policy. Since the Fed began
raising interest rates in 2015 for the first time since the crisis, the coalition has organized demonstra-
tions during FOMC meetings to protest interest rate hikes and advocate for full employment.
20 As of 2018, the Fed’s leadership—Fed governors and presidents of the Reserve Banks—are 80 percent
male and 87 percent white. Moreover, 80 percent of governors, presidents, and members of the Reserve
Bank boards come from banking or business backgrounds. Among directors, 78 percent were white
and 78 percent were male. (Center for Popular Democracy 2018).
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out of their way to solicit and consider public input when selecting a new president who
will have so much influence over interest rates and Wall Street supervision - instead, they
turned the process over to a handful of private individuals and ignored calls to choose
one of many qualified alternatives who might have brought a new perspective.”
1.2 Relevant Literature
The social science literature on the Federal Reserve System and the politics of monetary
policymaking is substantial, encompassing numerous overlapping strains that approach
the Fed from a variety of theoretical traditions and substantive angles—including central
bank independence (e.g. Alesina and Summers 1993; Shull 1995; Ainsley 2017); FOMC
voting behavior (e.g. McGregor 1996; Chappell and McGregor 2000; Meade and Sheets
2005); the foundations and determinants of monetary ideology (e.g. Hibbs 1987; Adolph
2013; Malmendier, Nagel, and Yan 2017); committee deliberation and decisionmaking
(e.g. Visser and Swank 2007; Schonhardt-Bailey 2013; Lopez-Moctezuma 2018); appoint-
ment politics (e.g. Havrilesky and Gildea 1992; Chang 2003; Schnakenberg, Turner, and
Uribe 2017); external pressures on Fed policymaking (e.g. Woolley 1984; Havrilesky 1995;
Weise 2008); and historical institutional accounts (Jeong, Miller, and Sobel 2009; Meltzer
2010; Binder and Spindel 2017).21 This research is almost exclusively focused on the Board
of Governors and the FOMC, however. References to the Reserve Banks are largely lim-
ited to presidents’ participation in the FOMC and the historical development of the Fed’s
decentralized structure, if they are mentioned at all.22
This dissertation departs from much of the contemporary scholarship by focusing on
the Reserve Banks in their own right. While the empirical chapters in the dissertation pro-
vide more in-depth reviews of the literature relevant to those particular analyses, I draw
on two general bodies of research that undergird my focus on Reserve Bank governance:
one that speaks to the Fed’s relationship with the financial sector, and one that provides
a theoretical lens for analyzing private interest involvement in public policymaking more
broadly.
1.2.1 Financial Interests and the Fed
The financial sector is the loudest voice in the politics of Federal Reserve policymaking
(Reagan 1961; Weise 2008; Corder 2012; Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2012).23 With respect to
monetary policy, financial interests, particularly those firms engaged in traditional com-
mercial lending, are vulnerable to both unanticipated and anticipated inflation and thus
21 For more comprehensive overviews of the literature, see Woolley (1994) and Morris (2002).
22 Much of what we do know about the Reserve Banks come from early qualitative accounts, including
reports and investigations commissioned by Congress. See Bopp (1935); Bach (1950); Miller (1961);
Brimmer (1972); U.S. House (1976); and Harrison (1991).
23 This literature is consistent with more general surveys of interest group activity in American politics
which find that business and corporate interests are more influential in economic policymaking to a
degree most other organized interests are not, e.g. Schattschneider (1960); Smith (2000); Schlozman,
Verba, and Brady (2012); and Gilens and Page (2014).
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have strong preferences for price stability (Epstein and Schor 1990). While some sophisti-
cated financial sector activities, such as foreign exchange trading and money market fund
investments, may benefit from higher and more volatile prices, in general banks are rel-
atively inflation-averse over the long run (Peretz 1983; Posen 1995). In fact, Posen (1995)
argues that the very foundations of Fed independence are located in the size and organi-
zational strength of the financial sector, the only “interest group that is more committed
to price stability than the median voter” and capable of providing the necessary political
support for counterinflationary policy.
The co-dependent relationship between the Fed and the financial sector has fueled
a popular narrative in which the Fed has been “captured” by the banking interests it
regulates (Stigler 1971; Carpenter 2013). While capture appears in different flavors, a
dominant form in the Fed literature is “cultural capture” (Kwak 2013). Cultural capture
operates through a combination of social, cultural, and intellectual currents, culminating
in policy that serves the ends of industry rather than the public. According to this view,
the Fed’s frequent fraternization with banks professionally and socially leads Fed policy-
makers to be unusually receptive to banks’ demands (Havrilesky 1995; Weise 2008). A
consequence is that monetary and regulatory policy processes may be biased in the di-
rection preferred by banks—presumably, toward tighter monetary policy and less intense
regulatory enforcement. The salience of bank preferences is enhanced by the relative lack
of contact between the Fed and non-financial or non-industry groups. As former AFL-
CIO official Markley Roberts noted: “Fed officials don’t lunch — or even consult — with
consumer or worker representatives.” Former Fed governor Sherman Maisel was equally
explicit: “The Fed interacts far less frequently with debtor groups or the less wealthy
than with the Establishment, which prefers a more restrictive monetary policy” (Woolley
1984). As Woolley (1984) argues, close ties between banks and central bankers “are of
political interest primarily because they reinforce the Federal Reserve’s special awareness
of and sensitivity to the financial community.”
One channel through which cultural capture has been institutionalized in the Fed is
through the Federal Advisory Council (FAC). The FAC was established in 1935 to accom-
modate bank representation in monetary policymaking following reforms that shifted
authority away from the Reserve Banks and toward the Board of Governors. Composed
of twelve financial sector representatives (one selected by each Reserve Bank president),
the FAC meets with the Board of Governors at least four times a year by law and advises
the Board on both monetary and regulatory policy. Havrilesky (1995) finds that mone-
tary policy is responsive to signals from the banking industry as communicated via FAC
directives issued every three months. In an extension of Havrilesky’s study, Weise (2008)
shows that while the Fed was more responsive to signals from non-financial interests,
such as consumer and labor groups, prior to 1979, its policy has since reflected almost
exclusive responsiveness to the FAC.24
Another channel, of course, is through the Reserve Banks. From early in the Fed’s
history, the Reserve Banks were identified as vehicles for private interests’ corruption of
24 The Board of Governors established the Community Advisory Council (CAC) in 2015 as a counter-
balance to the FAC and its other advisory council, which represents depository institutions. To date,
representatives from labor unions, community nonprofits, and academia have served on the CAC.
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Fed policymaking, and as potentially lethal threats to the Fed’s democratic legitimacy
(Bopp 1935; Eccles 1951). Reserve Banks’ vulnerability to capture—in both cultural and
“stronger,” more direct forms—stems from their ownership by local member banks, an
arrangement that creates a “clear path of access for the private banks to the FOMC and,
consequently, the Board of Governors” and a “formal, legal proximity between the reg-
ulated and regulator” (Conti-Brown 2014). Banks thus become direct stakeholders in
and key constituents of the Federal Reserve through their holding of Reserve Bank stock.
These stockholding banks’ participation in the governance of the Reserve Banks through
their election of directors creates another layer of access that threatens to bias Fed policy-
making away from the public interest and toward narrow special interests. Mayer (1976)
notes that the domination of the boards of directors by financial and industrial elites—the
“upper reaches of American society”—inflects the boards with a distorted sense of the
public interest: “This should not be interpreted as saying that the directors are concerned
with the economic interests of a narrow segment of society. But while they do try to rep-
resent the public interest, the public interest is amorphous and looks differently to people
in different circumstances.”
A congressional investigation on the occasion of the Fed’s 50th anniversary offers a
convenient look into the debate regarding the Reserve Banks’ vulnerability to capture by
banking interests (U.S. House 1964). Alfred Hayes, then president of the New York, re-
jected the argument as “ fallacious, not only because the bankers, even if they wanted
to, could not by such a means exert leverage on the presidents for this purpose, but also
because it cynically assumes that the presidents, whose appointments must be approved
by the Board of Governors, are men of such little scruple that they would violate their
oaths of office as members of the Committee, by subordinating the public good to the
private interest.” In contrast, economist Milton Friedman testified that banks’ representa-
tion in Reserve Bank governance could incidentally bias Fed policy away from the public
interest: “To [bankers] it seemed perfectly natural and understandable in trying to serve
the public interest to place major emphasis on interest rates and credit conditions rather
than on the aggregate quantity of money. From this point of view, I think it has been
an unfortunate thing that we have had a Reserve bank which has been as closely linked
to the banking community and to the lending and investment process as it has, not at
all because the individuals are trying to feather their own nests, not for that reason, but
because they naturally interpreted the instrument they were dealing with in terms of the
environment they knew best and were most familiar with.”
In addition, directors’ control over Reserve Bank president appointments and pres-
idents’ salaries, as well their responsibility for setting compensation for Reserve Bank
staff involved in the supervision of local banks, may also serve as mechanisms for more
direct forms of capture (Woolley 1984; Shull 2005). Adolph (2013) points to a similar
mechanism in which private banks have leverage over central bankers due their abil-
ity to influence central bankers’ future (post-central bank) career prospects. The Reserve
Banks’ unusual quasi-private status—along with its day-to-day proximity to financial in-
terests, given the Reserve Banks’ role in conducting on-the-ground supervision of banks
and serving as the local banking community’s own personal banker—thus creates oppor-
tunities for “stronger” forms of capture than might exist in the Board of Governors. A
story recounted by George Schultz, a former secretary of the Treasury, is suggestive: “I
11
did have an experience that sticks with me. When the New York Fed [presidency] was
open, I had a candidate. Alan Greenspan [then Fed chairman] and I had the same can-
didate. We talked about it....We never even got in the conversation. We were totally out
of it. The New York financial people appointed the guy. There was no question about it.
They got their man” (Bordo 2016).
Beyond varieties of capture, financial interests also devote significant political resources
to lobbying the Fed directly, as well as lobbying members of Congress over legislation re-
lated to the Fed. The American Bankers Association and Chamber of Commerce both
played an active role in the Fed’s founding in 1913 (Chang 2003) and have since served
as active participants in Fed policymaking (U.S. House 1976; Peretz 1983). Business
Roundtable, another interest group active in macroeconomic policy, was identified in the
1970s as the source of a coordinated industry campaign against legislation that would
have subjected the Fed to a complete audit (U.S. House 1976). Arthur Burns, then chair of
the Fed, reportedly asked the group to tell its members to flood congressional offices with
telegrams in opposition to the bill. A congressional investigation also found that Busi-
ness Roundtable had prepared speeches for Fed officials. The Fed’s reliance on the finan-
cial sector for political cover is another facet of their symbiotic relationship and perhaps
presents another means for banking interests to exert influence on Fed policymaking.
1.2.2 Political Influence Through Governance
More generally, this dissertation contributes to, and takes inspiration from, an important
growing body of literature that revives attention to what Anzia and Moe (forthcoming)
term “interest groups on the inside.” Taking as its starting point early studies of interest
group participation in politics (Schattschneider 1960; Lowi 1969), and building on more
recent efforts that shift the locus of American politics from elected officials to organized
policy demanding groups (Bawn et al. 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2014), this research ex-
amines how special interests work inside government to shape public policy. As Anzia
and Moe argue, “Interest groups are more than just outsiders that influence government
through lobbying and elections. They are often insiders that play official roles within
government itself.” The Reserve Bank boards of directors—where private bankers di-
rectly elect a majority of the Bank’s governing board, including from among themselves—
provide an almost extreme demonstration of this phenomenon. Just as public-sector
unions formally participate in the governance of public pension boards (to take Anzia
and Moe’s example), financial interests are by legislative design expressly invited to exer-
cise influence inside the Federal Reserve System via the governance of the Reserve Banks.
This dissertation thus provides a kind of detailed case study of banking interests working
inside a prominent quasi-governmental institution. Moreover, it highlights systems of
governance, as well as the authority to appoint key public policymakers, as mechanisms
through which private interests may operate inside government and exert both direct and
indirect influence on policymaking.25
25 The focus on corporate governance as an instrument of political power is a central feature of the litera-
ture of comparative political economy (see Gourevitch 2003 for an overview), but scholars of American
politics have begun to take note. In their study of rising income inequality, Hacker and Pierson (2010)
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Rudder’s (2008) discussion of “public-private governance” provides additional ana-
lytic leverage. Rudder defines private governance as “composed of the decision-making
processes and the binding decisions of private groups that affect the quality of life and
opportunities of a larger public.” Public-private governance, then, “combines, to vary-
ing degrees and in varying ways, the imprimatur of government on essentially private
decision making.” As it turns out, the political system is awash with arrangements in
which private groups exercise policymaking authority that is practically indistinguish-
able from that of government. These include credit-rating agencies, business associations,
and accounting boards that determine the rules governing public pension solvency (Cut-
ler, Haufler, and Porter 1999; Rudder 2008). While Rudder distinguishes public-private
governance from “quasi-governments” like the Fed, the oversight of the Reserve Banks
by private boards of directors arguably falls closer to the phenomenon she conceptualizes.
More generally, Rudder’s public-private governance arrangements share with the Re-
serve Banks the same lack of attention from the discipline. As she persuasively argues:
“Questions of whose interests get served, who gets to make decisions, how these partici-
pants view the world and their tasks, whether conflicts of interest are built into schemes
of private governance, and how a larger public is affected by privately made decisions
are ones that should be of particular interest to political scientists. To the degree that the
constitutional order, its protections and forms, are eclipsed by private and public-private
governance, political science must pay attention.”26
1.3 A Seat at the Table: Fed Governance As Influence
I argue that the participation of the boards of directors in Reserve Bank governance is
a critical, though poorly understood, avenue through which financial interests may in-
fluence the policymaking process. Banks participate directly in the governance of the
Reserve Banks, both by electing board members and sitting on the boards themselves.
This has important policy consequences given the responsibilities the boards have for
overseeing the Reserve Banks and appointing Reserve Bank presidents.
The boards have a deeper significance as well. While much of the literature seems to
dismiss directors on grounds that their influence is limited to an advisory or even merely
decorative role, whether or not directors are influential is in some sense beside the point.
Bank influence is built into the institutional structure of the Fed through the boards of
directors. This is a slightly different way of thinking about political influence than consid-
ering whether lobbying efforts or dollars contributed predict policy outcomes or provide
access to key policymakers. Banks’ access to policymaking is a feature of the system, not
a bug. As a formal component of the governance structure—effectively overseeing the
institution that regulates them and choosing the individuals who will determine the eco-
write: “The structure of American corporate governance—and its associated, distinctive patterns of
executive compensation—is a prime contributor to American winner-take-all-inequality. To a consid-
erable if largely unrecognized extent this is a political outcome.”
26 The language of political science itself reinforces ignorance of public-private systems of governance.
For instance, the term “public policy” inherently seems to exclude government-like rules and policies
that are established by non-governmental actors (Rudder 2008)
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nomic policies that directly impact their bottom lines—banks have a direct line to ensure
their policy preferences are baked into the organization.
In short, by having a seat at the table in the governance of important policymaking
institutions, directors and banks wield a public authority that guarantees them a stable
and protected means to pursue policy change. This is influence. Even if it were the case
that directors serve a merely marginal advisory role, or affect policy in exceedingly indi-
rect ways—assumptions not empirically validated in the existing literature—their formal
participation in the Reserve Banks’ system of governance is a pathway for financial inter-
ests to amplify their voice in government. Thus, in addition to lobbying legislators and
donating to campaigns, banks have an opportunity open to them that is, by design, not
available to other special interests: they can govern. Understanding how and to what
extent banks make use of this opportunity is of critical interest for understanding how
the banking sector participates in the policymaking process.
Beyond this central argument, I put forth two broad claims that are intended to prompt
a rethinking of the Reserve Banks in the literature. First, the Reserve Banks’ ownership by
private economic interests and the lack of direct participation by elected officials in their
governance have led political scientists to dismiss the Reserve Banks as somehow less
“political” than the Board of Governors and the FOMC. This is misleading. For one, the
Reserve Banks are clearly institutions of political contention. As discussed above, the Re-
serve Banks and their boards have been perennial subjects of congressional debate. More
fundamentally, the Board of Governors, the “public” tier of the Fed, appoints one-third
of the directors in each Reserve district and may veto the appointments of presidents and
other directors. The Reserve Banks are also, of course, legislative creations of Congress
and subject to its oversight. By their very nature, then, the Reserve Banks are imbued with
a public character—irrespective of their “private” incorporation. As Binder and Spindel
(2017) write, “Institutions are political not because they are permeated by partisan deci-
sion making but rather because political forces endow them with the power to exercise
public authority on behalf of a diverse and at times polarized nation.”
The notion that the Reserve Banks and their governance by boards of directors are
inherently political is not intended as a smear or an attack on the Fed’s independence,
but as a simple admission of fact. Reserve Banks were created by Congress and play
an important role in the conduct of public policy. Congress endowed the Reserve Bank
directors, private citizens, with the authority to handpick twelve of the most important
policymakers in the country. Just as political scientists have fruitfully analyzed the FOMC
and Board of Governors as political institutions, I argue that the Reserve Banks—a key
component of the Federal Reserve System—naturally deserve similar treatment.27
A second and related claim is that much of the existing scholarship tends to ignore the
politics inherent in the financial sector’s participation in Reserve Bank governance. The
private ownership of the Reserve Banks by local banks underscores a crucial point: while
27 A defining theme of the literature on the Fed is that it is a political institution, vulnerable to political
and interest group influence despite its statutory independence. See Meltzer (2011) for an overview.
As Greider (1987) argues: the Fed is not a “cloistered sanctuary where disinterested experts make
authoritative calculations about the future of the economy, ’above’ politics and protected from the
messy claims of special interests that surround the Congress and the President.”
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the Fed is designed to be “politically” independent, it is not independent of private banks
(Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2012). There is something paradoxical about this distinction.
Banks are key stakeholders in the Federal Reserve System. Many own stock in their Re-
serve Banks and have a say in the appointment of its leadership. Banks are also, of course,
special interests. While this is universally recognized in studies of the FOMC and mone-
tary policymaking more broadly (e.g. Woolley 1984; Havrilesky 1995), empirical studies
of the Fed largely dismiss the appointment of Reserve Bank presidents as a private—and,
implicitly, apolitical—process. This is problematic to the extent that we believe interest
groups play an important role in the policymaking process and that the financial sector
has interests that might diverge from the public.
In sum, accepting the Reserve Banks’ private status as grounds for their sidelining
in the literature requires accepting a limited view of what politics is: one that empha-
sizes the direct participation of elected officials. But we know politics encompasses much
more than that. The ownership of policymaking institutions by private banks; the formal
participation of banks in selecting the individuals who govern these institutions; private
citizens’ direct selection of key policymakers; privately appointed policymakers voting
on interest rates and managing bank supervision—these are all political phenomena that
are central to our understanding of how public policy is made and how political influence
is exercised.
1.4 Methodological Approach
An obstacle confronting scholars of the Federal Reserve System is a relative lack of ob-
servable information. The Fed’s opacity—compounded by its public-private organiza-
tional structure and its seemingly paradoxical “independence within government”—is
well known and in fact instrumental to its influence as a policymaker. This presents chal-
lenges for efforts to glean details about the internal processes that structure Fed policy-
making and the individuals and interests that participate in these processes.
Studying the Reserve Banks aggravates these challenges. As the “private” component
of the Fed, the Reserve Banks and the cadre of private citizens serving on their boards are
not subject to the same standards of transparency that bind the rest of the System. The
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), for example, applies to the Board of Governors but
not to the Reserve Banks.28 Moreover, much of policymaking activity conducted inside
the Reserve Banks is unobserved. Minutes and transcripts of Reserve Bank board meet-
ings are generally confidential, as are directors’ individual votes on the discount rate.
This leaves Reserve Bank researchers with few of the data sources commonly employed
in studies of the FOMC and the politics of monetary policy. The observational challenges
in this domain pose difficulties not only for inferring directors’ potential policy prefer-
ences, but also for developing a basic understanding of what directors do, what influence
they have, and how the Reserve Banks’ system of governance operates in practice.
28 The Reserve Banks maintain they are not subject to FOIA because they are not federal agencies un-
der the Act’s definition. This was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit in 2010, though the opinion did not
definitively resolve the question of the Banks’ status. See Karlson (2010).
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I attempt to overcome these obstacles by drawing on a wide variety of sources that of-
fer a window into the actors and processes that underlie Reserve Bank governance. These
include campaign contribution histories, open-source biographical records, FOIAed Re-
serve Bank documents, and a new survey of Reserve Bank directors. I leverage this in-
formation to construct three original datasets, each of which offer granular insight into a
different aspect of the directorates: their ideological composition; the process by which
directors are selected; and directors’ first-hand accounts of board activities and influence.
I also contextualize the data with anecdotes and historical background culled from the
Fed’s archives. Each of the new data form the basis of an empirical chapter in the disser-
tation. As each chapter investigates a different aspect of Reserve Bank governance, they
can be accessed as stand-alone inquiries.
This dissertation is unusual in the sense that it is primarily descriptive. Its overar-
ching objective is to gain general insights into an institution that has not seriously been
put under a microscope, rather than to infer causal relationships or even evaluate corre-
lations between independent and dependent variables. This is not to suggest that causal
identification and inference are impossible or undesirable in this domain. At heart, the
research questions underlying this project are causal in nature. Are directors influential
in policymaking? If the boards did not exist and Reserve Bank presidents were chosen
by politicians (as some members of Congress propose), would the Fed’s monetary policy
or its efficacy as a regulator be any different than what we observe today? Additionally,
does the ideological composition of the boards matter? If we shifted directors’ mean ide-
ology one or two standard deviations to the left, would we observe the selection of more
dovish presidents, and thus more expansionary monetary policy? These counterfactuals
are difficult to simulate: institutional changes to the boards that might be leveraged for
identification are rare, and the causal chains linking directors’ decisions to policy out-
comes are complicated.29 More generally, as scholars of interest groups and capture have
noted, assembling causal evidence of policy influence is especially challenging given the
difficulty of discerning groups’ preferences and motives, and even of observing the mech-
anisms of influence in action (e.g. Hacker and Pierson 2002; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady
2012; Carpenter 2013).30 Nonetheless, the hope is that by documenting basic institutional
details about the boards—who serves on them, how they are composed, and what they
do—we can erect a foundation upon which future theoretical and empirical work can
build. I thus view this project as exploratory and a necessary first step toward integrating
the study of Reserve Bank governance into the social science literature.
29 An old congressional report provides a nice summary of the challenges here: “’The influence of the
directors of the Federal Reserve banks on the formulation of monetary policy is in large part intangible
and is both difficult and unrewarding to measure and to define” (U.S. Congress 1952). Similarly, see
Bach (1950): “Reserve Bank influence is relatively informal, exercised through discussion and corre-
spondence with the (BOG) board members more than through formal voting strength.”
30 Creative examples with respect to the Fed exist, however. See Finer (2018), who uses tax ride data to
provide evidence of New York Fed information leaks to banks immediately prior to FOMC meetings.
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1.5 Plan of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide a brief
historical and institutional overview of the Reserve Banks and the Federal Reserve System
more broadly.
Chapter 3 investigates the political ideologies of Reserve Bank directors. I introduce
a new, hand-collected dataset that describes the professional and educational histories,
interest group affiliations, and political donation behavior for individuals who served as
directors over the last 40 years. Consisting of nearly 4,000 individual-year observations,
these granular data enable me to examine how directors’ political preferences vary across
Reserve districts, director classes, and over time. I show that Reserve Bank directors are
more likely to contribute to campaigns, more likely to donate to Republicans, and more
conservative than the average campaign donor in the United States. Bankers serving on
the boards of directors, moreover, are more conservative than their non-banker counter-
parts. I also find ideological variation across Reserve districts: the directors of the Boston
and New York Federal Reserve Banks are significantly less conservative than directors
at the ten other Reserve Banks, even after controlling for director’s individual and geo-
graphic characteristics. Taken together, the results provide a window into the political
leanings of the private citizens who govern the Reserve Banks.
Having established the ideological and biographical profiles of directors, Chapter 4
examines one of the selection processes that generates these outcomes: the election of di-
rectors by member banks. The chapter draws on an original dataset of Class A and Class
B director elections between 1980 and 2015 that describes the candidates running for elec-
tion and the election outcomes. In the first part of the chapter, I describe the contours
of the electoral landscape and document variation in election dynamics across multiple
dimensions, including Reserve Bank, director class, and member bank group. The second
part of the chapter explores theoretical explanations for the observed election dynamics.
I demonstrate that director elections are rarely contested, though contestation varies con-
siderably across Reserve district. Among races that are contested, the candidate with the
most nominations is significantly more likely to win. The analysis provides suggestive
evidence that low contestation in these elections may be explained by the important role
local banking associations play in coordinating the nominations of director candidates.
Chapter 5 attempts to validate the findings from the previous chapters and shed fur-
ther light on how the Reserve Bank boards operate in practice by asking directors about
their service experiences firsthand. The chapter presents the results of an online survey of
former and sitting Reserve Bank directors in which respondents were asked to reflect on
a wide variety of issues, including: the director selection process, the scope of directors’
responsibilities, Reserve Bank president appointments, and the tenor of board delibera-
tions. The objective of the survey was to uncover details that offer descriptive insight that
may inform the development of much-needed theoretical work in the domain of Reserve
Bank governance. The responses suggest that director recruitment processes are highly
networked; that banking associations play active roles in selecting directors; that directors
perceive themselves to be influential in monetary policymaking; and that Reserve Bank
presidents and staff largely dictate discount rate recommendations. More generally, the
survey illustrates that director experiences may vary considerably, even within the same
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Reserve Bank. While the survey sample is quite small, it nevertheless provides a new look
into the dynamics of Reserve Bank governance and the views of directors themselves.
Finally, in Chapter 6, I summarize key findings, describe the implications of the results
for our understanding of the Reserve Banks and financial sector participation in policy-
making, and outline a new research agenda on Reserve Bank governance.
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Chapter 2
The Federal Reserve System:
Background
“The System had originally been designed to represent a blend of private
and public interests and of decentralized and centralized authorities, but this
arrangement had become unbalanced. Private interests, acting through the
Reserve Banks, had made the System an effective instrument by which pri-
vate interests alone could be served. The Board in Washington, on the other
hand, which was supposed to represent and safeguard the public interest,
was powerless to do so under the existing law and in the face of the oppo-
sition offered by the men who ran the Reserve Banks throughout the country.”
— Marriner Eccles, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 1934-1948.1
The history of the Federal Reserve’s founding is vital to understanding both the Fed’s un-
usual institutional structure and the longstanding tension between its public and private
poles. In this chapter, I provide a brief overview of its history and basic components.
2.1 Overview
The Federal Reserve System was established with the 1913 Federal Reserve Act. Its pas-
sage followed contentious debate both in and outside of Congress over the proposed
central bank’s distribution of power. For some, the establishment of any central bank
was a non-starter. These opponents, channeling the spirit of Andrew Jackson, warned
that a central bank would institutionalize a monopoly over the money supply to the ben-
efit of big-city bankers. By contrast, the most ardent proponents of a central bank ar-
gued that not only should one exist but it should be owned and operated by commercial
1 Eccles (1951). As recounted in Todd (1994), Eccles accepted President Roosevelt’s offer to serve as
chairman only under the condition that the Fed be fundamentally restructured. He was instrumental
in drafting the 1935 Banking Act, which shifted power away from the Reserve Banks and centralized
the Fed’s authority in the Board of Governors.
19
banks (Meltzer 2010). As Chang (2003) notes, three interests in particular—small and ru-
ral country banks concentrated in the southern and western United States, Midwestern
city bankers, and Eastern financiers—clashed over whether control over monetary policy
would be centralized in a New York-based body run by bankers (as financiers hoped), or
whether it would be distributed across the country to ensure that no one interest group or
region would dominate (as most country and some city bankers, who opposed the idea
of a central bank in the first place, preferred).The political parties staked their positions in
the debate as well, with Republicans in Congress supporting a banker-run central bank
led by the Eastern financiers, while Democrats supported a largely decentralized system
with government appointment power.
The legislation reflected a political compromise in which regional Reserve Banks would
be statutorily subordinate to a national “Federal Reserve Board”—composed of seven po-
litical appointees, including the Secretary of the Treasury—but have power to set their
own discount rates and conduct their own open market operations.2 As H.H. Parker
Willis, one of the chief drafters of the 1913 Act argued, the establishment of Reserve Banks
was intended to ensure “local control” of monetary policy given variation in regional eco-
nomic conditions. The end result was an unusual public-private hybrid, with a “public”
body composed of political appointees based in Washington D.C. overseeing a “private”
constellation of regional banks owned and governed by private financial institutions.3
In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress reformed the Federal Reserve with the
Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, centralizing the Fed’s policymaking responsibilities in the
newly created “Federal Open Market Committee” (FOMC) and reducing the autonomy
of the Reserve Banks in the process.4 Rather than setting their own monetary policies, Re-
serve Banks would be a minority in the FOMC, with five presidents serving single-year
terms on a rotating basis. This inclusion of the Reserve Bank presidents on the FOMC
was proposed by the American Bankers Association (ABA), which Marriner Eccles, then
chairman of the Fed, accepted as a compromise to his own position that the presidents
should be relegated to advisory roles in setting open market policy (Meltzer 2010). The
political appointees composing the restructured Board of Governors would hold the ma-
2 Bach (1950) notes that bankers widely assumed they would be given representation on whatever board
was created to supervise the Reserve System. President Woodrow Wilson, however, opposed any de-
gree of formal banker representation, anticipating that bankers would frustrate the Board’s supervi-
sory authority and would generally resist restrictive credit policies.
3 Ambiguity over the Fed’s “public” status has existed since its inception. Greider (1987) provides an
illustrative example: when the Federal Reserve’s headquarters in Washington D.C. was completed in
1937, Rep. Wright Patman (D-TX)—proud populist and arch-foe of the Fed—argued that it was not
eligible for the public property tax exemption because it was owned by the privately incorporated
Reserve Banks. Upon receiving a tax bill, the Board of Governors refused to pay, arguing that the
Federal Reserve System was an “independent department” within government. It took more than
three years of legal wrangling for the Fed’s lawyers to convince D.C. it was a government body and
thus could enjoy the tax exemption. Decades later, in 1952, a survey commissioned by Patman asked
Reserve Bank presidents to define their status. They answered: “In our opinion, Federal Reserve banks
are partially part of the private economy and are part of the functioning of the Government (although
not technically a part of the Government)” (U.S. Congress 1952).
4 Eccles (1951) claimed that the Fed’s failure to prevent the Great Depression stemmed from decentral-
ization of the Fed’s policymaking authority and bankers’ hijacking of the Reserve Banks.
20
jority on the FOMC and set the discount rate, taking into account recommendations from
the Reserve Banks. The empowerment of the Board of Governors at the expense of the Re-
serve Banks had the effect of creating a more hierarchical Federal Reserve System in which
the Board of Governors plays the lead role in monetary policymaking. This structure—
resembling, as Reagan (1961) notes, a pyramid with a private base (the Reserve Banks), a
mixed middle level (the FOMC), and a public apex (the Board of Governors)—has largely
remained the same since 1935, even as the Fed’s responsibilities have grown. Figure 2.1
provides a simple overview of the key tiers of the Federal Reserve System.
Figure 2.1: Overview of the Federal Reserve System
In addition to creating the modern Federal Reserve, the 1935 Act was a turning point in
the tug-of-war between the Reserve Banks (particularly the New York Fed) and the Board
of Governors that has punctuated the Fed’s century-long history. While conflict between
the tiers continues to break out, the Board has steadily consolidated power over the Re-
serve Banks since the 1930s. To take a recent example, the implementation of the “Triangle
Document,” a 2010 directive from the Board of Governors to centralize bank supervisory
activities within the Board—bank examiners within the Reserve Banks now report to a
16-person committee in D.C. rather than to their respective Reserve Bank presidents—
recalls the centralization of the Fed’s monetary policymaking authority in 1935 (Hilsen-
rath 2015). These power struggles between the public and private tiers of the Fed are
not solely matters of process. As Meltzer (2011) argues, these are “political acts” conse-
quential precisely because “changes in the locus of power affect the choices of policies.”
For this reason, the Fed’s institutional design—and its efficacy in conducting monetary
policy, regulating the financial sector, and performing its other congressionally mandated
responsibilities—cannot be understood without context of the historical tensions between
the Board and the Reserve Banks.
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2.2 Tiers of the System
Table 2.1 summarizes the composition and responsibilities of each of the tiers of the Fed-
eral Reserve System. Each tier is described in further detail below.
Table 2.1: Tiers of the Federal Reserve System
2.2.1 Board of Governors
As the only component of the Federal Reserve System directly appointed by elected offi-
cials, the seven-member Board of Governors is the Fed’s link to the American electorate
and the primary source of its democratic accountability. Governors are appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate to 14-year terms. As the public face of the Fed,
the Board chairman testifies in front of Congress twice a year. The Board exercises broad
supervision of the Federal Reserve System while also setting reserve requirements for de-
pository institutions and approving changes to one of the Fed’s key monetary policy tools,
the discount rate (the interest rate at which banks may borrow from their local Reserve
Banks’ “discount window” in order to meet their reserve requirement). The Board is also
responsible for writing regulatory rules, supervising financial institutions, and enforcing
compliance with regulations. As discussed below, however, some of these supervisory
tasks have been delegated to the Reserve Banks.
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2.2.2 FOMC
Composed of the seven politically appointed Fed governors, the president of the Reserve
Bank of New York, and four of the remaining Reserve Bank presidents, the FOMC is the
Fed’s deliberative monetary policymaking body which meets in Washington D.C. at least
eight times a year. The primary goal of each meeting is to set the target for the Fed’s most
important monetary policy instrument, the federal funds rate (the interest rate at which
banks may lend funds to each other overnight). Along with the discount rate—which
is determined by the Board after reviewing recommendations from the directors of the
Reserve Banks—the Fed uses the federal funds rate to influence the trajectory of longer-
term interest rates in the economy and, ultimately, the supply of money and credit.5 The
privileged position of the New York Fed in the FOMC—the New York Fed president is
a permanent voting member and traditionally serves as vice-chair of the committee—
reflects the New York Fed’s unique responsibility for implementing the FOMC’s chosen
policies: to achieve the target rate, the New York Fed’s Open Market Trading Desk con-
ducts the requisite purchases and sales of government securities. Since the passage of the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act in 1977, the FOMC is obligated to target the federal funds rate
at a level that will support its dual mandate of price stability (via moderate long-term
interest rates) and full employment. The New York Fed’s Second District is also home
to the largest and most powerful financial institutions in the country, endowing it with
special insight into, and relationships with, key financial power players.
Table 2.2: FOMC Voting Schedule
The rotation of Reserve Bank presidents in and out of the FOMC each year was de-
fined by Congress in 1942. As Table 2.2 shows, the schedule assigns each Reserve Bank
to a group and allows for rotation within those groups, presumably to maintain a general
balance of regional representation in the FOMC each year.6 Crucially, although only five
Reserve Bank presidents vote in the FOMC at a time, all presidents attend and partici-
pate in the policy deliberations. All presidents, voting or not, are also expected to share
information on the state of their district economy in advance of FOMC meetings.
At the end of each FOMC meeting, the group releases to the public a policy state-
ment denoting the federal funds rate target, an brief explanation of its actions, the tally
5 For a comprehensive account of the mechanics of monetary policymaking, see Blinder (1998).
6 Contemporary observers may come to the conclusion that regional representation in the FOMC is
rather imbalanced. There are years, for example, in which the entire western United States is not
represented through voting presidents.
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of voting members who supported the chosen target, and the preferred action of those
who dissented. Minutes of the meeting are released three weeks later, while verbatim
transcripts are released with a 5-year lag.
2.2.3 Reserve Banks
The twelve Reserve Banks are distributed across the United States according to the orig-
inal boundaries drawn in 1914. As Figure 2.2 suggests, the distribution is a relic of the
early 20th century, when the country’s population and economic activity were concen-
trated in the eastern part of the country. Indeed, eight of the 12 Reserve Banks were
created east of the Mississippi, though recent proposals have called to either redistribute
or create new Reserve Banks to reflect the westward move of the population, where more
than 40 percent of the country now lives (e.g. Dearie 2015).
Figure 2.2: Federal Reserve Districts
Each Reserve Bank is tasked with implementing the Fed’s monetary policy and acting
as the designated fiscal agent and depository institution for banks and financial institu-
tions within its district.7 The Reserve Banks also conduct research, process checks and
7 The 1913 Act provided for a committee to determine the number and location of Reserve Banks.
Republicans lobbied for a small number of Reserve Banks (between three and 15) while Democrats
wanted as many as 50. Ultimately, 12 cities were selected from 37 that applied. The committee’s de-
cisions were accused of being driven by political pressure, leading the Fed to publish a defense. See
Havrilesky 1995 and Binder and Spindel 2013.
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online payments, evaluate bank merger and acquisition applications, and perform on-
the-ground supervision of banks and financial institutions within their districts.8
A more obscure function the Reserve Banks perform is bolstering the Fed’s institu-
tional independence from political pressure. As Meltzer (2010) notes, the Reserve Banks’
ownership by private banks and the insulation of presidents from the electoral process
are critical sources of Fed independence, allowing it to operate with greater policymak-
ing autonomy than any other agency in government. The Reserve Banks also provide the
System with a firewall of political support inside Congress. By locating Fed operating
arms around the country, lawmakers fortunate enough to have one (or two, in the case of
Missouri) established within their state lines will rally to protect it when under legislative
threat (Binder and Spindel 2017).9
As the “private” component of the Federal Reserve System, the Reserve Banks bear
a structural resemblance to private sector corporations. Reserve Banks are considered
private employers; presidents’ salaries are determined by each Reserve Banks’ board of
directors, just as corporate boards determine the compensation for their chief executives.
This is in contrast to the Board of Governors, whose workers (including the governors
themselves) are federal employees, with salaries determined by Congress.10 Each Re-
serve Bank is privately incorporated and issues equity shares to their stockholders: banks
located within the district that are members of the Federal Reserve System. About one-
third of all commercial banks in the U.S., or about 1,700 institutions, were members of the
Federal Reserve System in 2017.11 This includes all national banks, which are required by
law to join the System, and state-chartered banks that elect membership and meet speci-
fied application requirements. Member banks receive an annual dividend of 6 percent on
their Reserve Bank stock, as specified by Congress.12
Each Reserve Bank is overseen by a board of directors composed of nine members,
three of whom are appointed by the Board of Governors (“Class C” directors) and six
of whom are elected by member banks (“Class A” and “Class B” directors). Figure 2.3
provides a graphical depiction of the Reserve Bank boards. In some respects, the boards
8 Most of the Reserve Banks have branches outside the headquarter city. The branches are also led by
directorates, with the majority of directors selected by the Reserve Bank and the rest appointed by the
Board of Governors. The analyses in this dissertation exclude the Reserve Bank branches.
9 This is not lost on the Board of Governors. As Frederic Mishkin, a George W. Bush appointee
to the Board, said in an August 2008 FOMC meeting with respect to Reserve Bank presidents
and staff: “there’s a group of people out there who are not in Washington or New York (be-
cause people also have a hard time about New York) but who tend to be very important sup-
porters for us politically. So this is a system that I would very much like to see preserved.” See
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080805meeting.pdf, pg. 124.
10 The chair of the Federal Reserve, Janet Yellen, earned about $200,000 in 2017, well below the lowest-
paid Reserve Bank president, James Bullard of St. Louis, who earned $359,000. The highest-paid
president,Bill Dudley of New York, earned $470,000.
11 Board of Governors. Annual Report 2017, Statistical Tables, Table 5: “Banking offices and banks affili-
ated with bank holding companies in the United States, December 31, 2016 and 2017.”
12 The dividend Reserve Banks pay to member banks is a frequent target for progressive activists, who
argue it amounts to a generous subsidy for Wall Street. In 2015, Congress passed the “Fixing America’s
Surface Transportation Act” (FAST Act), which paid for highway construction funds by cutting the
annual dividend rate for big banks. The ABA filed a lawsuit against the government in 2017, arguing
that the dividends cut was a breach of contract.
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serve a similar role as corporate director boards. Like many corporate directors, direc-
tors of the Reserve Banks serve 3-year staggered terms, oversee budgets, provide risk
oversight, evaluate the performance and compensation of top officials, and appoint the
organization’s chief executive—the Reserve Bank president.13
Figure 2.3: Reserve Bank Board of Directors
In other respects, however, Reserve Bank boards resemble public bodies. Crucially, the
boards are statutorily obligated to operate in the public interest rather than in the interest
of stockholders, an objective reflected in the trifurcation of directors into classes. While
the three Class A directors are elected by their peers to serve as representatives of stock-
holding banks, Class B and Class C directors serve as representatives of the public. The
result is though a majority of directors are selected by private banks, a majority also for-
mally represents the public interest. The public interest is further protected by the Board
of Governors which, in addition to appointing Class C directors, has formal power to veto
the selection of Reserve Bank directors and presidents, as well as to remove directors and
staff from office.
The director classes are also distinguished by eligibility requirements and responsi-
bilities designed to minimize conflicts of interest. While Class A directors may be offi-
cers and directors of commercial banks, Class B and Class C directors—who should be
13 A two-term limit has been the norm since early in the Fed’s history, though it was never formalized in
legislation. Proponents of including formal tenure limits in the 1935 Banking Act cited concerns that
directors who had served for long periods “overawed” and dominated other directors (Bopp 1935).
The Federal Reserve’s bylaws now specify two-term limits, with an allowance for exceptions.
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Table 2.3: Overview of Federal Reserve Director Classes
Class A Class B Class C
Appointed by Banks Banks Board of Governors
Represent Banks Public Public
Eligibility May be employee,
director, and officer
of bank
May hold bank stock
May not be employee,
director, or officer
of any bank
May hold bank stock
May not be employee,
director, or officer
of any bank
May not hold bank stock
Common sector Banking, finance Industry, non-bank finance Industry, academia
selected, according to the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977, with “due but not ex-
clusive consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry, services, labor
and consumers”—may not be bank employees at the time of appointment. Class C di-
rectors, moreover, are prohibited from holding stock in any bank. In practice, the statu-
tory requirements governing director classes has produced a fairly predictable pattern of
“types” filling each class. As the only director class that may be filled by a banker, Class
A directors are almost always executives of banks. Class B directors tend to be executives
of local industry or non-bank financial institutions, presumably providing representation
to borrowers in the community.14 Class C directors, the only class appointed by non-local
principals, are most commonly pulled from local business, nonprofits, and academic in-
stitutions. Though all directors are prohibited from participating in any matter related
to banking supervision, Class B and C directors are involved in making hiring and com-
pensation decisions for Reserve Bank employees working on bank supervision. With the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, Class A directors are also now excluded from participat-
ing in the appointment of Reserve Bank presidents and vice presidents, though they may
still provide input to the search committee. The Board of Governors recently extended
these restrictions to Class B directors affiliated with institutions supervised by the Fed.
Table 2.3 provides a summary of the differences between director classes.
The public character of the Reserve Bank boards is additionally reflected in directors’
direct participation in monetary policymaking. Every 14 days, directors from each Re-
serve Bank vote to recommend a discount rate—the interest rate at which private banks
may borrow from the local Reserve Bank’s “discount window” in order to meet their re-
serve requirement—to the Board of Governors. While the Board of Governors need not
follow the recommendations, it is constrained by how far it can veer from them. The
discount rate votes are supplemented with monthly meetings between directors and the
Reserve Bank president in preparation for the president’s meetings with the FOMC. Di-
14 The intention of having member banks elect three bankers and three businesspeople was to give rep-
resentation to both lenders and borrowers in the community (Shull 2005).
27
rectors are also consulted for the Board’s publication of the “Beige Book”, an anecdotal
survey of local economic trends that is disseminated to FOMC members a week before
the policymaking meeting. The boards’ role thus extends beyond traditional corporate
governance. Directors help inform the monetary policy debate, select the Reserve Bank
presidents that vote in the FOMC, and guide the establishment of a national interest rate.
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Chapter 3
Who Governs the Federal Reserve
Banks?1
“This Committee has observed for many years the influence of private inter-
ests over the essentially public responsibilities of the Federal Reserve System.
As the study makes clear, it is difficult to imagine a more narrowly-based
board of directors for a public agency than has been gathered together for the
twelve banks of the Federal Reserve System.” — Rep. Henry S. Reuss (D-WI).2
This chapter explores the political ideologies and biographical characteristics of the boards
of directors. Drawing on the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections
(DIME, Bonica 2016a) and an original dataset of all directors serving between 1975 and
2015, I present four main findings. First, relative to the population of campaign contribu-
tors in the U.S., Reserve Bank directors make more donations, are more likely to donate to
Republicans, and are more politically conservative. Directors are also more conservative
than governors of the Federal Reserve Board and directors of Fortune 500 companies. Sec-
ond, bankers serving on the boards of directors (Class A directors) are significantly more
conservative than non-bankers, even those that are elected by bankers (Class B directors).
Third, the directors of the Boston and New York Reserve Banks are less conservative than
the directorates of the 10 other Reserve Banks and are the only directorates to have av-
erage ideology scores on the “liberal” side of the spectrum. Finally, directors’ average
conservatism has declined steadily over the last 40 years.
While this analysis is primarily descriptive, it is the first to my knowledge to provide a
window into the political leanings of the private citizens who govern the Federal Reserve
1 I am grateful to Sudeshna Barman, Frances Fitzgerald, Zachary Fry, Mitchel Kwok, and Denny Lai for
excellent research assistance. I also thank John Paul Rollert for providing access to BoardEx data and
seminar participants at UC Berkeley, the American Political Science Association annual meeting, and
the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management fall conference for valuable comments.
2 Forward to a 1976 study of the Reserve Bank directors by the House Committee on Banking, Currency,
and Housing (U.S. House 1976). Reuss, who served in Congress from 1955-1983, was chairman of the
committee and a longtime foe of the Fed. Indeed, as noted briefly in Chapter 1, Reuss sued the Fed on
grounds that the Reserve Bank president appointment process was unconstitutional.
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Banks. In doing so, the analysis complements existing work in political science and eco-
nomics on the political ideologies and policy preferences of Federal Reserve governors
and Reserve Bank presidents. It also contributes to a burgeoning body of literature, pi-
oneered by Bonica (2014), that brings campaign contribution data to bear to uncover the
ideologies of unelected political actors whose policy influence is often difficult to observe.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, I review existing
work on monetary policy ideology and outline my theoretical expectations of Reserve
Bank director ideology in Section 3.2. I then describe the sample and the campaign con-
tribution data employed to measure director political ideology in Section 5.1. Section
5.2 presents descriptive results, followed by results of regression analyses in Section 3.5.
Finally, Section 5.3 discusses the implications of the findings for future research on the
Federal Reserve System.
3.1 Related Literature
While little scholarship has focused attention on the Reserve Banks and the boards of
directors, a large body of empirical work on the relationship between individual-level
personal characteristics and latent monetary policy preferences provides a starting point
for identifying potential sources of variation in Reserve Bank director political ideology
and policy preferences.3
Most relevant to this analysis, preferences over monetary policy are strongly corre-
lated with, and heterogeneous with respect to, party identification and political ideology.
Among both political elites and the public, Republicans and conservatives are more in-
flation averse than Democrats and liberals (Beck 1984; Hibbs 1987; Alesina and Rosenthal
1995; Havrilesky 1995).4 Gallup polls, for instance, show that respondents who iden-
tify as Republican or conservative are up to 20 percentage points more likely to be “very
concerned” about inflation than self-identifying Democrats or liberals. The link between
partisanship and monetary ideology is further observed in White House appointment
strategies for filling vacant seats on the Board of Governors, with Democratic adminis-
trations reliably appointing monetary “doves” to the Board of Governors and Republican
administrations appointing relative “hawks” (Havrilesky and Gildea 1992; Chang 2003;
Chappell, McGregor, and Vermilyea 2005).5
3 While this literature focuses on preferences over monetary policy, the relationship between regulatory
policy preferences and personal characteristics such as partisanship and profession is also well doc-
umented. Republicans and ideological conservatives, among both political elites and the public, are
generally associated with preferences for financial deregulation policies while Democrats and ideolog-
ical liberals are more likely to support stronger financial regulatory efforts. See Broz (2013) and Keller
and Kelly (2015).
4 These findings hold cross-nationally. In a survey of 20 industrial economies, Scheve (2004) finds a
positive association between political conservatism and inflation aversion. Richer citizens, moreover
were more likely to cite tackling inflation as a policy priority relative to poorer citizens.
5 Monetary “hawks” are relatively averse to inflation. Hawks prefer “tight,” or contractionary, monetary
policy via higher interest rates. In contrast, monetary “doves” are less averse to inflation and prefer
trading off higher inflation for lower unemployment.
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This heterogeneity across the political space can in part be explained by monetary pol-
icy’s distributional consequences (Hibbs 1987; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Scheve 2004),
the source of which is assumed to be the implicit tradeoff between unemployment and
inflation as represented by the Phillips curve.6. Higher-than-anticipated inflation redis-
tributes wealth from creditors to debtors, punishing savers while rewarding borrowers.
Inflation may also erode the wealth of individuals earning fixed-incomes, such as pen-
sioners. The wealthy and elderly–key constituents of the Republican Party—will thus
support a low inflation/high interest rate position.
Among central bankers, professional backgrounds are also found to be strong predic-
tors of monetary policy preferences. In particular, policymakers with doctorates in Eco-
nomics or career experience in finance have more intense and consistent anti-inflationary
preferences than central bankers who hail from government careers (Havrilesky and Gildea
1995; Adolph 2013).The financial sector’s monetary conservatism is traced to its funda-
mental vulnerability to both unanticipated and anticipated inflation (Epstein and Schor
1990; Posen 1995; Weise 2008).7 While some sophisticated financial sector activities,
such as foreign exchange trading and money market fund investments, may benefit from
higher and more volatile prices, the industry overall has elevated price stability to top of
its agenda, a priority reflected in its lobbying activities (Weise 2008). Posen (1995) argues
that the very foundation of the Federal Reserve’s independence is located in the size and
organizational strength of the financial sector, the only interest group “that is more com-
mitted to price stability than the median voter” and capable of providing the necessary
political support for counterinflationary policy.
Beyond partisan and professional characteristics, variation in central bankers’ mone-
tary policy preferences may stem from regional considerations. As previous research has
shown, the voting behavior of both Reserve Bank presidents and members of the Board of
Governors in the FOMC may reflect greater responsiveness to the unemployment rate of
the region they are affiliated with than to the national rate (Tootell 2000; Meade and Sheets
2005; Meade 2007). These observed “regional identities” suggest that central bankers may
behave as delegates of regional constituencies, even if their statutory responsibilities do
not prescribe them to represent a particular geographical area.
3.2 Theoretical Expectations
I propose and test several general expectations regarding Reserve Bank directors’ politi-
cal ideologies. First, given that the director classes are defined both by a) the appointing
entity and b) the director’s career background, I expect to find variation in director ideol-
ogy across classes. With respect to the appointing entity, I anticipate bankers will select
more politically conservative (Class A and B) directors on average relative to the Board
of Governors’ (Class C) selections. This hypothesis follows from expectations regarding
6 Theoretical models of macroeconomic policymaking rely on the assumption that policymakers and
voters have utility functions decreasing in the rates of inflation and unemployment. Public opinion
supports this claim; see Hibbs (1987) and Shiller (1997)
7 Rogoff (1985) suggests that the most reliable inflation-averse actors are most likely to be found in the
financial sector.
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the appointer’s career background: government service has been found to be positively
associated with central bankers’ preference for prioritizing output stabilization over price
stabilization, while individuals with careers in finance are associated with more conserva-
tive political—and, in particular, monetary—ideology. Assuming that appointers select a
director at least as conservative as they are, one would expect banks to select Class A and
B directors that are more inflation averse (and thus also more politically conservative)
relative to the Board of Governors’ selections. That the Board of Governors is composed
of political appointees, moreover, gives additional reason to believe Class C directors will
be less conservative than other directors. Because the Board of Governors is composed of
both Democratic and Republican appointees in most years, their selections are likely to be
more ideologically diverse and, on average, moderate. In other words, the partisan poli-
tics inherent in the Board of Governors is likely be reflected in the appointment of Class
C directors. Who holds the majority on the Board of Governors should also be of rele-
vance: when Democrat appointees hold a majority on the Board of Governors, their Class
C picks should be less conservative than when Republican appointees hold a majority.
With respect to directors’ career backgrounds, I expect Class A directors to be more
conservative than Class B directors, even though they are appointed by the same entities.
As the only director class permitted to seat bankers—as well as to represent bankers’,
rather than the public’s, interests—electing banks have a clear incentive to seat one of
their own as a Class A director; indeed, bankers have traditionally been the only ones to
fill these seats. As described above, bankers are anticipated to be more inflation averse
and thus will have ideal points further right on the spectrum. Because all Class A direc-
tors are likely to be bankers, I expect they will be more conservative, and more uniformly
so, relative to Class B (and Class C) directors. That Class B directors are prohibited from
being bankers allows for a more occupationally diverse set of directors, presumably some
of whom hail from industries that are less conservative than banking with respect to mon-
etary and regulatory policy. Class B directors may thus exhibit more varied, and slightly
more moderate, political ideologies relative to their Class A counterparts.
H1: Directors with careers in banking (Class A directors) will be more politi-
cally conservative than their non-banker counterparts.
H2: Directors appointed by bankers (Class A and Class B directors) will be
more conservative than directors appointed by the Board of Governors
(Class C directors).
H3: Class C directors appointed by a Board of Governors in which Democratic-
appointees compose a majority of governors are less conservative than
Class C directors appointed by a Board of Governors composed of majority-
Republican appointees.
I further expect to find heterogeneity in director political ideologies across Reserve
districts. Specifically, I suspect that Reserve Banks headquartered in relatively liberal ar-
eas will have less conservative directorates relative to Reserve Banks headquartered in
more politically conservative areas. This hypothesis relies on a very simple assumption:
because directors must be residents of the Reserve districts, the pool of potential directors
across districts will vary with the political character of the region. The Boston Fed, for ex-
ample, which spans New England, likely has a larger pool of liberals from which it selects
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directors compared to the Kansas City Fed. Simply as a matter of selection, then, more
politically liberal districts should have more politically liberal directors. This hypothesis
is not intended to capture the formal process by which directors are selected—this is ex-
plored in the next chapter—but instead merely describes an intuitive relationship that I
expect to see in the data.
While I expect this hypothesis to hold overall, I single out the New York Fed as a
potential contrary case. Of all the Reserve Banks, New York—which is charged with
executing the FOMC’s interest rate policy through open market operations and regulates
the vast majority of “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions—is well-known for its intimacy
with and operational dependence on the financial sector. Indeed, Fed reformers of both
political parties have pointed to the New York Fed as a prime example of agency capture
by financial interests. For this reason, one might expect the New York Fed to have a rel-
atively conservative board of directors—at least with respect to monetary and regulatory
policy—in spite of its “liberal” locale.
H4(a): Reserve Banks headquartered in politically conservative areas will be
governed by more conservative directorates.
H4(b): The directorates of the New York Fed will be among the most con-
servative despite the relatively liberal political environment in which it is
headquartered.
It is worth emphasizing that I do not assume bankers or the Board of Governors select
directors on the basis of political ideology. In most cases this information is unobserved
to the appointers, and even if observed institutional norms against inviting “politics” into
the Fed likely discourages explicit selection on this basis. Instead, given that the director
classes are defined primarily by the employment and financial interests of individuals—
bankers may generally only serve as Class A directors, only individuals without stock-
holding interests in regulated financial institutions may serve as Class C directors, and so
on—I expect banks and the Board of Governors will select directors on the basis of pro-
fessional characteristics. As discussed in the previous section, professional characteris-
tics are often correlated with political ideology. Any observed ideological sorting among
directors across classes or Reserve districts, then, is assumed to reflect the underlying
characteristics of the individuals (for example: bankers likely have similar professional
characteristics and are also likely to serve as Class A directors).
At the same time, it is worth noting the history of more “overt” politics circling this
domain. Archival records suggest the partisan composition of the boards was a point
of contention over which the business community lobbied the government in the Fed’s
early years. In one example, a representative of the Republican National Committee from
Missouri sent a letter to Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon in 1929 complaining about
Democrats’ dominance in the St. Louis Fed and asking Mellon to “exert an influence”
to ensure that the next Class C director was a Republican. Doing so would ensure “the
Republicans of this Reserve District can feel they are not being ignored” (see Appendix
3.7.1). In another example from 1924, a Class A director of the Kansas City Fed wrote an
op-ed in a local newspaper claiming “there isn’t a Democrat on any Federal Reserve Bank
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board in the United States to-day”8. In internal communications, the Board of Governors
replied that some Reserve Banks had no Republicans on staff and thus they could not
be accused of favoring Republicans. Similarly, Congressman Campbell Slemp (R-VA)
wrote a letter to an acquaintance at the Treasury in 1922 claiming he had heard that not
one of the Richmond Fed’s 500 employees were Republican. The letter was forwarded
to the governor (president) of the Richmond Fed, who replied that the claim was likely
inaccurate but “we have no record of the politics of any of our officers or employees.”
The president goes on to infer partisanship from employees’ race: “There are forty-four
colored people in the bank, third-two of whom are males. While I know nothing about
it, it is more than likely that some, or most, of these colored employees belong to the
Republican party.” He also defends the Bank against partisan bias by arguing that the
predominance of Democrats, if true, merely reflected the fact that the Richmond district
was majority Democrat.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Identifying Reserve Bank Directors
I examine all individuals who served on the Reserve Bank boards of directors between
1975 and 2015, roughly 4,400 director-year panel observations.9 Directors (n=995) were
identified through the Annual Reports of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Direc-
tors’ Reserve Bank, class, employer, and employer location were also recorded from the
Annual Reports.10 Additional biographical information, including birth year, education,
employment history, interest group affiliations, and political activity, was collected from
public sources and BoardEx’s database of corporate professionals. I supplement this data
with demographic and economic data for each directors’ county of residence.
Table 3.1 provides a summary of select Reserve Bank director attributes broken out
by director class and Reserve district. There is considerable variation in director charac-
teristics across both dimensions. Directors serve for an average of 4.75 years, with Class
C directors serving more than a year longer than Class A directors on average. Director
turnover is highest among the Richmond and Minneapolis boards and lowest in Dallas
and St. Louis. Roughly 13% of directors in the sample are women; they are over three
times more likely to serve as Class B or Class C directors than as Class A.11 Women held
8 National Archives and Records Administration (Group 82, Box 854)
9 Beginning the analysis in 1975 is rooted in both practical and substantive concerns. As a practical mat-
ter, donation records and digitized Fed documents are incomplete prior to the late 1970s. Substantively,
the onset of the “Volcker Revolution” in 1979—when Fed Chairman Paul Volcker drove interest rates
to unprecedented heights in order to “tame the inflationary dragon”, thereby establishing the Fed’s
credible commitment to low inflation—is considered a significant break in the institutional character
of the Fed (Schonhardt-Bailey 2013).
10 Eighteen directors in the sample changed classes during their tenure. In all cases, the director began
service as a Class B director and was subsequently appointed a Class C director to serve as chair of the
board. I also identify five directors who served nonconsecutive terms on the board of directors. In all
but one case the director was Class A.
11 By comparison, the share of women on the boards of Fortune 500 companies was 20% over this period
34
the largest share of director seats on the board of the Atlanta Fed (17%) and smallest share
on the board of the Cleveland Fed (8.5%).
The majority of directors hold advanced degrees, with an MBA being the most com-
mon. In contrast to the Board of Governors and the presidents of the Reserve Banks, only
a small minority of directors, 2.5%, holds a PhD in Economics; economist directors are
most common at the Boston Fed. With respect to employment, academics and university
administrators compose nearly 5% of the sample and are most prevalent on the New York
and Dallas boards. Directors employed in banking or finance at the time of their appoint-
ment compose 41.5% of the sample. All but one Class A director serving between 1975
and 2015 was a bank employee. A small number of Class B and Class C directors were
employees of non-bank financial firms—such as private equity, venture capital, and fi-
nancial advisory companies—at the time of the appointment. While professional bankers
on the boards of the Kansas City and Minneapolis Feds held exactly one-third of director
seats, bankers or financiers held roughly one-half of director seats at the Chicago, Min-
neapolis, and Philadelphia Feds. While much attention has been paid to Reserve Bank
presidents’ ties to Goldman Sachs, only four of the 995 individuals who have served on
the Reserve Bank boards in the last four decades have been employed by or sat on the
board of Goldman Sachs.12 Moreover, only one of these individuals was employed by
Goldman at the time of their board appointment.
Roughly 3% of directors were employed as public sector union executives or were
found to have membership in unions at some point during their professional career.
Directors with organized labor affiliations were most common on the Richmond and
Chicago boards, composing 6 and 5 percent of those Banks’ directorates, respectively.
The Atlanta Fed did not have any directors with ties to organized labor over this period.
By contrast, roughly a quarter of all directors across each class have been members of
at least one of the three primary business lobby organizations: Chamber of Commerce,
National Federation of Independent Business, and Business Roundatable. More than half
of all directors from the Atlanta Fed held membership in at least one of these groups,
compared to 12% of directors of the Chicago Fed.
A small percentage (3.6%) of directors in the sample ran for electoral office, with the
majority of these directors seeking office prior to their appointment to the Reserve Bank
boards.13 Roughly 60% of office-seeking directors ran in local electoral races, such as city
council or county executive, compared to 25% seeking a state legislature seat and 11%
seeking a federal legislative position. Herman Cain, former director of the St. Louis Fed,
is the only director to have attempted a presidential run. Overall, about 90% of office-
seeking directors won a race at some point in their career.
(Bonica 2016b).
12 See, for example: Jonathan Spicer, “Warren blasts Yellen for endorsing very white, very male regional
Fed presidents.” Reuters. June 21, 2016.
13 There is one director in sample who has served in elected office and on the board of a Reserve Bank
concurrently, political activity that is generally prohibited by the Federal Reserve’s bylaws. Exceptions
are made, however, when the position held or sought is nonpartisan and not “viewed by the local
public as partisan.” Matthew T. Doyle served as city commissioner and mayor— two nonpartisan

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.3.2 Measuring Director Ideology
Estimates of director political ideology and data on director campaign contributions were
obtained from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (Bon-
ica 2016a). Consisting of over 100 million observations, DIME consolidates records of all
FEC-reported donations to candidates, party and political committees, and other groups
in local, state, and federal elections between 1979 and 2014.14. The data includes infor-
mation on the recipient’s identity and party affiliation, the size of the donation, and the
donor’s self-reported employer, profession, and residence. As detailed in Bonica (2014),
the universe of contribution data is leveraged to estimate common-space campaign fi-
nance scores (CFscores) employing a scaling approach predicated on the assumption that
contributors are likely to donate to ideologically proximate political actors. The resulting
CFscores place individuals on a unidimensional liberal/conservative scale, with higher
values denoting greater political conservatism. I utilize the CFscore as my variable of
interest in the descriptive analyses that follow.
I linked my sample of directors to DIME using a fuzzy string matching algorithm
that returns potential matches according to similarities in name, employer, and state
of residence.15 All returned matches were manually reviewed to validate the identity
of the campaign contributors using biographical data, housing records, and other pub-
lic sources.16 Of the 995 directors who served between 1975 and 2015, 859 (86%) were
matched to DIME and 817 (82%) were assigned CFscores (CFscores are not estimated for
contributors who donated solely to corporate or trade groups).17 Tables 3.2 and 3.3 be-
low summarize the donor rates by director class and Reserve district. Class B and Class
C directors are more likely to be matched to DIME and assigned a CFscore—and thus
more likely to have donated to campaigns—than Class A directors: 77% of Class A di-
rectors in the sample donated to political campaigns between 1979 and 2014 compared to
86% and 85% of Class B and C directors. Donor rates also vary across Reserve districts.
About 90% of directors from the Chicago and Dallas Fed serving between 1975 and 2015
were assigned CFscores. By comparison, the lowest donor rates were found among direc-
tors from the Philadelphia and Minneapolis Feds, where roughly 70% of directors were
matched to DIME and assigned CFscores.
Upon matching directors to DIME, I used directors’ unique identifiers to pull records
of all campaign contributions made between the 1980 and 2014 election cycles. Reserve
Bank directors matched to DIME made roughly 55,000 campaign contributions over this
time period, 70% of which went to party affiliated candidates and groups (Democratic,
14 The FEC reports contributions to federal campaigns of at least $200, though DIME includes donations
made to state campaigns that meet lower contribution thresholds
15 The algorithm employs a Jaro-Winkler edit distance measure of string similarity though an otherwise
identical algorithm based on Levenshtein edit distance performs comparably.
16 In several cases, DIME assigns multiple identifiers to a single individual. To avoid duplicates, I selected
the identification number and corresponding CFscore associated with the contribution made closest to
the time period the individual served on the Reserve Bank board of directors.
17 I calibrated my algorithm to return matches that met a relatively strict maximum character distance
requirement. The data is thus more likely to suffer from missing director matches rather than the inclu-
sion of false matches. Accordingly, the donor rate for my sample may be interpreted as a conservative
estimate.
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A 388 321 299 77%
B 323 289 278 86%
C 284 249 240 85%
Total 995 859 817 82%
Note: The table shows the majority of directors in each class were matched to DIME and as-
signed CFscores. Column 2 lists the number of individuals who served as Reserve Bank di-
rectors between 1975 and 2015. Column 3 lists the number of directors who were matched to
DIME. Column 4 lists the number of directors who were assigned a CFscore in DIME. Column 5
provides the share of directors in each class who were matched to DIME and assigned a CFscore.










Boston 91 80 77 85%
New York 89 79 75 84%
Philadelphia 91 72 65 71%
Cleveland 82 73 71 87%
Richmond 96 88 81 84%
Atlanta 76 68 64 84%
Chicago 75 69 68 91%
St. Louis 75 60 55 73%
Minneapolis 93 70 66 71%
Kansas City 79 67 65 82%
Dallas 72 67 65 90%
San Fran 76 66 65 86%
Total 995 859 817 82%
Note: The table shows the majority of directors in each district were matched to DIME and
assigned CFscores. Column 2 lists the number of individuals who served as Reserve Bank direc-
tors between 1975 and 2015. Column 3 lists the number of directors matched to DIME. Column
4 lists the number of directors who were assigned a CFscore in DIME. Column 5 provides the
share of directors in each district who were matched to DIME and assigned a CFscore.
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Republican, and Independent). The average director made 67 contributions and the mean
donation amount was $1,400. Roughly half of all director contributions went to Senate
and House races. Directors were most likely to contribute to partisan incumbents over
challengers—56% of partisan donations compared to 17% for challengers—and to donate
to campaign winners (55% of all partisan contributions). See Appendix 3.7.4 for a sum-
mary of director contributions broken down by class and Reserve Bank.
3.3.3 Drawbacks to DIME
A critical advantage of DIME is that it provides a validated measure of political ideology
for individuals whose political leanings or policy preferences are unobservable or system-
atically incomparable across groups, time and policy issues. This has enabled scholars to
study a host of political actors for whom popular measures of ideology or preference,
such as interest group ratings or ideal points estimated according to spatial voting mod-
els, are unavailable. To date, CFscores have been used to investigate the political ideolo-
gies of doctors (Bonica, Rosenthal, and Rothman 2014), Fortune 500 executives (Bonica
2016b), and lawyers, law clerks, and judges (Bonica and Sen 2017; Bonica, Chilton, and
Sen 2016; Bonica et al. 2017). Given that Reserve Bank directors are private citizens whose
policymaking activity is largely unobserved—directors’ individual votes on the discount
rate, for example, are confidential, as are the transcripts of meetings of the boards of
directors—the methods used to estimate the policy preferences and political ideologies
of other political elites, including Reserve Bank presidents and the Board of Governors
(see, for example, Chang 2003; Chappell, McGregor, and Vermilyea 2005; McCracken
2010; Meade 2010), are generally inapplicable. DIME thus offers a valuable opportunity
to identify and compare the estimated ideological positions of political actors that operate
relatively opaquely.
As several studies have noted, however, there are significant limitations to DIME in
particular and ideological scaling measures more generally (Broockman 2016; Hill and
Huber 2017; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2017) . One common concern regarding cam-
paign contribution data is that contributions may reflect strategic considerations, such
as the desire to hedge bets or choose winners, rather than an honest revelation of ideo-
logical preference. While it is conceivable that Reserve Bank directors—whether before,
after, or during their tenure on the board—made such strategic donations, previous work
finds little evidence of this behavior, neither among the whole donorate (Bonica 2014) or
among specific subgroups (Bonica, Chilton, and Sen 2016). In particular, Bonica (2016b)
finds no evidence of strategic giving among the population of Fortune 500 directors, a
population that closely resembles the Reserve Bank boards. Among directors in my sam-
ple who made multiple contributions to partisan candidates, just 5% split their donations
between parties roughly 50-50 (in the 46% to 54% range). By comparison, about 40%
made all donations to candidates from a single party. Moreover, because few Reserve
Bank directors—less than 4% of my sample—go on to pursue political office or serve in
government, it seems less likely that a significant number of directors would have incen-
tive to contribute strategically as a means of advancing their professional ambitions or
obtaining political favor from particular candidates.
A second limitation concerns the interpretation of CFscores. As Hill and Huber (2017)
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show, CFscores are only weakly correlated with other measures of individual-level pol-
icy ideology when looking within parties. In other words, while CFscores may be reli-
able predictors of an individual’s partisan identification, they are less reliable estimates
of policy preferences. As described in the previous section, however, monetary policy
preferences are strongly and durably correlated with partisan identity, and the latent
dove-hawk monetary ideology dimension itself is strongly correlated with the liberal-
conservative political dimension.18 In the case of monetary policy in particular, then, it
may reasonable to interpret CFscores as a proxy for policy preference, though I follow
other researchers’ caution with respect to reaching this conclusion. For this analysis, I
interpret CFscores as a meaningful proxy for directors’ partisan leanings and, at most, a
suggestive signal of their economic policy preferences.
A more serious problem for this analysis may result from selection into the sample.
Because individuals will only appear in DIME if they contributed to a political campaign
or committee, any analysis of Reserve Bank director ideology may be biased to the extent
that a director’s CFscore is correlated with their likelihood of donating. Contributors, in
other words, may differ on a variety of characteristics from non-contributors. Hill and
Huber (2017), for example, find that donors tend to be wealthier, older, more educated,
less religious, less racially diverse, and more ideologically extreme than non-voters.
The extremely high donor rate in my sample gives some reason to believe that selec-
tion bias is perhaps less threatening to this analysis relative to other contexts, however. Of
the 995 directors in the sample, 86% were matched to DIME. This is comparable to the 83
percent giving rate observed among Fortune 500 executives and directors (Bonica 2016b)
and significantly higher than the rate observed among other groups, including 68% of
Obama Administration bureaucratic appointees (Bonica, Chen, and Johnson 2015), 43%
of lawyers (Bonica, Chilton, and Sen 2016), and 9% of physicians (Bonica, Rosenthal, and
Rothman 2014). The Reserve Bank director donor rate also dwarfs the share of donors
among the voting-age population between 1980 and 2014, which averaged less than 2
percent across this period. In short, the vast majority of Reserve Bank directors donated
to a political campaign or committee at least once; 60% of the sample donated at least 20
times over the 40-year period. Among the directors who were not matched to the con-
tribution data, moreover, a disproportionate number had terms that expired before 1980.
Given that the DIME data does not begin until 1980, some of the directors appear to be
unmatched because they died prior to, or soon after, the 1980 election cycle. The remain-
ing unmatched directors are distributed relatively equally across time and Reserve Banks,
though nearly half of the unmatched directors are Class A (see Appendix 3.7.2).
Nevertheless, I try to address potential selection bias in my regression analysis in Sec-
tion 3.5 with a two-stage Heckman selection model. The Heckman model allows for cor-
18 The durability of partisanship allays an additional concern regarding time invariance. CFscores are
static measures and thus do not allow observation of potential changes in contributor ideology over
time. While there is ample evidence of partisanship stability over adulthood, I interrogate this issue
more thoroughly by examining the donation behavior of directors who donated to at least 8 distinct
Democratic or Republican party candidates both before and after their Reserve Bank board service
(n=288). Directors contribute to ideologically similar political candidates before and after their board
service (corr=0.8). A t-test of differences between pre- and post-service candidate CFscores is not
significant (p-value=0.4).
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rection of biased parameter estimates by accounting for the likelihood that an individual
selects into the sample. In the first-stage equation, I estimate a probit model in which the
dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a director was matched to DIME. On
the right hand side, I include variables that are likely correlated with a director’s decision
to donate, such as their gender, education, profession, and geographic location. Follow-
ing Bonica and Sen (2015), I include a variable in the selection equation that measures the
number of elected executive positions in each director’s state of residence. This variable
serves as an instrument to aid with identification of the selection model.19 A correction
factor computed from the first-stage probit model is then included in the second-stage
equation, which models the effect of directors’ attributes on their ideology scores. I re-
port the results from the first-stage model in Appendix 3.7.3. The second-stage results are
discussed in Section 3.5.
3.4 Descriptive Results
For the following analyses, I subset the sample to directors who made campaign contri-
butions to at least eight distinct candidates or committees between 1975 and 2015 (n=475).
CFscores are estimated most reliably for contributors with about eight distinct donations
(Bonica 2016a) and I adopt this cutoff with the aim of presenting a conservative analysis.20
3.4.1 The Political Ideologies of Reserve Bank Directors
To begin, I examine the overall distribution of Reserve Bank director ideologies. Figure
3.1 displays a density curve of CFscores of all directors in the subsetted sample with the
ideal points of prominent party figures demarcated along the horizontal axis for reference.
Note that the DIME data is not complete for the 2016 election cycle, so the ideal point of
Donald Trump is computed from his position as a campaign contributor, rather than candi-
date, through the 2014 election cycle.21 The distribution is right-leaning though bimodal,
with liberal Reserve Bank directors centered around a CFscore of -0.70 on the left side of
19 As discussed in Bonica and Sen (2015), the number of elected state executives (e.g. governor, attorney
general, secretary of state, etc.) is likely affects a director’s propensity to donate—if you live in a
state with more elected state executives, there will be more electoral races to which you may donate—
but not their ideology score. Similar to Bonica and Sen’s application, the state electeds instrument is
correlated—though, weakly–with whether a director is matched to DIME (corr=0.11) but not correlated
with a director’s CFscore (corr=0.06).
20 For robustness, I also ran the analysis using the full sample of directors with CFscores (n=817), direc-
tors who made contributions to at least 25 distinct recipients, directors who exclusively contributed
to presidential candidates, directors who exclusively contributed prior to serving on the Reserve Bank
boards, directors who made at least 50 total contributions, and utilizing a binary measure of ideology
based on whether the director’s CFscore falls below or above zero. The basic patterns are consistent
across all subsamples, though I detect statistically significant differences in director ideology between
more Reserve districts and director classes when using larger samples, likely due to greater statistical
power. Despite the more significant differences I uncover using the larger sample, I analyze the smaller
sample here as a means of establishing a lower bound on observed trends.
21 Trump’s CFscore for 2016 is undoubtedly much higher, given his support among ideologically conser-
vative individuals and groups during the presidential election.
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the spectrum—roughly the same position as the current Senate Minority Leader, Chuck
Schumer (D-NY, CFscore= -0.68)—and a greater density of directors centered around a
CFscore of 0.9 on the right side, to the right of Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
(R-KY, CFscore=0.7). Ideological “extremists” are clustered on the right side of the scale.
No Reserve Bank director over this time period was as liberal as Senator Bernie Sanders
(D-VT, CFscore= -1.73) or Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA, CFscore= -1.57), though sev-
eral directors have been more conservative than the most conservative sitting senator, Ted
Cruz (R-TX, CFscore=1.30), and also more conservative than recently retired senators and
well-known Fed foes Ron Paul (CFscore=1.487) and Rand Paul (CFscore=1.39).
The mean CFscore, denoted by the dashed gray line, is 0.33, and the median CFscore,
denoted by the solid gray line, is 0.57. Relative to the mean (CFscore= -0.05) and me-
dian (CFscore=0.07) of all individual donors in DIME, Reserve Bank director donors are
significantly more conservative.22 In the terms of the current Congress, the ideologies
of the mean and median Reserve Bank directors approximate the ideological positions
of the “moderate” wing of Republicans in the Senate, falling between the ideal points of
Olympia Snowe (R-ME, CFscore=0.28) and Lisa Murkowski (R-AK, CFscore=0.58). Di-
rectors’ relative conservatism is reflected in their share of donations going to Republican
candidates or committees: 64% of all directors’ partisan contributions went to the GOP;
in presidential races; 70% of all directors’ contributions went to Republican candidates.
To provide further context, Figure 3.2 compares Reserve Bank directors against two
theoretically similar populations: FOMC members and Fortune 500 directors. For the
FOMC, roughly 75% of Federal Reserve governors and 42% of Reserve Bank presidents
who served between 1975 and 2015 were matched to DIME and assigned a CFscore. While
these samples are small, they nonetheless suggest ideological differences when compared
with Reserve Bank directors. The distribution of directors is more right-leaning, and thus
more conservative, than the distribution of FOMC members, as confirmed by a two-
sample K-S test (D=0.21, p=0.02).23 This difference is driven primarily by governors,
however: the mean and median CFscores of governors (-0.18 and -0.09, respectively) are
significantly less conservative than that of directors. The distribution of Federal Reserve
governors over this period is clearly bimodal, reflecting the even split of governors’ par-
tisan affiliations in the sample (half were appointed by Democratic administrations and
half were appointed by Republicans). In contrast, the distribution of Reserve Bank presi-
dent ideology looks similar to the ideological distribution of Reserve Bank directors. The
mean Reserve Bank president in the sample (CFscore=0.28) is only slightly less conser-
vative than the mean Reserve Bank director. K-S tests confirm that governors are sig-
nificantly less conservative than directors (p=0.002) while observed differences between
president and director ideologies are not statistically significant (p=0.7)24. These results
22 Directors are also more conservative than the population of donors residing within the congressional
districts represented by candidates that received donations from directors (mean CFscore=0.2, median
CFscore=0.26).
23 A t-test of the difference in means between the ideologies and directors and governors yields the same
conclusion (p=0.02). I report K-S test results, however, simply because K-S tests require fewer assump-
tions about the underlying distribution of my data.
24 I use a Holm adjustment, which controls for Type I errors induced from making multiple comparisons,
to adjust p-values.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Reserve Bank Director CFscores. The dashed
gray line denotes the mean and the solid gray line denotes the median.
The ideal points of prominent politicians are provided along the x-axis;
note that unlike the other politicians listed, the ideal point of Donald
Trump is computed from his history of campaign contributions, rather
than as a recipient of contributions as a candidate for office (the DIME
data includes records through the 2014 election cycle). The distribution
of director CFscores leans to the right, suggesting a greater density of
politically conservative directors.
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are consistent with theories of political appointments that presume agents appoint direc-
tors that are ideologically similar. Governors of the Federal Reserve Board are Senate-
confirmed presidential appointees and as a consequence the governor population should
represent both ends of the ideological spectrum. This is reflected neatly in the bimodality
of the distribution of governor ideologies and in the “moderate” (i.e. near zero) mean
CFscore. Reserve Bank presidents are selected by Reserve Bank directors; that their ide-
ological distribution and mean donor mirror that of directors is unsurprising. In fact, it
suggests a simple explanation for why we observe Reserve Bank presidents with conser-
vative voting records in the FOMC (see, for example, Woolley 1984; Chappell, Havrilesky





























(b) Fortune 500 Ideology
Figure 3.2: Ideological Distributions of Reserve Bank Directors vs. FOMC Mem-
bers and Fortune 500 Directors. Directors are on average more conservative than
governors of the Federal Reserve Board and directors of Fortune 500 companies.
Turning to the Fortune 500, Figure 3b plots the distribution of Reserve Bank director
ideologies against the directors of Fortune 500 companies as identified by Bonica (2016).25
The shapes of the distributions share a resemblance, a result that may be explained in
part by the overlap between the two samples: roughly 10% of directors in my sample
are found in Bonica’s sample.26 Reserve Bank directors are more conservative than For-
tune 500 directors and executives, however. The mean and median ideologies among
25 Bonica (2016) analyzes the ideologies of both the directors and executives of the Fortune 500. I fo-
cus solely on the Fortune 500 directors and, following his analysis, subset the sample of Fortune 500
directors to those who made more than 25 total (not necessarily distinct) contributions.
26 The overlap increases to 13% when considering Reserve Bank directors who were CEOs or Chairmen
or Fortune 500 companies.
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Reserve Bank directors are about twice as large as the mean (CFscore=0.13) and median
ideologies (CFscore=0.31) among the Fortune 500. A K-S test confirms the distributional
differences between the two groups (D=0.16, p¡0.01). Even when looking only at Class C
directors, those most likely to serve on Fortune 500 boards—16% of Class C directors in
my sample have served as Fortune 500 directors—there are significant distributional dif-
ferences (D=0.14, p¡0.01). Overall, like Reserve Bank directors, Fortune 500 directors are
on average “moderately” conservative relative the average campaign donor in the popu-
lation. They are less conservative as a group, however, than the directors that oversee the
Reserve Banks.
As a final inquiry into the overall distribution of director ideologies, Figure 3.3 plots
the mean and median ideal point for each cohort of directors serving each year between
1975 and 2015. That is, each point takes the average (and median) CFscore of all Re-
serve Banks directors serving in a given year.27 I use the panel data—each row denoting
a director-year observation—and subset it to include only those directors with CFscores
estimated from at least eight distinct campaign contributions (n=2,272). The gray shaded
bars in the figure denote years in which Democratic appointees composed a majority on
the Board of Governors. As the figure shows, director cohorts have become less conser-
vative over time. The most conservative boards in this time period served at the end of
the Carter Administration and the beginning of the Reagan presidency. From these peaks
director cohorts have generally become less conservative, with the average cohort CFs-
core falling close to zero during the Obama Administration. Indeed, the boards serving
during the 2008-2015 period were the least conservative in the sample. The decline in
director ideology over time is reflected in the selection of less conservative directors over
time: between 1980 and 2015, the average ideology of newly appointed directors—those
directors serving their first year on the board—declined steadily (see Appendix 3.7.5).















Figure 3.3: Mean and Median Director CFscore, 1975-2015. The gray
bars denote years in which Democratic appointees composed a majority
on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Directors have become less
conservative over time.
One concern is that the small number of directors with CFscores in the 1970s and early
1980s is biasing the mean ideology upward and exaggerating the decline in cohort CFs-
cores over time. The average number of directors in the sample each year is 56. In the
first decade of my sample, n is smaller—about 35 directors/annually, or half the average
annual sample of directors serving in the 2000s. The magnitude of the decline persists,
however, after truncating the sample to exclude directors serving before 1990. The aver-
age cohort CFscore fell by 73% (.31 point) between 1990 and 2015, only slightly smaller
than the 75% decline (0.33 point) observed between 1975 and 2015. Alternatively, the de-
cline in director CFscores may simply be an artifact of the CFscore estimation procedure,
reflecting a secular decline in all estimated ideal points over this time period. While I find
some evidence of this when examining the ideology of all political candidates receiving
campaign contributions, the decline is more muted than the one observed for Reserve
Bank directors: the average CFscore of candidates declined by 0.08 points (44%) between
the 1980 and 2014 electoral cycles. Using dynamic CFscore measures, which are estimated
separately for political candidates for each electoral cycle, the decline is .11 points (50%).
Thus despite finding evidence of a decline in average ideal points for political candidates,
the ideal points of Reserve Bank directors appear to have fallen more dramatically over
the last four decades.
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I do not find a relationship between director ideology and the partisan makeup of the
Board of Governors. As Table 3.4 shows, regressing director CFscores on a binary in-
dicator for Democratic-majority Boards of Governors produces a negative coefficient on
the dummy variable but it is not statistically significant.28 This is true when running the
analysis with only Class C directors, who are appointed directly by the Board of Gover-
nors.29 While this is a very simple test of the hypothesis and the within-year sample sizes
are fairly small, the failure to uncover a relationship between the partisan affiliation of
the Board of Governors and the ideology of Class C directors may suggest that governors
do not view the selection of Reserve Bank directors with a partisan lens. As I discuss in
greater detail below, Class C directors are still relatively conservative when compared to
the modal donor in the U.S and a vast majority (72%) come from business. Thus while
governors’ voting behavior and speech in the FOMC may be shaped by their political
ideology as established in the literature, ideological or partisan decisionmaking may not
extend to governors’ other responsibilities, such as appointing Reserve Bank directors.
Moreover, anecdotal accounts suggest Class C directors appointments are handled by a
specific division in the Federal Reserve—the Reserve Bank Operations and Payments Sys-
tems (“RBOPS”)—along with a subset of governors sitting on the Federal Reserve Board’s
Committee on Reserve Bank Affairs. If governor partisanship or political ideology is in
fact related to the ideology of Class C directors, one may have to look at the partisan
composition of the Committee on Reserve Bank Affairs or the identity of the RBOPS Di-
vision leader rather than the whole Board. In short, more information on the process by
which the Board of Governors makes it Class C director appointments would aid both
the interpretation and formulation of theoretical expectations regarding the relationship
between the ideology of the Board of Governors and the ideology of the agents they select
to oversee the Reserve Banks.
3.4.2 Variation in Director Ideology, Across Class
Figure 3.4 displays the density curves of director CFscores stratified by class. The gray
dashed and solid lines denote the CFscores of the mean and median directors, respec-
tively. Each distribution is right leaning, with the greatest density of conservative donors
in the Class A distribution. The ideological distribution of Class C directors is more
clearly bimodal, with greater density to the left of the scale relative to the other classes.
To more clearly assess differences across class, I plot the mean ideology of each di-
rector class in Figure 3.5. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The figure appears
28 I lag the indicator forward since new directors appointed to serve in year t are selected late in the
previous year, t-1. For example, if the Board of Governors became Democratic majority at the start
of 2000, their selections for Class C directors would not begin service until the start of 2001. This of
course ignores mid-year director appointments due to resignation or deaths, though these compose a
minority of the sample.
29 I also do not find a relationship when running the analysis with the sample of Class C newcomers, i.e.
Class C directors serving their first year. Statistical power may be especially problematic here given the
small sample size: of the 134 Class C “newcomers,” just one-fifth were selected by Democratic-majority
governors. Overall, Democratic-appointee governors held a majority on the Board of Governors for























Figure 3.4: Distribution of Reserve Bank Directors CFscores, by Class.
The gray dashed line denotes the mean and the gray solid line denotes
the median. Class A has the greatest density of directors on the right
side of the ideological spectrum, while Class C has the least. The distri-
butions become increasingly bimodal as one moves from Class A to to
Class C.
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Table 3.4: Relationship Between Director Ideology










Residual Std. Error 0.72 (df = 2270)
F Statistic 0.16 (df = 1; 2270)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
consistent with the hypotheses laid out in Section 3.2: Class A directors (bankers) are more
conservative than their non-banker Class B and Class C colleagues. Class B directors also
appear to be more conservative on average than Class C directors, the only individuals
not selected by bankers, though this difference is not statistically significant. For context,
the mean CFscore of Class A directors (0.48) falls to the right of Senator Susan Collins’
(R-ME, CFscore=0.44). The ideal points of the average Class B (0.30) and Class C (0.22)
directors fall to both sides of Collins’ colleague Senator Olympia Snowe (0.28). Summary
statistics for the class means are reported in Appendix 3.7.7.
Distinctions between the director classes are also visible in their contribution behav-
ior. More than 70% of Class A directors’ partisan contributions between 1980 and 2014
were given to Republican candidates and committees, compared to 61% and 63% of Class
B and C directors’ contributions, respectively.30 Though Class A directors were more
likely to donate to Republican affiliates relative to the other classes, they are less active
and less generous contributors. Class A directors made about 33 contributions per in-
dividual, with an average donation of $926, compared to 53 contributions (average do-
nation=$1,458) for Class B directors and 66 contributions (average donation=$1,654) for
Class C directors.
The across-class analysis underscores Class A directors’ distinctiveness. Particularly
when compared to Class C directors, but also with respect to their fellow banker-appointed
Class B colleagues, Class A directors appear to be more conservative on average, reflect-
ing the greater number of conservative-leaning directors in their ranks. These results
suggest that Class A directors’ relative conservatism is likely explained by the fact that all
30 For the entire donor population over this period, about 53% of FEC-reported contributions were to















Figure 3.5: Mean Director Ideology, by Class. The error bars denote
95% confidence intervals. Class A directors are more conservative than
Class B and Class C directors.
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Class A directors share the same profession—and one generally prohibited among Class
B and C directors: banking. Banks, when allowed to elect one of their own to sit on the
Reserve Bank board, select individuals that happen to be more politically conservative
relative to those they elect when they are prohibited from appointing a banker. Inter-
estingly, the ideological similarity between Class B and Class C directors suggests that
the participation of the Board of Governors in the Reserve Bank director appointment
process may not necessarily engender greater ideological diversity among the Reserve
Bank boards—a key objective, at least as it relates to economic policy, motivating the Fed-





























Figure 3.6: Mean Director CFscore, 1975-2015, by Class. Each panel dis-
plays the mean CFscore for each class of directors, each year. The blue
lines are loess smoothing functions and the gray bands are confidence
intervals. Average CFscores have fallen for each director class, but the
decline has been the most pronounced among Class B directors.
Finally, to get a sense for how the ideological positions of the director classes may have
changed over time, Figure 3.6 displays the average CFscore for each cohort of directors
serving in a particular year, broken down by director class. Each mean has declined over
time, but the trend is most pronounced among Class B directors: the average CFscore for
Class B directors serving during the Obama Administration is about 0.6 point lower than
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for Class B directors serving around the end of the Carter Administration. One poten-
tial explanation for this differential decline is that gains in occupational diversity among
the Reserve Bank directorates—a response to persistent pressure from Fed reformers in
Congress—have largely come from Class B directors (Fessenden and Richardson 2016).
I find some evidence of this in my sample: the percentage of Class B directors working
in business (all sectors) has fallen from over 80% in the 1970s to 65% in the 2000s. At
the same time, the percentage of lawyers, union executives, and nonprofit executives that
have been elected as Class B directors has grown. By contrast, the share of business ex-
ecutives serving Class C directors has grown while the share of lawyers, academic, and
union executives has fallen (see Appendix 3.7.6).
3.4.3 Variation in Director Ideology, Across Reserve District
Next, I explore the distributions of Reserve Bank director CFscores across the twelve Re-
serve districts. Figure 3.7 presents histograms of the distributions of director ideal points
for each Reserve Bank. As the figure shows, there is a striking degree of distributional di-
versity. While several Reserve Banks—Cleveland, Kansas City, and Dallas, for example—
are strongly right leaning, others—such as Philadelphia and San Francisco—are more
bimodal. New York, interestingly, appears almost unimodal, while Boston is rare in its
leftward alignment.
To more clearly observe the relative conservatism of each bank, Figure 3.8 compares
the mean ideal points for each Reserve district, ranking them from least to most conserva-
tive. The error bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Several things stand out. First, two
Reserve Banks over the 1975-2015 period have directorates with CFscores that average
below zero: Boston and New York.31 The mean CFscore for Boston Fed directorates (CF-
score=0.436) is in the vicinity of the ideal points of former senators Max Baucus (D-MT)
and Robert Byrd (D-WV), well-known “moderate” Democrats. Similarly, the average
New York Fed directorate CFscore (-0.17) is in the vicinity of another former moderate
Democratic senator, Ben Nelson (D-NE). The New York Fed’s relatively liberal direc-
torate is fairly surprising given the bank’s well-documented intimacy with Wall Street
(and thus, presumably, with inflation-averse banking interests). Second, on the other end
of the ideological scale, the Kansas City and Minneapolis Reserve Banks have the most
conservative directorates overall. The average CFscores of the Kansas City directorate
(0.81) and Minneapolis directorate (0.79) place them in the vicinity of former senator Kit
Bond (R-MO). Between the two least and most conservative directorates, there is a fair
amount of ideological uniformity among the other Reserve Bank boards.
Consistent with the CFscore rankings, the directors of the Kansas City and Minneapo-
lis Feds gave the highest share of contributions, about 80%, to Republican candidates
and committees between 1980 and 2014. The directors of the Boston Fed gave by far the
lowest share to Republicans: only 19% of Boston director contributions went to the GOP,
well below the next-lowest shares of Republican contributions, 54% and 55%, made by
directors from the St. Louis and New York Feds, respectively. Directors from the Dallas
31 The difference is even more pronounced when comparing median CFscores across Reserve Banks. See
Appendix 3.7.7.
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of Reserve Bank Directors CFscores, by Bank
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Fed were both the most active and the most generous contributors relative to the other
districts. The Philadelphia Fed had the least active contributors, while the Minneapolis







































































Figure 3.8: Mean Director Ideology, by Reserve Bank. The error bars
denote 95% confidence intervals.
To test whether Reserve Banks headquartered in politically conservative cities are
overseen by relatively conservative directorates, I run a bivariate OLS model using the
Republican presidential election vote share in the headquarter city’s county as the inde-
pendent variable. I average the GOP vote share across each presidential election from
1976 through 2012. Table 3.5 shows there is a statistically significant positive relation-
ship between a Reserve Bank county’s average GOP vote share and the CFscores of the
Reserve Bank’s directors. A percentage point increase in GOP presidential vote share is
associated with a 0.02 point increase in CFscores.32 The results confirm a simple story of
geographical selection: Reserve Banks in conservative areas have larger pools of conser-
vatives from which directors are selected. It is worth noting, however, that this effect size
32 As an alternative, I also test for the relationship between director CFscores and a population-weighted
average of GOP vote share across all counties in each Reserve district. To create this Reserve district-
level measure, I compile a list of all counties in each Reserve district (Reserve Bank districts cross state
lines but do not cross county borders). I then aggregate GOP vote totals across all counties in each
Reserve district. I find a 1 percentage point increase in Reserve district GOP presidential vote share
is associated with a 0.03 point increase in director CFscores. The coefficient is significant at the 0.001
level.
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is likely muted by the fact that all of the Reserve Banks are located in relatively liberal
urban areas.33 In Missouri, for example, St. Louis City (an independently incorporated
city) and Jackson County, home of Kansas City, were two of the three counties to vote
for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election; the other 111 Missouri counties voted for Don-
ald Trump. Indeed, St. Louis City and Jackson County have voted Democratic in every
presidential election since 1976. Richmond City and Dallas County were the only Reserve
Bank headquarters where the GOP presidential vote share averaged more than 50% over
the last 40 years, and even in these cases the average GOP vote share was below 60%.











Residual Std. Error 0.68 (df = 473)
F Statistic 56.33∗∗∗ (df = 1; 473)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
As a further illustration, Figure 3.9 compares scatter plots of the relationship between
GOP vote share and CFscores for (a) counties in which Reserve Banks are headquar-
tered and (b) counties in which Reserve Bank directors reside.34 The blue lines are loess
smoothers with 95% confidence intervals. For both plots I assigned the GOP vote share
for the closest presidential election to the start of a director’s tenure; if the director’s
tenure overlapped with more than one presidential election, I took the average GOP vote
share. As the left panel shows, Reserve Bank headquarter counties are most frequently
Republican-minority. Directors live in counties that are more evenly distributed, how-
ever: the observations in the second panel are less clustered on the left side of the plot
than observations in the first panel. In both cases there is a positive relationship between
the the GOP presidential vote share and directors’ ideology. As the GOP vote share in-
creases, directors have higher (i.e. more conservative) CFscores.
33 Controlling for the county’s percent of the population living in urban areas only reduces the magnitude
of the GOP vote share coefficient slightly, and it remains statistically significant.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20 40 60 80





(b) Reserve Bank Director Home Counties
Figure 3.9: Relationship between Director CFscores and GOP Presidential Vote
Share. Panel A measures GOP vote share in the counties in which the 12 Reserve
Banks are headquartered. Panel B measures GOP vote share in the counties in
which Reserve Bank directors reside. The counties in which the Reserve Banks
are headquartered are generally counties with GOP vote share below 50%. The
counties directors reside in are more ideologically diverse.
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Finally, to give a sense of how each Reserve Bank’s ideology may have changed over
time, Figure 3.10 displays the average CFscore of directors in each Reserve district since
1975. Data is pooled by decade (e.g. 1975-1985). The figure shows that the majority of
directorates saw declines in average director CFscores over the last four decades. In par-
ticular, the directors of the San Francisco Fed have grown significantly less conservative
over time. Between 1975 and 1985, the San Francisco Fed directorate was the third-most
conservative, behind Minneapolis and Kansas City; between 2005 and 2015, the San Fran-
cisco Fed directorate is the second-most liberal, behind Boston. Only three Reserve Banks
saw slight increases in director conservatism relative to the 1975-1985 decade: New York,
Richmond, and Chicago. Overall, the pattern suggests the decline in the average director
CFscore since 1975 is mirrored at the Reserve district-level.
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Figure 3.10: Mean Director CFscore, 1975-2015, by Bank. Each panel displays the
mean CFscore for each Reserve Bank board, for each decade (1975-1985, 1986-
1995, 1996-2005, and 2006-2015.) Most Reserve Banks saw a slight decline in
average directorate ideology over the last four decades.
3.5 Regression Results
The preceding section described the distribution of the raw data and explored variation in
director CFscores broken out by director class and Reserve Bank. In this section I evaluate
the observed differences in director ideology taking into account directors’ biographical
characteristics. I estimate the following models for class and district variation:
Yi = β0 + β1(class) + β2[biographical] + β3[county] + ei (3.1)
Yi = β0 + β1(district) + β2[biographical] + β3[county] + ei (3.2)
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Yi denotes the CFscore for each director i. Biographical is a vector of individual-level
traits for each director, including their profession, level of education, gender, and elected
office experience. County is a vector of demographic and economic covariates for the
director’s county of residence. I average the county-level data over the years of the direc-
tor’s tenure; for instance, if the director served between 1990 and 1995, I take the average
of the economic and demographic variables between 1990 and 1995. β1 in each model is
the coefficient on the variable of interest: director class and Reserve district. To clearly il-
lustrate determinants of director ideology across each dimension, I estimate the class and
Reserve district models separately. As discussed in Section 3.3.3, I correct the multivariate
regression estimates for sample selection bias using a two-step Heckman model.35
Table 3.6 presents the results for the director class model, where director class is the
independent variable of interest and director CFscore is the outcome.36 Class A direc-
tors are the reference group. Given the strong correlation between the class distinctions
and director profession categories—for example, the correlation between being a Class A
director and a banker is 0.96—I exclude profession dummies from the models. Model 1
presents the simple bivariate relationship between director class and CFscores. Model 2
adds indicators for gender, age, and education.37. Model 3 adds county-level indicators
to control for directors’ areas of residence. I report robust standard errors for all models.
The bivariate results in Model 1 confirm the CFscores of Class B and Class A directors
are lower than the average ideal point of Class A directors: Class C directors’ CFscores
are .31 point lower (p¡0.001) than the Class A mean. Class B directors’ CFscores are 0.19
point lower (p=0.001). The results hold when controlling for directors’ individual charac-
teristics, though the difference in CFscores between Class A and Class B directors is now
greater than the difference between Class A and Class C directors. The results also show
that male directors have higher CFscores on average than women and directors with JDs
have significantly lower CFscores than directors without JDs. The age a director was ap-
pointed, a director’s membership in a business interest group (Chamber of Commerce,
Business Roundtable, or NFIB), and whether a director ran for elected office do not have
statistically significant effects on CFscores.
Adding controls for GDP of the director’s state of residence, the county GOP vote
share, and percent of the county population that resides in urban areas, the coefficient on
Class B directors remains statistically significant. The coefficients on GOP vote share and
real GDP are also significant. Consistent with results in the previous section, a percentage-
point increase in the GOP vote share in a director’s county is associated with a 0.02 in-
crease in CFscores. States with higher GDP are also associated with lower CFscores.
The results suggest that while Class B directors are less conservative than Class A
directors on average, and Class C directors are less conservative than Class B directors,
after controlling for directors’ personal characteristics Class C director ideology does not
appear much different than Class A director ideology. Class B directors, however, are less
35 For both the class and district OLS models, the uncorrected results are similar to the corrected results,
suggesting little selection bias in the analysis. The Inverse Mills Ratio is not significant in either model.
36 Note for space the table excluded some non-significant biographical variables.
37 I also include variables denoting whether a director changed classes during their tenure and whether
the director held a top management position (chairman, CEO, or president). These variables are not
statistically significant in any model and I do not report them here
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Class B −0.19∗∗ −0.29∗ −0.27∗
(0.06) (0.13) (0.12)












No/2-year college 0.20 0.04
(0.22) (0.22)
Business Group Member 0.11 0.14
(0.08) (0.08)
Elected Office Run −0.12 −0.22
(0.18) (0.19)
log(Real State GDP) −0.08∗
(0.04)




Constant 0.47∗∗∗ 0.34 0.80
(0.04) (0.41) (0.62)
Observations 802 749 671
R2 0.03 0.11 0.23
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.09 0.21
ρ −0.97 −1.14
Inverse Mills Ratio −0.83 (0.70) −0.99 (0.68)
Note: Class A is the reference group. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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conservative as a group than Class A directors, even if they have similar educational back-
grounds and live in similar areas. The findings are interesting considering that Class B
and Class C directors have similar professional and educational backgrounds; one would
expect that Class C directors would be at least as liberal as Class B directors controlling
for directors’ individual traits. Future research on the election of Class A and B directors
should provide more insight into the pool of individuals that are nominated to serve as
directors for each class.
Table 3.7 presents the OLS results of the relationship between the Reserve Banks (dummy
coded) and CFscores. The reference group is the Richmond Fed, which falls in the middle
of the Reserve Banks in terms of the ideology of its directors. The bivariate results from
Model 1 confirm that relative to the Richmond Fed, the Boston, New York, and Philadel-
phia Feds have significantly lower average CFscores. The average CFscore for Boston’s
directorate, the least conservative in the sample by far, is nearly 3/4 of a point lower than
Richmond’s mean ideal point (CFscore=0.44). The directorates overseeing the Minneapo-
lis, Kansas City, and Dallas Feds are more conservative than the directors overseeing
Richmond Fed. Overall, I find statistically significant pairwise differences for 36/66 Re-
serve Bank pairs, including between the boards of the Kansas City and St. Louis Feds, the
only Reserve Banks headquartered in the same state.
When controlling for education, profession, and other personal characteristics, Model
2 shows the negative coefficients on the Boston and New York Feds remain statistically
significant, as do the positive coefficients on the Kansas City and Minneapolis Feds. In
this model, directors with PhDs and JDs have less conservative ideologies than directors
without PhDs or JDs.38 Directors employed as union and nonprofit executives are also
significantly less conservative. As with the class model, being male and being appointed
to the Reserve Bank boards at a later age are associated with more conservative ideolo-
gies. The results hold when adding controls for state GDP, county GOP vote share, and
the percent of the county living in urban areas, though the statistical significance of the
coefficients on Minneapolis and Kansas City are eliminated.
Taken together, the district models underscore the relative liberalness of the Boston
and New York Fed directors. These directors are significantly less conservative than the
median Reserve Bank even after controlling for directors’ backgrounds and geographic
characteristics. The results also confirm that directors employed in industries beyond
banking and business—law, academia, organized labor, and nonprofit institutions—are
generally less conservative.39 Greater occupational diversity on the Reserve Bank boards,
a core demand of progressive groups focused on Reserve Bank governance reform, may
38 While directors with PhDs in Economics compose a small part of my sample—there are only 25 of
them—having an Economics PhD is associated with being less conservative. This is in contrast to
previous literature on central banker ideology where having an Economics PhD, like having financial
sector experience, is generally an indication of greater conservatism, at least with respect to mone-
tary and regulatory policy. While CFscores do not measure ideology across different policy spaces,
the negative coefficient on PhD economists may reflect the general conservatism of the population of
directors—the vast majority of whom have experience in the financial sector or private industry.
39 Among business executives, I observe some variation in ideology when breaking business out by sec-
tor. Directors working in energy, mining, and natural resources tend to be more conservative relative
to other sectors, while directors working in real estate and construction tend to be less conservative.
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Atlanta 0.12 0.12 0.13
(0.10) (0.13) (0.12)
Boston −0.74∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗ −0.80∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Chicago −0.06 −0.09 −0.01
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Cleveland 0.17 0.09 0.16
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
Dallas 0.25∗ 0.14 0.27
(0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
Kansas City 0.28∗∗ 0.31∗ 0.12
(0.10) (0.14) (0.14)
Minneapolis 0.33∗∗ 0.37∗ 0.18
(0.12) (0.17) (0.17)
New York −0.51∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗ −0.27∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Philadelphia −0.22∗ −0.16 −0.16
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12)
San Francisco −0.12 −0.08 0.04
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13)










Union Exec. −1.11∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.27)
Nonprofit Exec. −0.69∗∗ −0.53∗∗
(0.21) (0.20)
log(Real State GDP) −0.12∗∗∗
(0.04)




Constant 0.36∗∗∗ −0.07 1.03∗
(0.07) (0.31) (0.49)
Observations 802 749 671
R2 0.18 0.35 0.39
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.32 0.35
ρ −0.81 −0.61
Inverse Mills Ratio −0.55 (0.36) −0.37 (0.30)
Note: Richmond is the reference bank. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.00162
thus also result in moving the average ideal point of Reserve Bank directors to the left.
3.6 Conclusion
Reserve Bank directors are political actors and their decisions have important policy im-
plications, both in terms of how the Fed makes monetary policy and the efficacy of the
Fed as a financial regulator. Given directors’ responsibilities for managing Reserve Bank
operations, selecting Reserve Banks presidents, and structuring the bounds of discount
rate policy, who governs the Reserve Banks is thus a fundamental question of policy rel-
evance. This chapter aimed to provide a comprehensive investigation into who governs
the Reserve Banks by documenting the biographical characteristics and political ideolo-
gies of Reserve Bank directors since 1975.
I show that the directors who govern the Reserve Banks are politically engaged and
relatively conservative. Directors are more likely to donate to political campaigns, more
likely to donate to Republican candidates, and more conservative than the average cam-
paign donor in the United States. In particular, bankers elected by local banks (Class A
directors) are more conservative than their non-banker counterparts, even after control-
ling for director’s individual characteristics. I also find that the directors of the Boston and
New York Reserve Banks are significantly less conservative than the directorates of the 10
other Reserve Banks, and indeed are the only directorates to have average ideal points
that fall on the “liberal” side of the ideological scale. Lastly, I show that directors have
become less conservative over time. Directors serving during the Obama Administration
are the least conservative director cohorts to have served in the last 40 years.
While these findings are primarily descriptive, they are the first to establish the polit-
ical leanings, and potential policy preferences, of the powerful and often inconspicuous
political actors that govern the “private” arm of the Fed. Below, I suggest several exten-
sions that would contribute to a research agenda on Reserve Bank governance.
First, future work should attempt to tie director ideologies to observable policy out-
comes in order to better gauge the relevance of director identity and ideology to the pol-
icymaking process. The analysis presented here hints at one consequence of directors’
conservatism: they select conservative Reserve Bank presidents. Indeed, Reserve Bank
presidents serving as conservative counterweights in the FOMC is a well-established
empirical finding (Woolley 1984; Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor 1993; Meade and
Sheets 2005), and this analysis provides an intuitive explanation for why this might be the
case: the conservative bias among Reserve Bank presidents is reflected in the directorates
as well. It follows that Dodd-Frank’s exclusion of Class A directors, the most conservative
of the bunch, from the Reserve Bank president selection process could presumably result
in the appointment of less conservative Reserve Bank presidents going forward. Future
work could exploit this institutional change with an interrupted time-series design to get
leverage on this research question. While the recentness of the change coupled with pres-
idents’ relatively long terms poses some data challenges, this kind of study is appealing
because it engages directly with questions of whether reforms aimed at eliminating the
influence of banks—and a perceived threat of “capture”—are effective.
Beyond the appointment of Reserve Bank presidents, the opacity of directors’ policy
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activity means there are few available data sources that can be leveraged to explore the
effect of director ideology on policy outcomes. Discount rate recommendations, however,
are one promising option. Do less conservative boards, like those governing the Boston
Fed, recommend lower discount rates relative to other Reserve Bank boards? Does the
overall decline in director ideology observed in this analysis track with less hawkish dis-
count rate recommendations over time? Regulatory enforcement actions may be another
viable data source to tie director ideology to policy outcomes. Though directors are pro-
hibited from engaging in regulatory affairs at the Reserve Banks, Class B and C directors
are involved in making personnel decisions in this domain, and the boards more gener-
ally are tasked with managing the Reserve Banks’ operations. Publicly available data on
Reserve Bank regulatory enforcements may allow us to determine, for instance, whether
more liberal boards are associated with more aggressive Reserve Bank enforcement.
Second, one of the more surprising results of this analysis is that the directorates of
the New York Fed are significantly more liberal relative to other directorates. But this is
perhaps surprising only if one accepts the common—though not clearly substantiated—
wisdom that business, and particularly finance, is politically conservative. As many re-
searchers have argued, business is not a monolith (Dahl 1961; Smith 2000; Hart 2004);
bank size, industry sector, economic conditions, and a host of other factors surely struc-
ture individual firm preferences. The election of Class A and B directors by private banks
thus offers a unique opportunity to explore what banks want when they are choosing
representatives to govern the Reserve Banks. Are larger banks likely to select more lib-
eral directors than smaller—and presumably more inflation-averse—community banks?
Does the geographic location and sectoral character of the area in which the bank operates
influence which types of directors are likely to be elected? The answers to these questions
have implications for research that considers the different means by which business in-
terests participate and make their voices heard in the policymaking process.
Lastly, the reliance on CFscores in this analysis is of concern given that there are few
other measures of Reserve Bank director ideology or policy preference against which the
scores can be externally validated. Moreover, while a large literature finds a strong asso-
ciation between political ideology—what CFscores presumably capture—and monetary
ideology, a more precise measure of preferences over monetary and regulatory policy
would be preferable. The composite nature of CFscores means we cannot directly infer
directors’ positions on specific policy areas, a feature that is especially problematic if one
considers the rise of “socially liberal” corporate executives such as Jamie Dimon, chair-
man of JP Morgan Chase and former Class A director for the New York Fed. If bankers
and business executives are supporting liberal candidates and causes for social policy
and more conservative candidates on economic policy, CFscores for these individuals are
likely more “moderate” than would be the case if observing preferences over economic
policy specifically. While there have been numerous efforts scaling the monetary ideology
of Fed governors and presidents using FOMC votes and transcripts, the lack of compara-
ble information for Reserve Bank directors mandates a different approach. One potential
solution would take inspiration from research on the ideology of bureaucrats and scale
monetary policy preferences by surveying Reserve Bank directors on policy questions
(see, for example, Malhotra and Jessee 2014). Such surveys would provide a means to




Figure 3.11: Letter from E.B. Clements, Missouri representative of the Republican Na-
tional Committee, to Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, dated January 22, 1929. Na-
tional Archives and Records Administration (Group 82, Box 854).
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3.7.2 Missing Data
Minneapolis Kansas City Dallas San Francisco
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Figure 3.12: Distribution of Unmatched Directors, by Class and Reserve Bank.
The figure shows the 136 directors who were not matched to DIME by Reserve
Bank and class. Roughly half of all unmatched directors are Class A. Directors
from the Minneapolis and Philadelphia Feds are the most likely to be excluded
from DIME, while directors from the Dallas and the Chicago Feds are most likely















Figure 3.13: Distribution of Unmatched Directors, by Start Year. The bar chart
shows the counts of directors not matched to DIME by the year the director first
joined the Reserve Bank board. A large number of the unmatched directors in
the sample were those who began serving prior to 1980. Because directors are
generally appointed to the Reserve Bank boards later in their careers, and be-
cause DIME does not include contribution records prior to 1979, it seems likely
that a substantial number of the unmatched directors were elderly or deceased
at the start of the DIME sample. Examining the distribution of unmatched direc-
tors by the year in which the director finished their service on the board shows
a similar pattern.
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3.7.3 First-Stage Heckman Selection Model Results

























GOP Vote Share −0.01
(0.005)












Inverse Mills Ratio −1.21 (0.63)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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3.7.4 Summary of Contributions, by Class and Bank











A 294 9,549 32.5 $926 71%
B 276 14,648 53.1 $1,458 61%
C 233 15,328 65.8 $1,654 63%
Note: Sample limited to directors who contributed to Democratic, Republican, or Independent candidates and committees.
Class C directors are the most active contributors over the 1975-2015 period, making roughly 66 contributions per person
compared to 53 contributions per Class B director and 33 contributions per Class A director. Class A directors contribute
to Republican candidates and committees more frequently than Class B and C directors, with 71% of all contributions from
Class A directors going to Republican recipients, compared to 61% and 63% from Class B and Class C directors, respectively.











Boston 74 3,542 47.9 $1,208 19%
New York 73 5,139 70.4 $1,736 55%
Philadelphia 63 1,795 28.5 $960 67%
Cleveland 69 3,041 44.1 $1,250 78%
Richmond 79 2,669 33.8 $1,205 74%
Atlanta 65 2,929 45.1 $980 65%
Chicago 66 3,525 53.4 $1,371 71%
St. Louis 54 2,209 40.9 $991 54%
Minneapolis 67 2,199 32.8 $836 82%
Kansas City 65 3,303 50.8 $1,745 80%
Dallas 64 5,677 88.7 $1,826 70%
San Fran-
cisco
64 3,497 54.6 $1,645 66%
Note: Sample limited to directors who contributed to Democratic, Republican, or Independent candidates and committees.
Dallas directors are the most active contributors over the 1975-2015 period, making 89 contributions per director in the
sample. Directors from the Minneapolis and Richmond banks were the least active, with 33 and 34 contributions per
director, respectively. Directors from the Minneapolis (82%) and Kansas City (80%) banks contributed the highest share of
their contributions to Republican candidates and committees. Directors from the Boston bank contributed the lowest share
(19%) to Republican candidates.
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Figure 3.14: Mean Ideology of Incoming Cohorts, 1980-2015. The blue line is a
loess smoother and the gray band denotes the 95% confidence interval around
the mean estimates. The figure shows that the average CFscore of incoming di-
rectors each year—that is, the average ideal point of those directors serving their
first year on the Reserve Bank boards—has declined between 1980 and 2015.
The measure is noisy given the small number of directors each year—the n each
year ranges from a high of 19 to a low of 7 in early years— though the decline in
newcomer CFscores persists when subsetting the sample to exclude earlier years
where data is more sparse. Nonetheless, the figure suggests that the observed
decline in mean director ideology is likely driven by the selection of slightly less
conservative directors over time.
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3.7.6 Director Professions by Class, Over Time

































Figure 3.15: Share of directors employed as bankers, business executives (all sec-
tors), academics, farmers and ranchers, lawyers, union executives, and nonprofit
executives.
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3.7.7 Summary of Director CFscores, by Class and Bank
Table 3.4: Summary of Director CFscores, by Class
Class n Mean Median Min Max SD
A 147 0.48 0.69 -1.47 1.44 0.61
B 172 0.30 0.52 -1.26 1.43 0.74
C 156 0.22 0.51 -1.54 1.57 0.76
Note: Summary statistics for director CFscores across direc-
tor classes. The sample is subsetted to include only those di-
rectors who were assigned a CFscore and contributed to at
least eight distinct candidates or committees.
Table 3.5: Summary of Director CFscores, by Bank
District Bank n Mean Median Min Max SD
1 Boston 51 -0.44 -0.60 -1.30 0.79 0.61
2 New York 47 -0.17 -0.14 -1.32 1.00 0.60
3 Philadelphia 34 0.21 0.45 -1.01 0.90 0.62
4 Cleveland 36 0.54 0.73 -1.03 1.01 0.54
5 Richmond 41 0.44 0.48 -0.85 0.95 0.49
6 Atlanta 38 0.59 0.82 -0.77 1.13 0.55
7 Chicago 47 0.37 0.73 -1.38 1.17 0.81
8 St. Louis 36 0.42 0.54 -0.80 1.04 0.53
9 Minneapolis 35 0.79 0.97 -1.47 1.39 0.71
10 Kansas City 37 0.81 0.91 0.05 1.24 0.34
11 Dallas 39 0.62 0.79 -0.88 1.06 0.57
12 San Francisco 34 0.17 0.57 -1.54 1.05 0.80
Note: Summary statistics for director CFscores across the Reserve districts. The
sample is subsetted to include only those directors who were assigned a CFscore
and contributed to at least eight distinct candidates or committees.
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Chapter 4
The Electoral Dynamics of Reserve Bank
Governance1
“I am pleased to advise you that the Federal Reserve Board has been under
no political pressure whatever, so far as I know. The only pressure that the
Board has been under is bank politics rather than political politics. It is to be
regretted that there is entering into the system bank politics which will be more
destructive to the system than political politics.” — D.R. Crissinger, chairman
of the Federal Reserve Board, 1923-1927. 2
The previous chapter documented the biographical characteristics and ideological distri-
butions of Reserve Bank directors. While the average director is male, highly educated,
and conservative, I find considerable variation in director ideology and biographical char-
acteristics across Reserve Banks and director class. In this chapter, I examine one of the
processes that generate these outcomes: the election of Class A and Class B directors by
member banks.
As the key juncture in which private banks first formally participate in Reserve Bank
governance, director elections provide a unique opportunity to illuminate the mecha-
nism by which banks select individuals to represent them in the Federal Reserve System,
as well as the consequences of this mechanism. Specifically, analyzing elections allows
us to evaluate the extent to which banks make use of this channel, how competitive the
elections are, and the factors that drive banks’ selections of board representatives. In do-
ing so, the electoral process can also provide insight into the sources of the Reserve Bank
boards’ conservatism and ideological variation across districts. In short, understanding
the role of private influence in Fed policymaking must start with an examination of how
banks select peers to represent their policy interests when governing the affairs of the
Reserve Banks.
1 I am extremely grateful to Alex Mendoza, Thomas Kadie, and Zachary Fry for research assistance on
this chapter. I also thank Reserve Banks staff for providing me with access to historical election ballots
and archivists at the National Archives at College Park for assistance with records requests.
2 Letter to Roy A. Young, governor (president) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, dated De-
cember 13, 1923. National Archives and Records Administration (Group 82, Box 854).
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I analyze an original dataset of Class A and Class B director elections between 1980
and 2015. In the first part of the chapter, I describe the contours of the electoral landscape
and document variation in election dynamics across multiple dimensions, including Re-
serve Bank, director class, and member bank group. As in the previous chapter, the hope
is that detailed description will not only provide a snapshot of what director elections
look like in practice, but also facilitate future theory building around the politics of Re-
serve Bank governance. In the second part of the chapter, I conduct simple regression
analyses to evaluate potential predictors of candidate victory and election contestation.
The goal here is to explore the utility of existing theories of electoral politics for explaining
Reserve Bank elections dynamics, and suggest other theoretical frameworks that might
present fruitful ways forward.
I highlight three groups of findings. First, I show that consistent with earlier studies,
director elections are rarely contested. Across Reserve Banks, however, contestation rates
vary significantly. Around 40% of elections at the St. Louis Fed are contested, for example,
compared to 1% of elections at the Richmond Fed. The overall low rate of contestation is
driven by a dearth of nominations. Despite the low cost of submitting a name, only about
13% of banks eligible to nominate a candidate in each election do so.
Second, I find that among contested elections, the candidate with the most nomina-
tions is significantly more likely to win. Voting banks appear to view nominations as
endorsements and use them to guide their vote choice. By contrast, banks do not ap-
pear to vote according to some measure of candidate quality as defined by a candidate’s
professional or educational background, or their affiliation with industry interest groups.
Nor does it appear that banks are picking up and selecting on candidate political ideology.
Directors lean conservative not because voting banks are choosing the more conservative
candidate, but because the candidates are conservative to begin with. In addition, I do
not find robust evidence of an incumbency advantage in director elections in my sample.
Third, I find evidence that elections using nomination committees—regional state
banking associations that recommend the name of a preferred candidate for nomination—
have significantly fewer candidates running than elections that do not involve nomina-
tion committees. The results suggest that when banking associations formally participate
in the nomination process, they succeed in getting their preferred candidate on the bal-
lot and, ultimately, elected. Low contestation in director elections may be explained by
the coordination banking associations provide during the nomination stage, rather than
member bank apathy.
Together, these findings provide insight into the electoral process underlying Reserve
Bank governance. In doing so, I contribute to several recent efforts that investigate bank
participation in director elections (Adams 2017; Black and Dlugosz 2017). More broadly,
the analysis contributes to our understanding of how interest groups can influence policy
from within (quasi-) governmental institutions (e.g. Anzia and Moe forthcoming), as well
as to our understanding of the diversity of electoral contexts in the U.S.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 provides an overview of the Reserve
Bank director election process, while Section 4.2 reviews relevant literature. Section 5.1
describes the collection and construction of a new dataset of director elections. In Section
4.4, I present a detailed descriptive analysis of the data. Section 4.5 provides an analysis
of who wins director elections. In Section 4.6, I conduct an exploratory analysis of the de-
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terminants of election contestation. Section 5.3 concludes with suggested paths forward.
4.1 Reserve Bank Director Elections
Class A and B directors are elected to three-year terms and are generally limited to serv-
ing two terms. As delineated by Section 4 of the Federal Reserve Act, each of the twelve
Reserve Banks selects their Class A and B directors through a preferential voting system
conducted by group. Member banks in each district are classified into three groups ac-
cording to capitalization, with Group 1 comprising the largest banks and Group 3 the
smallest.3 The threshold capital levels vary over time and across Reserve districts. In
1980, for instance, Group 1 member banks of the St. Louis Fed had at least $4 million
in capital, significantly less than the $185 million held by Group 1 members of the New
York Fed. In 2015, the New York Fed’s Group 1 banks had capital of at least $1 billion.
Each of the three voting groups nominates and elects one Class A and one Class B direc-
tor, presumably to ensure that member banks have equal representation on the boards
regardless of their size. Given the boards’ staggered composition, elections are generally
held for one Class A and one Class B director each year, though unexpired terms may
be filled via special election. Each eligible bank may cast one vote in in each race. Bank-
holding companies with multiple subsidiary banks in a Reserve district may designate
only one bank to participate in the director election process. Nominations and votes must
be cast by a designated bank officer, usually the president or CEO.
In the months prior to an election, Reserve Banks distribute a circular to member banks
notifying them of the upcoming vacancies on the board, the date on which the election(s)
will be held, whether the incumbent directors whose terms are expiring are eligible and
willing to stand for reelection, and the list of banks eligible to participate in the election.
In addition, the circulars open a call for nominations where each eligible bank may sub-
mit one name, including one from their own bank, to be added to the ballot. After about
one month, Reserve Banks then circulate a ballot with the list of nominees, their biogra-
phies, and the names of the banks that nominated each candidate. Member banks have
15 calendar days to cast their votes, which remain anonymous. If an election has more
than two candidates running for the same seat, banks must rank the choices. A candidate
is declared the winner if they receive a majority of first-choice votes. While elections were
primarily conducted via mail for much of the Fed’s recent history, Reserve Banks now
allow for online submissions of nominations and votes. Appendix 4.8.1 displays a ballot.
In some cases, Reserve Banks utilize nominating committees—composed of represen-
tatives from state banking associations or groups of executives from member banks—to
recommend names for Class A and B candidates. While the nominating committees them-
selves cannot nominate a candidate, they appear highly effective at structuring the ballot
as discussed later in the chapter.
3 The Act provides for the Board of Governors to make these classification but this authority has been
delegated to the Reserve Banks.
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4.2 Related Literature
This study most directly contributes to a small body of literature that examines the Re-
serve Bank director election process, both as a means to better understand the Federal
Reserve System and to gauge private interest influence in its policymaking. Early ac-
counts of director elections from the early 1930s describe an essentially pro forma process
(Bopp 1935; Clark 1935). These studies found that elections were rarely contested and
largely controlled by state banking associations. Either through their participation as a
nominating committee, or informal back channels, banking associations were effective in
coaxing members banks to coalesce around their preferred candidate and submit their
name for nomination. Director elections, in other words, do not function as a democratic
selection process.
Later anecdotal accounts describe a similar process. In his survey of Reserve Banks
in the early 1970s, Mayer (1976) found that banking associations—and, in at least one
Reserve district, the Bank president–controlled the nomination process. Consequently,“in
many Districts it is not really true that the majority of directors are chosen in a meaningful
way by the member banks” (Mayer 1976). Similarly, a comprehensive 1976 report by the
U.S. House Committee on Banking, Currency and Housing concluded:
“[T]he idea of broad democratic input on the part of the member banks in
an ’election’ is largely a facade. Rather the process appears to be a ratification
of whatever nominating process exists in each district—in some cases nomina-
tions by bank lobbying organizations; in others, less formal bank nominations;
and in others, a process influenced by the System itself. Miraculously, the ’vot-
ing’ commercial banks scattered throughout each district agree on the names
with rare dissents” (U.S. House 1976).
Empirical demonstrations of these early cross-sectional descriptions have only re-
cently been conducted. Specifically, financial economists studying the behavior of cor-
porate boards of directors have turned attention to the Reserve Banks to estimate the
monetary value of holding a Reserve Bank director seat (Adams 2017; Black and Dlugosz
2017). These studies examine contemporary Class A and Class B election and find that
banks (but not other companies) represented on the boards receive a private benefit in the
form of higher stock prices. Markets apparently view Class A directorships as an oppor-
tunity to obtain inside information. Beyond the private benefits of board service, Adams
(2017) also finds that, consistent with the early anecdotal accounts, director elections are
rarely contested, particularly for Class B seats. She also finds suggestive evidence, again
in keeping with the early studies, that director candidates that served on the leadership
of the American Bankers Association (ABA) are more likely to win election. However,
these studies do not examine across-Reserve Bank differences in electoral outcomes, or
consider candidate attributes or trends in member banks’ participation. I focus on these
features in the following analyses.
Beyond these director election studies, examining other electoral contexts in the U.S.
may provide additional benchmarks for our expectations of director election dynamics.
Local elections, for example, share similar features of director elections. Local elections
are regional, often non-partisan, and largely “managerial” in the sense that voters select
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candidates primarily on the basis of competence over custodial issues rather than political
ideology (Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012). These elections feature much lower turnout and
less contestation than their more salient national counterparts (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch
2002; Gray 2004; Trounstine 2013; Anzia 2014). I return to this literature in the regression
analyses in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. Zooming out to American politics more broadly, recent
literature that conceptualizes political parties as coalitions of policy demanding groups
suggests another way of thinking about director election politics (Cohen et al. 2008; Bawn
et al. 2012; Hacker and Pierson 2014). According to this school, interest groups use the
nomination stage of elections to coordinate the selection of a preferred candidate. Nom-
inations thus provide an opportunity for groups to join forces to select a candidate they
can all agree on, rather than compete with each other during the election stage. In a sense
this logic is compatible with Bopp’s account of highly coordinated action by state bank-
ing associations. We should expect, then, that banking associations (which are groups
of member banks) play a role in coordinating the nomination of directors to ensure the
banks’ preferred candidate makes it on the ballot—and is unlikely to face a competitor.
The large literature on corporate governance and private sector board elections may
also offer insight. Reserve Bank boards are, of course, designed in the mold of corporate
boards of directors and many of the member banks participating in Reserve Bank elec-
tions likely have experience in a corporate election setting. Corporate director elections
are even less likely to be contested than local elections; over 99% of director elections are
uncontested each year (Hirst 2018; Cai, Garner and Walkling 2009; Bebchuk 2007).
Overall, these literatures suggest director elections are likely to be low-contestation
and low-participation environments. Even if these elections are pro-forma, as early ac-
counts suggest, they remain the direct avenue for banks to participate in Fed governance.
Whether and how banks use this channel is of interest for understanding the Federal Re-
serve and private interest influence in policymaking.
4.3 Director Election Data
This analysis employs an original dataset of Reserve Bank director elections from 1980-
2015. Election ballots circulated to member banks are the primary data source. To obtain
ballots, I submitted information requests to Reserve Banks’ research and legal depart-
ments beginning in December 2016. While the Reserve Banks are not subject to the Free-
dom Of Information Act (FOIA), most have issued their own information request policies
that aim to abide by the “spirit” of the Act. At some Reserve Banks, these records were
already digitally archived and my requests were fulfilled within weeks. In other cases,
however, Reserve Banks had to locate and digitize the documents, review them for sen-
sitive information, and vet the records through their legal department before release. For
five of the Reserve Banks, archived ballots were available online for at least some of the
years of interest.
My sample, summarized in Table 4.1, consists of ballots for 601 Class A and B contests
going back to 1980. I obtained ballots for all but one of the Reserve Banks, Atlanta. For
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two additional Banks, Philadelphia and Chicago, I obtained ballots only for recent years.4
The most complete records in my sample come from the New York, Richmond, and Dallas
Feds. My sample of contests is considerably larger than those collected by Adams (n=201)
and Black and Dlugosz (n=318), though both sets of authors have more complete coverage
within their time periods of interest.5 Critically, the larger sample in this study allows for
a more comprehensive documentation of electoral conditions, particularly with respect
to variation across Reserve Banks.
Table 4.1: Director Election Ballot Sample
District Bank Years Covered Num Contests Num Candidates
1 Boston 1987-2015 62 63
2 New York 1980-2015 83 90
3 Philadelphia 2001-2015 20 21
4 Cleveland 1980-2013 73 88
5 Richmond 1980-2015 72 73
6 Atlanta NA NA NA
7 Chicago 1988-2015 41 47
8 St. Louis 1980-2010 64 101
9 Minneapolis 1987-2015 46 51
10 Kansas City 1992-2015 51 77
11 Dallas 1980-2014 75 115
12 San Francisco 2009-2015 14 19
Note: The table describes the sample of director election ballots collected. In total, there are
601 contests, involving 745 candidates, between 1980 and 2015. Ballots were obtained for all
but one Reserve Bank, Atlanta. I have the most complete election coverage for the New York,
Richmond, and Dallas Feds, and the least coverage for the Philadelphia and San Francisco Feds.
The final data is a panel in which the unit of observation is a candidate-contest. A
contest, or election, is defined by several dimensions: Reserve Bank (the Reserve district
in which the election is held); director class (whether the open seat is Class A or Class B);
time (year the election was held); and bank group eligible to vote (either Group 1, Group
2, or Group 3). A candidate is an individual nominated by member banks to run in a
particular contest.
To construct variables, a pair of research assistants and I recorded three categories of
information from each of the ballots. First, we collected and coded information on the
election itself: the year it was held, whether the contest was for a Class A or Class B
seat, the bank group eligible to participate in the election, the total number of member
banks in the group eligible to participate in the election, and indicators denoting whether
4 The Atlanta Fed charged a fee of several hundred dollars to collect, digitize, and release their records.
Records from the Philadelphia Fed for years prior to 2001 were only available to view in person. My re-
quest for pre-2009 ballots from the San Francisco Fed was still being evaluated by the legal department
at the time of writing.
5 Some Reserve Banks prohibited researchers from sharing released records.
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a nominating committee was used and whether the contest was a special election.6 The
second category of information recorded pertained to the candidates in each of the elec-
tions. In addition to the candidate’s name, title, employer, and location, relevant details
from the candidate’s biographical sketch—e.g. education, business and banking interest
group affiliations, and public service experience—were recorded. Thirdly, for each can-
didate competing in a contest, we recorded and tabulated the list of member banks that
nominated them. As a final step, I supplemented candidates’ biographical data with CF-
scores (Bonica 2016) where possible and added indicator variables denoting whether a
candidate was an incumbent and whether they won their race. Appendix 4.8.2 provides
summary statistics for the variables used in the analyses below.
One drawback to relying on the election ballots is that missing data for individual
years were not uncommon, either because the ballots were not retained by the Reserve
Bank or were of poor scan quality. In total, about 5% of observations have incomplete
data. While the data coverage is inconsistent and the resulting panel I construct unbal-
anced, the degree to which data is missing is unlikely to be a function of differences in
Reserve Bank capacity or professionalism.7 For this reason I am less concerned that miss-
ing data confounds the results from my analysis. Imputing the missing data, moreover,
produces similar regression results as those presented below, though with larger standard
errors for estimated coefficients.
A more substantive drawback to the data is that it does not shed light on other aspects
of the electoral process that are of interest. I was unable to obtain data on bank turnout,
for example, or on the margins of victory for winning candidates.8 One consequence
is that while I can measure election contestation (as a crude dummy variable or simple
count of the number of candidates running in each contest), I do not have other measures
of competitiveness that would be of interest.9 At a minimum, however, the data I do have
can illustrate the basic contours of the director selection process.
6 I count all member banks listed on the bank group’s ballot as eligible to participate in the election
unless the ballot explicitly notes the bank was ineligible.
7 Even if missingness were a function of Reserve Bank administrative capacity, it is not immediately
clear that this would be correlated with director election characteristics. Moreover, given that most of
the missing records are older, if it were the case the missingness resulted from Reserve Bank traits, it
would likely reflect more on previous Reserve Bank staff’s poor record keeping practices, rather than
current Reserve Bank administrative capacity.
8 Suto (2018) obtained voter turnout for New York Fed director elections between 1915 and 1927. He
finds member bank turnout between 37-96%. There does not appear to be a correlation between the
number of candidates running and the turnout rate: for a Class A election in 1922, for example, 96% of
eligible Group 1 banks voted even though the election was not contested. For a 1916 Class A election
with two candidates running, 59% of eligible Group 1 banks voted.
9 Note that this data may be available in the future. At some Reserve Banks, a certificate of election that
announces vote totals is circulated among member banks. None of the Reserve Banks I obtained data
from had these records prepared or cleared for release, though some suggested they may be available
at a later time.
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4.4 The Electoral Landscape
To learn more about the electoral landscape, this section provides a detailed descriptive
analysis of the election data at the contest and candidate levels. I also describe the popu-
lation of member banks eligible to nominate candidates and vote in director elections.
4.4.1 Contests
Figure 4.1 plots the rates at which director elections are contested—that is, if more than
one candidate is running in an election—across all contests in the sample, as well as bro-
ken out by director class and by Reserve Bank. The general picture is of low contestation:
overall, 17.5% of elections in the sample had more than one candidate running, with the
remaining 82.5% of elections featuring one unopposed candidate. These rates are con-
sistent with those documented by Adams (2017) and Bopp (1937), who found 80.2% and
73.3% of elections unopposed in their respective samples. On average, 1.2 candidates ran
in each election in my sample. I find Class A elections are contested at a significantly
higher rate than Class B elections, again mirroring trends identified by Adams and Bopp.
Roughly 28% of Class A contests featured more than one candidate compared to 7% of
Class B contests. Across Reserve Banks, director elections are most frequently contested—
roughly 40% of the time—at the St. Louis Fed, followed closely by Dallas and Kansas
City. In contrast, elections are very rarely contested at the Richmond and Philadelphia
Feds. Only 1% of elections at each of those Banks had more than one candidate running.
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Figure 4.1: This chart plots the contestation rates for all elections in the
sample and for elections broken out by director class and Reserve Bank.
The rate of contestation in director elections is low overall, though there
is variation across class and Reserve Bank.
Disaggregating elections by class highlights further variation in contestation across
Reserve Banks. As Figure 4.2 shows, Class B elections are significantly less likely to be
contested than Class A elections in every Reserve district. In fact, six of the eleven Reserve
Banks in the sample did not have any contested Class B elections. By contrast, Class A
elections were contested more than half of the time in four Reserve Banks; in Dallas, 64%
of Class A elections were contested.
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Figure 4.2: This chart compares Class A and Class B election contes-
tation across Reserve Banks. More than half of Reserve Banks in the
sample did not have any instances of contested Class B elections. Class
A elections were much more likely to be contested, with contestation
rates above 50% in four of the Reserve Banks.
Contestation also varies according to the size of the banks participating in the election.
For both Class A and Class B seats, Group 1 elections—in which the largest member banks
in a Reserve district nominate and vote for directors—are the least contested. Group 3
elections, featuring the smallest banks, are the most likely to be contested. This tracks
with the number of banks eligible to participate in each group. On average, about 156
banks were eligible to nominate and vote in Group 3 elections, compared to 94 in Group
2 and 32 in Group 1.
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Figure 4.3: This chart compares election contestation rates across bank
group. Group 1 banks, composing the largest member banks in each
Reserve district, had the fewest contested elections. Group 3 banks,
featuring the smallest banks, had the highest rate of contestation.
Beyond contestation, director elections vary in other ways. Table 4.2 provides a sum-
mary of contest characteristics for the whole sample and broken out by director class and
Reserve Bank. Special elections to fill unexpired director terms are more common for
Class B elections in the sample. The Boston and New York Feds have the highest spe-
cial election rates while the Richmond and San Francisco Feds did not hold any. Overall,
about 8% of elections in the sample were special elections.
Consistent with Adams (2017), I find about 17% of contests involved the participation
of a nomination committee.10 While the majority of Reserve Banks in the sample never
10 In Adams (2017), the Atlanta Fed uses a nominating committee for most of its contests. Including
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Table 4.2: Summary of Contest Characteristics
Num Contests Mean Cands Pct Class A Pct Special Elec Pct Nom Cmte
Total 601 1.2 48.9 7.7 17.3
Class A 294 1.4 100.0 4.8 18.7
Class B 307 1.1 0.0 10.4 16.0
Boston 62 1.0 51.6 17.7 93.5
New York 83 1.1 45.8 14.5 45.8
Philadelphia 20 1.1 50.0 10.0 0.0
Cleveland 73 1.2 46.6 5.5 5.5
Richmond 72 1.0 50.0 0.0 2.8
Chicago 41 1.2 48.8 9.8 0.0
St. Louis 64 1.6 51.6 4.7 0.0
Minneapolis 46 1.1 50.0 4.3 4.3
Kansas City 51 1.5 49.0 5.9 0.0
Dallas 75 1.5 48.0 6.7 0.0
San Francisco 14 1.4 50.0 0.0 0.0
Note: The table provides a summary of director election characteristics for all contests in the sample and bro-
ken out by class and Reserve Bank. Reflecting the fairly low rates of election contestation, the average number of
candidates running in each election falls between 1.0 and 1.6 across Reserve Banks. As expected, roughly half of
all elections in the sample are Class A. Overall, nearly 8% of contests were special elections called to fill a direc-
tor’s unexpired term. About 17% of contests in the sample employed a nominating committee that recommended
candidates for member banks to nominate.
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used a nominating committee, the Boston Fed used one in nearly all of its elections over
this period. Nominating committees appear to be quite effective at structuring competi-
tion on ballot. Of the 104 contests that involved a committee, all but five of those elections
(4.8%) were uncontested–a significantly lower rate of contestation than elections that did
not use a nominating committee (20%). Moreover, in those five contested elections (all
Class A), the candidates promoted by the nomination committee won every time.11.
4.4.2 Member Bank Nominations
Across the sample, member banks submitted 3,922 nominations in total, about six per
candidate on average. The modal candidate received 1 nomination. The distribution
of nominations candidates received are similar across incumbency status, director class,
Reserve Bank, and bank group.
The share of member banks that was eligible to participate in an upcoming election
and submitted a candidate for nomination—the nomination participation rate—has re-
mained relatively steady over time, averaging 12.6% across elections (Figure 4.4). Though
small sample sizes within year inhibit a more disaggregated temporal analysis, breaking
out the nomination participation trend by bank group suggests some of the underlying
dynamics. Big banks (those in Group 1), while having the highest nomination partici-
pation rates relative to small and medium-sized banks, have become much less active in
nominating director candidates over this time period. Conversely, the nomination partic-
ipation rate of the smallest banks (those in Group 3) has increased slightly over time. This
is even as the number of Group 3 banks eligible to participate in elections fell dramatically
over this period due to bank consolidation.12
Atlanta in my sample would presumably increase the 17% share I observe.
11 This is also consistent with a 1976 survey which found that among the five Reserve Banks that used
nomination committees, there were no instances of member banks rejecting the banking associations’
recommended nominee (U.S. House 1976)
12 In 1985, there were over 14,000 commercial banks in the U.S. In 2015, that number fell to 5,500. The
dramatic decline in the number of banks over this period is consistent with the general downward
trend observed since the 1970s, following the growth of branch banking and the acquisition of small
community banks by larger institutions. See McCord, Prescott and Sablik (2015).
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Figure 4.4: This chart presents the number of candidate nominations
submitted by member banks for an upcoming election as a share of
all member banks eligible to nominate and vote in that election. The
blue line is a loess smoother; gray shading represents standard error
bounds. This nomination participation rate has remained fairly steady
over time. Over this 35-year period, an average of 12.6% of eligible
banks nominated a candidate in an election.
Looking beyond the time trend, Figure 4.5 below presents aggregated nomination par-
ticipation rates across several key dimensions. The first panel shows member bank partic-
ipation rates (the number of candidate nominations submitted as a fraction of all member
banks eligible to submit a nomination) in the director nomination process, across Reserve
Banks. Member banks in the Philadelphia and Boston Feds are the most active nomina-
tors in the sample. In Philadelphia, nearly a quarter of eligible member banks in each
election nominated a candidate. The Chicago and Kansas City Feds, by contrast, have the
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least active member banks. In Chicago, less than 4% of member banks in each election, on
average, took advantage of the open nomination process and submitted a name for the
ballot. There does not appear to be a correlation between the share of races contested and
the member bank participation rate within districts.
Member Bank Participation Rates in Nomination Process, by Bank, Bank Group, and
Class
Reserve Bank Member




















































Figure 4.5: This chart presents the number of candidate nominations
submitted by member banks for an upcoming election as a share of all
member banks eligible to nominate and vote in that election, broken out
across Reserve Banks, member bank groups, and director class. Mem-
ber bank participation in the nomination process varies across each of
these dimensions.
The second panel of Figure 4.5 breaks down nomination participation rates by member
87
bank group. On average, Group 1—composed of the largest banks within each Reserve
district, each year—had 32 member banks eligible to participate in each election. Group
2 and Group 3 consisted of 94 and 156 member banks, respectively. Participation in the
nomination process is inversely related to bank size. About 15% of Group 1 member
banks submitted candidate nominations for an upcoming election compared to 8% for
Group 2 banks and 6% for Group 3 banks.
Lastly, as the third panel shows, member banks are more active in the nomination pro-
cess for Class A elections than in Class B elections. The average Class A contest received
candidate nominations from eight banks compared to six member bank nominations in
the average Class B contest. Class A candidates are also much more likely to be affiliated
with at least one of their nominators, unsurprising given that Class A candidates are em-
ployed by banks. Over three-quarters of Class A candidates were affiliated with at least
one of their nominators, compared to 6% of Class B candidates.
While I do not analyze the identities of the nominating banks, a cursory look sug-
gests that some banks, particularly in Group 3, are active, repeat nominators that submit
names nearly every year they are in the sample. In most cases, however, member banks
exercise their nomination authority just once. Interestingly, the biggest banks in the coun-
try are not active nominators. Bank of America only used its nomination authority twice
between 1980 and 2015. Chase Manhattan submitted a nomination five times.
4.4.3 Candidates
Given that the vast majority of director candidates ultimately win their race, candidate bi-
ographical characteristics closely mirror the characteristics of elected directors described
in the previous chapter. Candidates are overwhelmingly male—88%, slightly higher than
the share among the sample of elected directors—and employed in the banking or com-
merce sectors. About 20% of candidates have an MBA. Roughly 28% listed an affiliation
with the state or national chapters of the ABA (among Class A candidates the share is
nearly 50%), about the same share that listed affiliation with the Chamber of Commerce.
Nearly 14% and 5% of candidates listed an affiliation with the Independent Community
Bankers of America (ICBA) and Business Roundtable, respectively. About 17% reported
previous government experience on their ballot biography. The average CFscore for can-
didates is 0.35, slightly higher than the average among my sample of elected directors.
When compared across groups, candidates running in director elections have fairly
homogeneous characteristics. Figure 4.6 displays the proportion of unique candidates,
broken out by bank group, with selected professional characteristics as reported in their
ballot biographies.13 All candidates, including those running in more than one elec-
tion, are included once. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. While large (Group 1),
medium (Group 2), and small (Group 3) bank elections feature candidates employed in
similar occupational sectors, large bank elections have a higher share of candidates with
MBAs and membership in the Business Roundtable. Small and medium bank elections
feature higher shares of candidates that are members of the major banking organizations:
13 As the vast majority of candidates ultimately win their election, breaking out candidate biographies
by class mirrors the analysis of director biographies presented in Chapter 3.
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Figure 4.6: Candidates’ Professional Attributes, by Bank Group. This
graph shows the proportion of unique candidates, broken out by bank
group, with selected professional attributes. Bars denote 95% confi-
dence intervals. Large (Group 1), medium (Group 2), and small (Group
3) elections feature relatively similar candidates, though there are slight
difference in interest group membership and educational attainment.
Figure 4.7 further breaks out candidates according to whether they won or lost their
election. As above, winners and losers share similar biographical profiles with few dif-
ferences between them. For Class A candidates, none of the biographical traits appear to
differ between those who won and those who lost. Among Class B candidates, winners
are slightly more likely to have PhDs and MBAs. Curiously, winners are less likely to
have reported membership in the Chamber of Commerce than losers. Overall, however,
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Figure 4.7: Candidates’ Professional Attributes, Winners vs. Losers.
This graph compares professional attributes among winning and losing
candidates. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Winners and losers
do not exhibit significant differences.
Examining winners in contested and uncontested elections, however, suggests some
differences between candidates. Figure 4.8 examines selected attributes of winning can-
didates according to whether the winner ran in an uncontested or contested race, within
class. Contested Class A winners have higher rates of membership in some of the key
interest groups (ABA, ICBA, and Chamber of Commerce) than uncontested Class A win-
ners. Among Class B winners, those winning contested races had higher rates of affilia-
tion with the Chamber of Commerce and were more likely to come from the agricultural
sector, have a PhD, and be male.
In addition to the characteristics displayed in Figure 4.8, there are also differences in
90
candidates’ political ideology. As a group, winners of contested races are significantly
more conservative than uncontested winners (p¡0.001), with a mean CFscore more than
half a standard deviation greater than uncontested winners. The difference is starkest
among Class B winners: the mean CFscore for contested winners is 0.62 compared to 0.12
for uncontested winners. While these patterns do not clearly suggest that contested win-
ners are of higher “quality” than unopposed winners, they raise the possibility that when
voting banks have more than one candidate to consider, certain candidate characteris-
tics, like interest group affiliation, are relevant to their vote choice. I examine contested
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Figure 4.8: Winners’ Professional Attributes, By Contestation. This
graph compares selected professional attributes of election winners in
contested and uncontested races. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals.
Within each director class, contested and uncontested winners differ in
some respects. A larger proportion of Class A contested winners have
membership in key financial interest groups than Class A winners from
uncontested races. Among Class B races, contested winners are more
likely to work in agriculture, more likely to have a PhD, and more likely
to affiliated with the Chamber of Commerce than uncontested winners.
4.5 Who Wins Director Elections?
In this section, I dig deeper into contested elections to determine which factors predict
candidate victory, conditional on a candidate’s decision to run. While many factors, both
relating to the candidate and the electoral environment, influence election victory, I focus
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here on features at the candidate level.14
4.5.1 Theory
Director election ballots include brief (roughly one-half page) biographies of the candi-
dates running for an open seat. Given the size of the Reserve Bank districts and the ab-
sence of campaigning in this electoral context, member banks likely have little knowledge
or information about candidates before they vote. Biographies that describe candidates’
backgrounds may thus be especially useful sources of information. Studies of state and
local elections document an assortment of candidate features—including profession and
education credentials—that affect voters’ perceptions of candidate quality and the likeli-
hood of winning (see Bibby and Holbrook 2004). As the previous section showed, how-
ever, candidate biographies are fairly homogeneous. Moreover, since candidates in a con-
test are essentially matched on profession and the size of their employer—Class A, Group
1 contests, for example, will only have candidates that work for big banks—homogeneity
in candidate attributes will be even more pronounced.15
Consequently, member banks may be more sensitive to other pieces of information
that are more likely to vary across candidates and may better signal a candidate’s desir-
ability. In particular, I focus on incumbency and the number of nominations a candidate
receives. I posit that each of these factors are associated with a greater likelihood that a
candidate wins their (contested) election.
The local politics literature provides support for these hypotheses. In city council
elections, for example, incumbency is associated with a large electoral advantage, signif-
icantly increasing the incumbent candidate’s probability of winning and their vote share
(Trounstine 2011; Krebs 1998). Endorsements from local media and political organizations
are also associated with victory in local races (Krebs 1998; Davidson and Fraga 1988; Co-
hen et al. 2008). While media and political parties do not play a role in director elections,
nominations a candidate receives from member banks may be interpreted by other banks
as endorsements. Given that these are relatively low information environments, a longer
list of nominations may be a strong signal of a candidate’s popularity or quality.
In addition to incumbency and endorsements, I also evaluate the possibility that po-
litical ideology matters in director elections. Though I am skeptical this is the case—only
a handful of biographies in the sample reported information that directly revealed or
alluded to a candidate’s partisanship or ideology—it is possible that voting banks are se-
lecting on some sense of perceived ideology that is unobserved. Indeed, the local politics
literature finds evidence of partisan and ideological voting even in nonpartisan elections
(Bonneau and Cann 2015; Squire and Smith 1988).
14 Adams (2017), for instance, models the likelihood of electoral victory as a function of the institutional
characteristics of the candidate’s employer, including assets held and reputation. Electoral contestation
more broadly, of course, is shaped by a host of other institutional factors, e.g. expected voter turnout
and voter knowledge, which I do not account for in this analysis.
15 Note that Adams (2017), however, finds the larger the candidate’s firm, the greater the likelihood they
win election. Firm size may thus be a relevant consideration for voting banks even within bank group.
Future work should consider both candidate-level and firm-level characteristics.
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4.5.2 Empirical Model
I estimate the following logit model using the subset of candidates running in contested
races:16
logit(winraceij) = αij + βij(male) + βij(highdegree) + βij(aba) + βij(icba) + βij(chamber)
+βij(a f f ilnom) + βij(incumbent) + βiji(numbernoms) + βij(c f score) + eij
where winraceij denotes whether a candidate i won a contested election j. incumbent
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the candidate is running as an incumbent. male is equal
to 1 if the candidate is male. highdegree is a three-level factor with undergraduate edu-
cation as the baseline and MBA and other graduate degree as the other two levels. aba,
icba, and chamber are dummies equal to 1 if the candidate listed an affiliation with any
national or local chapters of the organization. a f f ilnom is a binary variable equal to 1
if the candidate is an employee, board member, or other affiliate of a member bank that
nominated them. numbernom is a continuous variable counting the number of nomina-
tions the candidate received; measuring this as a share of all banks eligible to nominate
produces similar results. As in the previous chapter, c f score denotes a left-right measure
of political ideology. Robust standard errors are clustered at the Reserve Bank-level. I also
estimate the baseline model with Reserve Bank fixed effects to account for time-invariant
confounders across Reserve districts.17 Results from models using samples subsetted by
director class and bank group are reported in Appendix 4.8.4.18
4.5.3 Results
Figure 4.9 presents average marginal effects from the full-sample baseline and fixed ef-
fects models. Odds ratios are reported in Table 4.2 in Appendix 4.8.3. I highlight three
takeaways. First, as foreshadowed in the descriptive analysis, candidates’ professional
characteristics and affiliations do not appear to predict the likelihood of winning director
elections. The average marginal effects of candidate education and affiliation with bank
and business interest groups are not significantly different from zero. Even for Class A
candidates, listing an affiliation with the ABA does not increase the probability of win-
ning a contested election; the average marginal effects estimated from both models are
actually negative, though not statistically significant.
16 Given the strong correlation between director class and candidate profession, I exclude profession
measures from the model, though including them does not affect the results.
17 The results presented below are also robust to including election year fixed effects.
18 Because I have especially small cell counts for Class B races—there are no Class B incumbents in the
sample who lost an election, for instance—I report results for Class A elections alone.
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Figure 4.9: Average Marginal Effects, baseline and fixed effects models
using contested races (n=249). The number of nominations a candidate
receives is a consistent predictor of a candidate’s probability of winning
a contested director election.
Candidate political ideology also does not predict victory in these models. Though the
previous chapter demonstrated that directors lean conservative, this is not because voting
banks are choosing the more conservative candidate; rather, candidates are conservative
from the start.
Second, I do not find strong evidence of an incumbency advantage in director elec-
tions. In the baseline model, incumbency increases the probability of a candidate win-
ning by 25 percentage points on average. This effect is no longer statistically different
from zero with the inclusion of Reserve district fixed effects, however, and is not signif-
icant in the subsetted Class A models presented in Appendix 4.8.4. While it may be the
case that incumbency does not confer an electoral advantage in Reserve Bank director
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elections, the null result might also be explained by small cell counts that inhibit detec-
tion of any potential effects. Only 32 incumbents (15%) ran in contested elections; in all
but five cases, the incumbent won. Of the 526 non-incumbents in the sample, 40% ran
in contested elections. Together these results may hint at an incumbency advantage that
primarily serves to deter nominations of other candidates.19
Lastly, I find that number of bank nominations a candidate receives is a significant and
positive predictor of victory. Across the baseline and fixed effect models, a candidate’s
probability of winning a contested election increases by 3-6 percentage points on aver-
age for every additional nomination they receive. Figure 4.10 takes a closer look at the
predicted probabilities of nominations on electoral victory. The probability of winning
increases sharply as the number of nominations listed on a candidate’s ballot biography
increases. This trend holds for both incumbents and non-incumbents.
19 When running the models on candidates in both contested and uncontested elections, I find a con-
sistent and statistically significant 20 percentage point average marginal effect on the probability of
winning an election.
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Figure 4.10: The probability of a candidate winning an elections in-
creases sharply as the number of nominations they receive increases.
The marginal effect sizes are similar when running the models on Class A elections
alone and on each of the three bank groups. The subsetted bank group models shown in
Appendix 4.8.4, however, suggest there is variation in the marginal effect of nominations
on the probability of winning, with Group 3 bank elections having an average marginal
effect about one-third the size of the average effect for Group 1 and Group 2 bank elections
(2 percentage points compared to 6 percentage points). Overall, these results suggest
voting member banks view nominations as endorsements and use these endorsement to
guide their voting behavior.
4.6 What Explains Contestation Variation?
A puzzle underlying the previous analyses is why director election contestation is so low
in the first place. Reserve Bank directorships are presumably prestigious positions and, as
recent studies have shown, they confer private monetary benefits to firms (Adams 2017;
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Black and Dlugosz 2017). If firms stand to benefit tangibly and reputationally from these
directorships, why are so few candidates nominated?
Barriers to entry, a common explanation for uncompetitive government elections (e.g.
Abramowitz 1991; Ansolabehere and Gerber 1996), is unconvincing in this electoral con-
text. The costs of running in director elections are quite low: any of the designated officers
of the member banks eligible to participate in an election are free to nominate a candidate,
even themselves. These costs are arguably even lower than in local election races (which
require and campaign resources) and corporate board elections (where the nominations
process is generally more restrictive). In Group 3 elections, where 155 member banks
on average are eligible to participate in each election, it is difficult to imagine that high
barriers to entry—whether administrative or financial—explain why we see only 1.3 can-
didates, rather than 100, running in each election. Moreover, given the homogeneity in
director candidate characteristics and quality, a theory of electoral contestation centered
on differences in ambition among potential candidates (see, for example, Lawless and Fox
2005) is also unpersuasive.
A more promising explanation comes from early accounts (Bopp 1935, 1937; Clark
1935) that point to local banking association control over the nomination process. As
Bopp notes, “The conclusion is inescapable that somehow the word of some agency does
get around to all of the nominating and electing member banks” (1935). Adams (2017),
using whether a Class A candidate served on the national board of the ABA in the year
of their nomination as a proxy for ABA influence, finds suggestive evidence in support of
Bopp’s theory.
While I find the low rates of contestation Bopp and Adams observe, as Section 4.4.1
shows, I also find considerable variation in contestation across Reserve Banks. In partic-
ular, when looking at Class A elections, contestation rates vary from less than 5% to more
than 60%. A more thorough account of director elections, then, requires explaining not
only low contestation overall, but the variation in contestation across Reserve districts.
To that end, I conduct an exploratory analysis of election contestation. In addition to fol-
lowing Adams’ evaluation Bopp’s theory of banking association influence, I propose and
test a simple theory of strategic entry in director elections. While a more thorough inves-
tigation into the determinants of director election contestation is beyond the scope of this
paper, the exercise below aims to evaluate the promise of these theories as paths forward.
4.6.1 Theory
According to Bopp, director elections feature few candidates because local banking associations—
primarily, the state chapters of the ABA—coordinate the nomination of a favored candi-
date. This coordination may be done semi-formally through their organization as a nom-
inating committee or through back-channel means. It follows that differences in election
contestation across Reserve Banks may be explained by variation in the strength of re-
gional banking associations. Specifically, Reserve Banks with fewer contested elections
may have banking associations in their district that are more active in local politics and
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more capable of exerting their power among member banks.20
A good measure of regional ABA strength would reflect each state banking associ-
ation’s organizational capacity, e.g. dollars spent lobbying, membership, or office staff
levels. These organizational variables could account for how active the association is in
local politics and proxy the likelihood that they are capable of providing the coordination
mechanism Bopp posits. Though I was unable to obtain this data from the ABA chapters,
for the purposes of this exploratory analysis, I measure ABA strength simply by whether
a nominating committee recommended a candidate for a director election.
Beyond ABA strength, another factor that may influence director election contestation
is the perception of Reserve Bank board influence. Even if we assume Reserve Bank di-
rectorships are generally valuable to firms, that contestation varies from year-to-year and
across Reserve Banks suggests the possibility that a firm’s interest in a director seat may
be heightened in certain periods. One potential consideration for member banks deciding
whether to submit a nomination may be whether the open director seat is expected to be
especially valuable, such as when the Reserve Bank’s presidency is vacant and the board
of directors will exercise its authority to appoint a new president. The logic here is that
when a Reserve Bank presidency is vacant, or is anticipated to be vacant in the near term,
an open seat of the board of directors may be “pivotal” in the sense that the newly elected
director will participate in the selection of a new Reserve Bank president. This opportu-
nity to more directly influence the selection of the Reserve Bank’s CEO may induce more
member banks to submit a favored candidate for nomination.
4.6.2 Empirical Model
To evaluate the promise of these two theories, I estimate a simple OLS model:
numcandsj = αj + β j(nomcommittee)+ β j(presvacancy)+ β j(specialelec)+ β j(incumbrun)+ ej
where numcandsj is a continuous measure denoting the number of candidates run-
ning in a director election j.21 nomcommitee is a binary indicator equal to 1 if a nominat-
ing committee (composed of state banking organizations in a Reserve district) circulated
a recommendation for a candidate at the beginning of an election’s nomination stage.22
presvacancy is a binary variable equal to 1 if, at the beginning of the director election
20 In particular, I propose that banking associations may be especially powerful in structuring the con-
testation of Class B elections. Because Class B candidates must not be formally affiliated with banks,
bankers may have less familiarity with potential candidates and may therefore rely more on banking
association recommendations. However, because there are no Class B races in my sample that featured
a nomination committee and were contested, I cannot test this proposition with my data.
21 Poisson and negative binomial models produce substantively similar results. Running separate nom-
ination committee and presidency vacancy models also produce similar results, so I include the two
independent variables of interest in one model for ease.
22 Given that the nominating committee variable is highly correlated with Reserve districts—only certain
Reserve Banks use nominating committees—I do not include Reserve Bank fixed effects in the model.
For the same reason, I do not include regional and demographic variables that have been shown to ex-
plain contestation in local government elections, e.g. district size, racial diversity, and partisan balance
(Gray 2004).
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process, (1) the Reserve Bank’s presidency was vacant, or anticipated to be vacant fol-
lowing a public announcement of the sitting president’s intention to step down; and (2)
the search for a new president is expected to begin after the start of the new director’s
term.23 I also include specialelec, a dummy indicating whether the election was called
to fill an unexpired term, and incumbrun, a dummy indicating whether an incumbent
was running in the race. These variables have been found to inhibit contestation in local
government elections (Gray 2004). I present results using the full sample of races and for
Class A elections alone.
4.6.3 Results
Table 4.3 summarizes the OLS results for the exploratory contestation analysis. Consis-
tent with Bopp, and with the descriptive analysis in Section 4.4.1, races with nomination
committees are associated with fewer candidates running for election. The coefficient
size for nominating committee in the full sample, moreover, is similar to that found in
Adams (2017). For Class A elections, the effect size is larger. These results provide fur-
ther evidence that nomination committees are effective at restraining member banks from
submitting other candidates for nomination. In other words, when banking associations
formally participate in the director nomination process, they succeed in getting their pre-
ferred candidate on the ballot and—in every case in my sample—elected.
I do not find evidence in support of the presidency vacancy theory, however. The co-
efficient is not statistically significant and it is also in the opposite direction we would
expect if it were the case that having a Reserve Bank president vacancy encouraged more
candidate nominations. From this simple model, then, I cannot conclude that the oppor-
tunity to sit on a “pivotal” board affects the number of candidates in a race.
Lastly, I find mixed results for the special election and incumbency variables. The
incumbency effect is negative and statistically significant in the full sample but not dis-
tinguishable from zero in the Class A subset. The special election coefficient is negative
and not significant in the full sample, but becomes positive and significant when look-
ing at Class A elections alone. While the results could suggest the special election and
incumbency variables help explain director election contestation, the results should be
interpreted with caution given small cell counts (there are few contested special elections,
for instance). At a minimum, future research should not discount incumbency and special
elections as potential predictors of contestation.
4.7 Discussion
This chapter examined the electoral dynamics underlying the selection of Class A and
Class B directors between 1980 and 2015. The analysis contributes to our understanding
of the director election process by providing the most comprehensive description of the
electoral landscape to date using the largest sample of elections collected so far. In doing
23 Sixty-two races in the sample were held with a Reserve Bank president vacancy.
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Table 4.3: Effects of Nom Committee and Pres Vacancy on Contestation
Dependent variable:
numcands
Full Sample Class A Subset
(1) (2)
Nom Committee −0.23∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.11)
RB Pres Vacancy −0.03 −0.11
(0.08) (0.13)
Special Elec −0.01 0.44∗
(0.09) (0.20)





Adjusted R2 0.02 0.05
F Statistic 4.57∗∗ (df = 596) 4.60∗∗ (df = 289)
Note: Robust SEs. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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so, I provide detailed insight into the contests, the identities of the candidates running,
and the participation of member banks in the nomination process.
I show that while Reserve Bank director elections are rarely contested, contestation
rates vary considerably across districts. Moreover, only a small fraction, about 13%, of
member banks eligible to nominate a candidate utilize this opportunity. I also find that
nominations appear to guide member banks’ vote choice, where candidates with more
nominations are significantly more likely to win contested elections. Who the candidate
is appears to be less relevant to winning than the endorsements the candidate receives.
Additionally, I find suggestive evidence that nomination committees successfully inhibit
contestation. Consistent with early accounts of director elections, regional state banking
associations do appear to control the nomination process.
Taken together, the results suggest that director elections are highly coordinated, with
regional banking associations playing a significant role in structuring who gets on the
ballot—both in terms of recommending a preferred nominee and deterring member banks
from submitting other nominees. While I cannot observe banking associations’ behavior
directly, at a minimum the analysis underscores the idea that banking influence is most
potently exercised before the election process. The real action, in other words, is in the
nomination stage. One implication of this results is that the ideological distribution of
directors is right-leaning not because member banks select the most conservative candi-
dates, but because candidates are conservative to begin with. A cursory analysis suggests
that, at least for Class A races, candidates are more conservative overall than the popu-
lation of political donors employed in banking or finance, the general pool from which
directors are pulled (Bonica 2014). Banking associations’ control over the nomination pro-
cess, then, may help explain the existence and perpetuation of the conservative governing
apparatus documented in the previous chapter.
Future work should focus on how banking associations execute this coordination mech-
anism in the nomination stage. In particular, greater attention to measuring banking asso-
ciation influence—perhaps through interviews or other qualitative approaches—and its
variation across Reserve districts could be especially valuable. A significant drawback
to the analysis in the previous section is the inadequate proxy for ABA strength. The
existence of a nomination committee is a clear signal that banking associations are partic-
ipating in the nomination process, but it does not address a more fundamental question:
why do some Reserve Banks use nomination committees and others do not? Investigat-
ing variation in regional banking association influence and how this may relate to adop-
tion of nomination committees would help explain the variation in contestation rates I
document. Moreover, examining how banking associations coordinate the nomination
process informally, without organizing as a committee, could shed light on the range of
tactics by which banking associations are able to take control of the nomination process.
In addition to building off Bopp (1935), this research could integrate more contemporary,
group-centered theories of election politics (Cohen et al. 2008; Bawn et. 2012), which
posit that policy demanding groups (in this case, bansk) have an incentive to take control
of and coordinate nomination processes.
Another extension of this study could explore the relationship between bank size and
election dynamics. One finding from this analysis is that Group 3 (small) banks are less
likely to submit nominations for director candidates relative to the participation rates of
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larger Group 1 and Group 2 banks. One potential explanation is that Group 3 elections—
which have a larger number of eligible member banks—require and receive more coor-
dination during the nomination stage given their numbers. While I do not find evidence
that nomination committees are more frequently involved in Group 3 elections, more pre-
cise measures of banking association influence could provide better leverage to investi-
gate this possibility. At the same time, I also find that Group 3 elections are more likely to
be contested than Group 1 and Group 2 elections. This is perhaps unsurprising given that
there are more eligible member banks in Group 3, but it runs counter to the notion that
banking associations focus more intensely on coordinating Group 3 banks. An alternative
explanation for the inverse relationship between nomination participation rates and bank
size is that big (Group 1) banks perceive the stakes of director elections to be higher than
smaller banks. Big banks may have more to gain from placing a preferred candidate on
the board, and perhaps more to lose if not. We might therefore expect Group 1 banks to be
more proactive about nominating candidates. A final potential explanation is that Group
1 banks may be more tightly networked than banks in other groups. As a result, Group
1 bankers may just have more information about who would be a good candidate for the
director seat. Evaluating these and other competing explanations could be a fruitful path
forward for understanding how different banks utilize director elections to ensure their
policy preferences are represented on the board.
This study has a number of limitations. First, the data does not allow for a more thor-
ough examination of time trends. This is in part due to the incompleteness of my sample,
but also to the fact that in most years, only 24 director elections are held. Even though
I make no attempts at causal inference and aim to provide primarily descriptive insight,
inferring time trends from this small number of within-year observations is challenging.
The rarity of some important election variables also complicates my ability to examine
theoretically relevant relationships. For example, there are only five Class A incumbents
that lost an election in my sample; among Class B incumbents, there are zero. The small
cell counts make it difficult to test for incumbency advantage in the data.
Second, this analysis does not discuss other actors, beyond members banks and bank-
ing associations, that may play a role in director selection. Bopp (1935) notes that while
the Boston Fed had an especially strong banking association that exerted control over the
election process, a sitting Class A director in the Chicago Fed, “Mr. Reynolds,” was influ-
ential in selecting candidates for nomination to their board. Reserve Bank presidents may
also play a role in selecting directors in some districts (Bopp 1935; Clark 1935). A more
contemporary example is found in former New York Fed President Bill Dudley. Accord-
ing to transcripts of meetings of the New York Fed’s board of directors, Dudley presented
the board with recommended candidates for open Class A and Class B seats. Directors
then voted to endorse Dudley’s candidates, which was then communicated to the state
banking associations that composed the district’s nomination committee.24 Attention to
other participants would provide further insight into the director selection process and
contribute to our understanding of why electoral outcomes like contestation may vary
across Reserve Banks.
24 The candidates recommended by Dudley, who were ultimately nominated by member banks and won
uncontested, were Alphonso O’Neil-White, Paul P. Mello, Glenn Hutchins, and Terry Lundgren.
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Lastly, while this analysis focused on director elections, there is still much to learn
about the appointment of Class C directors by the Board of Governors. This is an even
more opaque process than director elections, and I was unable to obtain relevant records
from the Board through FOIA. However, evidence from the archival record suggests that,
at least early in the Fed’s history, the Board heavily relied on recommendations from Re-
serve Bank presidents, sitting Reserve Bank directors, and even other federal agencies.25
Moreover, the Board of Governors appeared to prioritize the appointment of candidates
who were “well-known” in the district’s important industries; for example, the Board
supported its selection of several Chicago Fed director candidates on the basis of their
popularity in agricultural circles. More recently, Reserve Banks have developed their
own strategies for identifying potential Class C directors for the Boards’ consideration.
The Cleveland Fed has an online recommendation form open to the public, while the
Kansas City Fed maintains a “director pipeline program” to develop a pool of future
Class C candidates. Future work should develop a more complete descriptive account of
the Class C director selection process, which could allow more comprehensive theoretical
work on director selection more generally.
In the next chapter, I attempt to fill in some of the gaps in our understanding of the
director selection process, and director responsibilities more broadly, with a survey of
former Reserve Bank directors.
25 For instance, a candidate for the Cleveland Fed’s board of directors in the late 1940s was recom-
mended by a divisional director of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. National Archives
and Records Administration (Group 82, Box 993).
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4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Director Election Ballot
Figure 4.11: Sample ballot, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2005
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4.8.2 Summary Statistics for Variables
Table 4.1: Variable Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Incumbent 745 0.294 0.456 0 1
Male 745 0.881 0.325 0 1
Number of nominations 700 5.603 5.467 1 33
Affiliated with nominator 745 0.452 0.498 0 1
ABA affiliation 710 0.272 0.445 0 1
Community bank org affiliation 710 0.144 0.351 0 1
Chamber of Commerce affiliation 710 0.269 0.444 0 1
Bus Roundtable affiliation 710 0.058 0.233 0 1
Govt experience 710 0.208 0.406 0 1
CF score 648 0.338 0.734 −1.605 1.621
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4.8.3 Regression Results: Who Wins Director Elections?
Table 4.2: Logit Output (Contested Elections), Odds Ratios
Dependent variable:
winrace
Full Sample Class A Subset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incumbent 3.88∗ 2.76 2.61 1.80
(0.65) (0.68) (0.65) (0.67)
Male 2.59 3.18 2.59 4.67
(0.70) (0.71) (0.95) (0.91)
MBA 0.82 0.71 0.78 0.61
(0.43) (0.46) (0.50) (0.55)
Other Grad 0.69 0.58 0.71 0.54
(0.42) (0.45) (0.52) (0.64)
ABA 0.76 0.98 0.65 0.83
(0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.52)
ICBA 0.95 0.83 0.90 0.74
(0.49) (0.51) (0.53) (0.56)
Chamber 1.62 1.86 2.37 2.52
(0.39) (0.41) (0.47) (0.50)
Govt Exper 0.70 0.82 0.30 0.33
(0.49) (0.52) (0.71) (0.72)
Nom Affiliate 1.63 2.01 2.26 2.80
(0.49) (0.55) (0.52) (0.61)
Num Noms 1.30∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.49∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
CFscore 1.10 1.41 0.96 1.28
(0.31) (0.33) (0.36) (0.40)
Constant 0.07∗∗ 0.003 0.05∗∗ 0.001
(0.98) (1.73) (1.15) (1.78)
Observations 193 193 153 153
Log Likelihood −100.66 −98.27 −71.68 −68.61
RB Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients. SEs in parentheses.
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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4.8.4 Average Marginal Effects: Who Wins Director Elections?









































































Figure 4.12: Average Marginal Effects, Contested Class A Elections. These results
largely mirror the effects estimated on the full sample of contested elections.
108















































































Figure 4.13: Average Marginal Effects, Contested Elections, by Bank Group,
Baseline Model. Note that for some variables cell counts within group may be
quite small, limiting the reliability of the results. Though these models should be
interpreted with caution, for those variables that have sufficiently large counts
(e.g. the number of nominations), they suggest there may be substantive differ-
ences in electoral dynamics across bank groups.
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Chapter 5
National Survey of Reserve Bank
Directors
“They are, for the most part, men with a large amount of business experience
and a broad point of view with respect to the public interest. They are an in-
valuable link between the Government and the business community. Because
of them, the Government is better able to understand the point of view of
business and business is better able to understand the point of view of Gov-
ernment.” — Report of the Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt
Management, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 82nd Congress, 1952.
In the preceding chapters, I collected and analyzed data to describe observable out-
comes of Reserve Bank governance dynamics. Chapter 3 documented the biographical
profiles and ideological distributions of Reserve Bank directors and showed that directors
tend to be conservative and relatively active (Republican) campaign donors. In Chapter
4, I investigated the electoral process that selects Class A and Class B directors and found
suggestive evidence that local banking associations play a powerful role in controlling
directors elections. While these empirical analyses are exploratory, they leverage original
data to describe who sits on the Reserve Bank boards and how they got there.
In this chapter, I take a more qualitative approach and conduct a survey of former and
sitting directors. By eliciting directors’ first-hand accounts of their board service, I aim
to develop a much more detailed and realistic picture of how Reserve Bank governance
operates in practice. These descriptive accounts also allow me to validate the empirical
trends documented in Chapters 3 and 4.
Surveys of political and economic elites have yielded important insights into elite pol-
icy preferences, how they influence the policymaking process, and the political land-
scapes in which they operate (e.g. Clinton et al. 2011; Oliver, Ha, and Callen 2012;
Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013; Anzia 2015). For the Fed in particular, interviews
with FOMC members and staff have been instrumental in illuminating its decisionmak-
ing procedures and interactions with Congress and the banking sector (e.g. Woolley
1984; Meltzer 2010; Schonhardt-Bailey 2013). Most closely related to this project, Harrison
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(1977; 1991) surveyed about 100 directors in 1977 and again in 1989 for their attitudes re-
garding the Fed’s independence and the influence of the Reserve Bank boards. He shows
that across both surveys, directors considered their most important role to be the provi-
sion of on-the-ground intelligence about local economic conditions, but acknowledged
that their input over monetary policy was limited. The survey I field takes a page from
Harrison, updating and expanding the scope of this early work to build a more complete
picture of what Reserve Bank directors do and how they are chosen.
To this end, I asked directors about a wide range of issues, including the director se-
lection process, the scope of directors’ responsibilities, Reserve Bank president appoint-
ments, and the tenor of board deliberations. The responses suggest that director recruit-
ment processes are highly networked; that banking associations play active roles in se-
lecting directors even in Reserve districts not known for using nomination committees;
that directors perceive themselves to be influential in monetary policymaking; and that
Reserve Bank presidents and staff largely dictate discount rate recommendations. More
generally, the survey illustrates that director experiences vary considerably, even within
the same Reserve Bank. While the sample is small and not entirely representative of the
broader population of Reserve Bank directors, it nevertheless provides a new look into
the dynamics of Reserve Bank governance and the viewpoints of directors themselves.
The primary contribution of the survey is informational. Specifically, the responses
provide new descriptive insight—what Aberbach, Chesney, and Rockman (1975) call “de-
scriptive theory.” Without a clear sense of how elite institutions and processes operate, it
is difficult to formulate precise expectations that may be analyzed formally or tested em-
pirically. Less structured research methods, like informational surveys and interviews,
can support the development of descriptive theory upon which more systematic studies
can build. As I show here, respondents’ views about the role directors play and the pro-
cesses by which they are selected clarifies our understanding of how the Reserve Bank
boards function and highlights inconsistencies between directors’ views and the empiri-
cal and theoretical accounts I discuss in preceding chapters. Grappling with these incon-
sistencies may be a good starting point for future research on Reserve Bank governance.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 5.1, I describe the online survey, the sam-
pling frame, and the sample’s representativeness. Section 5.2 walks through several cate-
gories of survey responses, including director selection, board responsibilities, the presi-
dent appointment process, and discount rate policymaking. Section 5.3 concludes.
5.1 Data: National Survey of Reserve Bank Directors
The survey instrument consisted of roughly 40 questions and was designed to capture
the full range of a director’s experience while serving on a Reserve Bank board. In partic-
ular, I focused on questions about board operations, director recruitment, and directors’
perceptions of their influence that I believed remained unanswered or under-explored in
the academic literature and journalistic accounts. To that end, I asked former and sitting
directors a series of questions that aimed to gather insight into: (1) how directors are re-
cruited and which actors are most active in the recruitment process; (2) how much time
directors devote to their responsibilities and how that time is split among different tasks;
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(3) who directors consult in preparation for board meetings; (4) the kinds of policy issues
on which directors are asked to advise; (5) how the Reserve Bank president appointment
process works; and (6) the tenor of board meetings and the degree of conflict character-
izing directors’ deliberations. I also asked respondents about their partisanship and their
preferences on regulatory and monetary policy.1
The survey was administered online via Qualtrics. Responses were confidential and
participants were not required to provide any self-identifying information. Respondents
also had the opportunity to skip questions and offer write-in responses to questions. Di-
rectors were initially contacted in late January and early February 2018 and given four
weeks to complete the survey. Individuals that did not respond were sent four reminder
messages over the following four weeks after making initial contact.
5.1.1 Sample Construction
To construct the sampling frame, I relied on the list of Reserve Bank directors compiled for
Chapter 3 and focused on former and sitting (living) directors that began their board ser-
vice no earlier than 1990 (n=522).2 I restricted the sample in this way largely on grounds
of convenience, as a large share of directors serving before 1990 are now deceased or in
advanced age. To obtain email addresses, I conducted internet searches for each of the 522
individuals in the frame. In some cases this was a straightforward process because many
directors are still employed and have email addresses listed through their employer’s
website. In other cases finding email addresses was more difficult, particularly for those
individuals who are now retired. If I could not find a working email address, I conducted
searches in LinkedIn and Facebook.
In total, I found working contact information for 343 former and current directors
(about 66% of the sample) and invited this number to take the online survey. I emailed
267 directly and messaged 76 via LinkedIn.3 Invites were fairly evenly balanced across
the director classes, though fewer Class C directors were contacted compared to Class A
and B directors. Invites were also roughly balanced across Reserve Banks, but directors
from the Minneapolis Fed were slightly overrepresented (contact information was found
for about 10 more directors at Minneapolis relative to the average). On average, about 28
former or sitting directors from each Reserve Bank were contacted.
Of the 343 former and sitting directors invited, 16 completed the survey—a response
rate of about 4.7%.4 The sample is obviously very small, complicating my ability to draw
generalizable descriptions of director experiences. Moreover, as described below, the
sample is not representative of the broader population of directors. This is a significant
drawback given my interest in evaluating cross-district variation in board dynamics. De-
spite the clear limitations of this data, it is worth stressing that the survey responses are
1 As this survey was exploratory, I did not include manipulation or attention checks.
2 A total of 573 directors began their service on or later than 1990, but 51 of these directors had passed
away by the time the survey was administered.
3 I emailed an additional 27 directors but received bounce-back messages from those addresses.
4 In total, 27 directors began the survey but 11 did not complete it. 18 answered the first question but
two respondents left the survey after this first question.
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a source of completely new information on a topic that is in need of greater scholarly
attention. At a minimum, the data can help contextualize the findings presented in the
preceding chapters and point to productive areas for future research.
5.1.2 Representativeness
Figure 5.1 provides an overview of directors that participated in the survey. Respon-
dents came from seven Reserve Banks, with the Chicago and Minneapolis Feds most
represented; each of those banks had three respondents. The New York, Philadelphia,
Cleveland, Kansas City, and Dallas Feds did not have any survey participants, though
two respondents elected not to identify their Reserve Bank affiliation. The majority of
respondents, about 63%, were Class B directors. Class A and Class C directors were each
represented by three respondents. Lastly, a majority of respondents (nine) served on the



























Figure 5.1: Survey Respondent Characteristics. The x-axis denotes the
number of respondents. The y-axis lists three groups of characteristics:
the respondent’s class, decade they began their director service, and
the Reserve Bank with which they are affiliated. While the respondents
cover each of the three director classes and decades of services, only
seven of the 12 Reserve Banks are represented.
Table 5.1 below provides a cross tabulation of respondent characteristics, including re-
spondents’ self-reported party identification. The three Class A respondents in the sample
represented the Richmond, San Francisco, and Chicago Feds. The three Class C directors
represented the Boston, Atlanta, and Minneapolis Feds. Of the three Class A respondents,
two identified as Republicans and one identified as an independent. Among the three
Class C respondents, two identified as Democrats and one identified as a Republican. Of
the 10 Class B respondents, two identified as Republicans. While the number of respon-
dents is too small to reasonably glean patterns in respondent characteristics, at a basic
level the relationship between director class and party ID seems to conform to what we
would expect: Class A directors in the sample are more likely to identify as Republicans,
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while Class C directors are more likely to identify as Democrats.
Table 5.1: Survey Respondent Overview
Respondent Bank Class Decade Party
1 Atlanta B 2000s Independent
2 Atlanta C 2000s Democrat
3 Boston B 2000s Democrat
4 Boston C 2000s Democrat
5 Chicago A 2000s Republican
6 Chicago B 1990s Republican
7 Chicago B 2000s Democrat
8 Minneapolis B 1990s Republican
9 Minneapolis B 2010s Prefer not to answer
10 Minneapolis C 1990s Republican
11 Richmond A 2000s Republican
12 San Francisco A 2000s Independent
13 St. Louis B 1990s Democrat
14 St. Louis B 1990s Independent
15 Prefer not to answer B 2000s Democrat
16 Prefer not to answer B 2010s Independent
Note: The table describes the Reserve Bank, director class, decade of service, and party
identification of respondents to the online survey.
Overall, however, directors who elected to report their partisanship were more likely
to identify as Democrats than as Republicans or independents. This is somewhat surpris-
ing given the results from Chapter 3, which show that directors are significantly more
likely to donate to Republican candidates and are concentrated on the right side of the
ideological spectrum. A possible explanation for the seemingly large number of self-
identified Democrats in the survey is that Democrats were disproportionately more likely
to participate in the survey than Republicans or independents.
Class B respondents were much more likely to respond to the survey than the other di-
rector classes. About 8% of Class B directors invited to the survey completed it, compared
to response rates of 2.5% and 3% for Class A and Class C directors, respectively. Across
Reserve Banks, response rates were highest for the Atlanta and Chicago Feds, which each
had about 10% of directors respond to the survey (though this amounts to just two and
three respondents).
5.2 Survey Results
In this section, I discuss responses to the director survey. Given the small number of re-
spondents, I present response counts, rather than percentages, in the charts below.5 I also
5 The number of respondents may vary across questions; not all respondents answered every question.
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break out responses by class and Reserve Bank where relevant in order to get a better
sense of potential variation. For some questions—such as respondents’ personal experi-
ence with recruitment and their policy preferences—I expect responses may differ across
director class given both differences in the selection process (e.g. elections for Class A
and B directors vs. Board of Governors’ appointments for Class C directors) and differ-
ences in directors’ professional backgrounds and ideology. For other questions, such as
the influence of actors in the director selection process and directors’ responsibilities on
the board, I expect director experiences are more likely to be a function of the Reserve
district in which they served. It should be stressed, of course, that the small sample pre-
cludes inferring that any differences in responses are due to respondent class or Reserve
Bank. Rather, the aim is to document the range of responses and identify any patterns
that may be suggestive of broader relationships.
5.2.1 Director Selection
All but one of the survey respondents were approached by another party to gauge their
interest in serving as a Reserve Bank director (Figure 5.2(a)). Just one of the three Class A
respondents nominated themselves using the nomination form circulated among member
banks voting in a director election. Among those who were approached by another party,
most were contacted by Reserve Bank staff, as shown in Figure 5.2(b). Some of these
respondents provided additional insight into their recruitment. One Class C director from
the Minneapolis Fed, for example, noted they were approached by Reserve Bank staff
about a directorship after serving on a Reserve Bank committee of community leaders that
provided feedback on the district’s economic health. In addition, a Class B respondent
from the Chicago Fed reported they were approached by staff from both the Reserve
Bank and the Board of Governors.
Class B directors were the only group of respondents to have been contacted by a
sitting or former director. Notably, none of the Class B respondents were approached by
a banking association, even though banking associations presumably recommend Class
B as well as Class A director names to member banks. In contrast, one of the Class A
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Figure 5.2: Director Recruitment. In panel (a), respondents were asked how they were
initially recruited. For those who responded that someone reached out to them, panel
(b) asks respondents who reached out. In panel (b), no respondents chose the options
“member bank” or “other.” For each panel, the y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
Figure 5.3 shows whether respondents were acquainted with a sitting Reserve Bank
director prior to their own appointment to the board. A majority of respondents, 10 of the
16, were acquainted with a sitting director, including all three Class A respondents. That
many respondents already knew a Reserve Bank director prior to their service suggests
that the director recruitment process may be highly networked, with new directors being
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 acquainted with a sitting director?
Figure 5.3: Prior to your appointment, were you acquainted with a sit-
ting director? The y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
Directors were also asked to evaluate the degree of involvement—from “extremely”
to “not at all”—of several actors in the director selection process. The top panel of Figure
?? shows respondents’ evaluations of actor involvement in selecting Class A directors,
given their personal experience serving as a director. Respondents generally agreed that
Reserve Bank presidents and, to a lesser extent, sitting directors, were active in selecting
Class A directors. By contrast, most respondents answered that officials from the Board
of Governors did not play a big role in selecting Class A directors; a majority said the
Board of Governors was “not at all”, “slightly”, or “somewhat” involved. Respondents
were divided on the role of Reserve Bank staff.
Most respondents reported that most external groups—consumer organizations, labor
unions, and business associations—were not especially active in recommending or select-
ing Class A directors. These groups were generally evaluated as “not at all” or “slightly”
involved, save for in the Boston Fed, where a respondent noted that labor unions and
business associations were “very” involved, and consumer groups “somewhat” involved.
Moreover, respondents agreed that local elected officials were not involved in selecting
Class A directors.
Consistent with my analysis of director elections from Chapter 4, local banking asso-
ciations appear to be fairly active in choosing Class A directors. Five of the seven Reserve
Banks represented in the sample had a respondent say local banking associations were
either “extremely” or “very” involved in the process. This is true even for respondents
from Reserve Banks that, as I show in the previous chapter, did not use nominating com-
mittees (composed of local banking associations) in their elections: Chicago, St. Louis,
and Minneapolis. Interestingly, the one respondent who noted banking associations were
“extremely” involved was from the Richmond Fed, which had a very small share of elec-
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tions (less than 3%) involving a nominating committee. An explanation for the dissonance
between the elections analysis and respondents’ evaluations of banking involvement in
elections may be that I have incomplete records of nominating committee involvement in
director elections. Another explanation may be that banking associations participate in





































Extremely Very Somewhat Slightly Not.at.all
How involved would you say the following actors are in recommending or selecting
 Class A and B directors, beyond member banks?
Figure 5.4: How involved would you say the following actors are in recom-
mending or selecting Class A and Class B directors, beyond member banks?
The y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
The response patterns with respect to respondent evaluations of Class B director se-
lection are broadly similar to what we observed with Class A selection. As the bottom
panel of Figure 5.4 shows, Board of Governors officials, labor unions, consumer groups,
and business associations are generally not evaluated as being active in recommending
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or selecting Class B directors. Reserve Bank presidents, directors, and staff, by contrast,





























How involved would you say the following actors are in recommending or selecting
 Class C directors, beyond the Board of Governors?
Figure 5.5: How involved would you say the following actors are in rec-
ommending or selecting Class C directors, beyond the Board of Governors?
The y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
Figure 5.5 shows respondents’ evaluations of involvement in the Class C director se-
lection process, beyond the role of the Board of Governors. As with the selection of Class
A and B directors, Reserve Bank presidents, sitting directors, and staff appear to play an
important role in recommending or selecting Class C directors. Most respondents iden-
tified these three actors as “extremely”, “very”, or “somewhat” involved. In contrast to
evaluations of Class A and B director elections, more respondents evaluated consumer
groups, labor unions as business associations as being “very” or “somewhat’ involved
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in selecting Class C directors. These responses were concentrated in the Boston, Atlanta,
and San Francisco Feds.
As the charts above show, Reserve Bank presidents and sitting directors appear to be
fairly active in the director selection process across districts, especially relative to outside
groups and the Board of Governors. Figure 5.6 below displays directors’ responses when
asked how often Reserve Bank presidents and directors propose names to fill vacant di-
rector seats. Overall, a majority of respondents said sitting directors propose names to
fill vacant director seats “most of the time.” By contrast, a majority of respondents said
Reserve Bank presidents proposed names only “sometimes”. Sitting directors appear to
play an important role in selecting new directors in each district, consistent with the re-
sults presented earlier that show most directors were already acquainted with a sitting
director prior to their appointment. Compared to sitting directors, Reserve Bank presi-
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How often does the Reserve Bank president or sitting directors
 propose names to fill vacant director seats?
Figure 5.6: How often does the Reserve Bank president or sitting direc-
tors propose names to fill vacant director seats? The y-axis denotes the
number of respondents.
5.2.2 General Responsibilities
To get a sense of directors’ workload, they were asked several questions about their re-
sponsibilities and their interactions with Reserve Bank staff.
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As seen in Figure 5.7(a), the majority of respondents devoted 10-20 hours each month
performing director duties. One respondent, a Class B director from the Atlanta Fed
serving during the 2000s, reported spending more than 60 hours each month on direc-
tor responsibilities. Another respondent, a Class C director from the Boston Fed, noted
that serving during the financial crisis was different than their experience as a director in
the preceding years. While 10-20 hours per month was standard before the crisis, they
reported participating in at least 10 hours of meetings each week, both at their Reserve
Bank as well as at the Board of Governors. Overall, a majority of respondents said board
meetings were held in person at least 90% of the time (Figure 5.7(b)). Directors were
also asked whether they had an opportunity to express their preferred committee assign-
ments, with slightly more than half of respondents saying they were not able to choose
their committee assignments.
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Figure 5.7: In panel (a): How many hours per month were spent performing
director duties? In panel (b): What share of board meetings were held in person?
For each panel, the x-axis denotes the number of respondents.
Figure 5.8 shows directors’ responses when asked whether their responsibilities were
more heavily focused on corporate governance (such as strategic planning and personnel
decisions) or on policy (include discussing local economic conditions). Overall, most
respondents said they spent much less time on corporate governance activities than on
policy.6
6 In a 1976 study of the boards commissioned by the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and
Housing, most Reserve Bank boards reported spending the bulk of their time on administrative, rather
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on governance
How much of your job would you say was devoted to carrying out corporate governance
 responsibilities (such as strategic planning, auditing, and personnel),
 versus responsibilities related to local or national economic policy?
Figure 5.8: How much of your job would you say was devoted to car-
rying out corporate governance responsibilities (such as strategic plan-
ning and auditing), versus responsibilities related to local or national
economic policy? The y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
The next three charts display responses to questions that try to gauge directors’ poten-
tial influence on Reserve Bank policymaking and operations. First, as Figure 5.9 shows,
directors reported being asked their opinions on a wide range of policy issues by Reserve
Bank staff, though some respondents said they were never asked about inflation or lo-
cal credit conditions. Most respondents agreed they were frequently asked to weigh in
on local employment and the general health of the industries in which they work. This
makes sense as director anecdotes about local economic conditions are often compiled
by Reserve Bank staff and reported in the Federal Reserve Board’s “Beige Book”, which
is released two weeks prior to each FOMC meeting.7 Interestingly, a majority of respon-
dents also reported being asked their opinions on inflation and regulatory burdens at least
“somewhat often.” When breaking out responses by director class, it does not appear that
Reserve Bank staff ask different classes of directors to weigh in on different issues.
7 One respondent, a Class B director from the St. Louis Fed, noted at the end of the survey that they saw

























How often did Reserve Bank officials ask directors for opinions on the following issues?
Figure 5.9: How often did Reserve Bank officials ask directors for opin-
ions on the following issues? The y-axis denotes the number of respon-
dents.
Second, in Figure 5.10, directors were asked to evaluate their influence on selected
issues, with responses broken out by the responding director’s class.8 There is a fair
amount of disagreement among respondents, both within and across class. For the most
part, respondents agree (“somewhat” or “strongly”) that the boards of directors have a
meaningful impact on shaping the Reserve Bank’s consensus understanding of local eco-
nomic conditions and the Bank’s community outreach efforts. A majority of respondents
also “somewhat” agree that the boards have an impact on the direction of the Reserve
Bank’s research activities. Respondents appeared more divided, however, on directors’
influence on key corporate governance issues: the Reserve Bank’s audit and hiring and
personnel decisions. This is perhaps explained by the limited time director spend on
8 The wording of this question was inspired by a question in Harrison (1991).
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Neither agree nor disagree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
For each of the activities below, how strongly do you agree with the following statement:
 'Boards of Directors have a meaningful impact on the formulation and direction of...'
Figure 5.10: For each of the activities below, how strongly do you agree with
the following statement: “Boards of Directors have a meaningful impact on the
formulation and direction of...” The y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
Eleven of the 16 respondents “somewhat” or “strongly” agreed that directors have an
impact on discount rate policy and monetary policy more generally. As directors vote
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on recommendations for the discount rate, it is slightly surprising that directors did not
more strongly agree with the statement that they had influence on this area. I explore
respondents’ perceptions of their discount rate responsibilities in more depth in Section
5.2.4. For the Reserve Bank’s regulatory and supervisory activities, the modal response
was “neither agree nor disagree.” At least one respondent from each class, moreover,
“somewhat” agreed that directors have a meaningful impact on regulatory and supervi-
sory activities. This too is somewhat surprising given that director involvement in these
areas is ostensibly prohibited 9 Overall, the three Class C respondents seemed to exhibit
less disagreement over the notion that they had influence over regulatory activities, mon-
etary policy, and discount rate decisions than Class A and Class B respondents.
Lastly, directors were asked which three responsibilities they personally considered to
be the most important part of the job. Figure 5.11 shows that most respondents selected
providing Reserve Bank staff with intelligence about local economic conditions as one of
the three most important responsibilities directors fulfill, followed by advising on inter-
est rate policy. Serving as a liaison between their industry and the Fed, and overseeing
the Reserve Bank’s internal audit were the next most common selections for each of the
classes of respondents.
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Figure 5.11: Of the following responsibilities directors might fulfill,
which three did you consider to be most important? The x-axis denotes
the number of respondents.
Overall, respondents seem to agree that providing intelligence about local economic
conditions to shape the Reserve Bank’s consensus about the regional economy is one of
directors’ most important, and influential, responsibilities. This result is consistent with
the study by Harrison (1991), where nearly all the directors surveyed saw this as one
of their primary—and, for many directors, only—substantive roles. At the same time,
less than half of directors surveyed in that early study viewed their service as having an
impact on the Reserve Bank research activities, discount rate policy, and monetary policy
more generally. Respondents in my survey, by contrast, were somewhat more likely to
agree that they have a meaningful impact on each of the areas.
5.2.3 President Appointment Process
Half of the 16 survey respondents participated in a search for a new Reserve Bank pres-
ident during their tenure on the board of directors. Figure 5.12 below displays these di-
rectors’ evaluations of how influential certain actors were in determining the short list of
candidates to fill vacant Reserve Bank president seats. Respondents agreed that the chair
of the board of directors that leads the search committee—always a Class C director—
was “extremely” or “very” influential. Beyond the chair of the search committee, other
Reserve Bank directors and officials from the Board of Governors appear to be the other
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actors that are most likely to be influential in the president appointment process. Ex-
ecutive search firms, which are utilized by Reserve Banks to establish a list of potential
candidates, were generally viewed as “somewhat” influential, perhaps suggesting that
these firms play a role in constraining directors’ choice set. Local business and banking
associations were generally not seen as influential. Outgoing presidents, moreover, seem



























How influential would you say each of the following actors are in determining
 the short list of candidates to fill Reserve Bank president vacancies?
Figure 5.12: How influential would you say each of the following actors
are in determining the short list of candidates to fill Reserve Bank president
vacancies? The y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
Directors were also asked which three traits were personally most important to them
when selecting a new Reserve Bank president. The most popular trait across all respon-
dents was candidate’s strategic vision. Respondents also identified previous Reserve
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Bank experience, communication skills, business experience, and—for Class B directors—
similar monetary policy views as important traits. Two respondents, Class A and Class C,
wrote in leadership skill as a trait that was important to them. No respondents selected a
candidate being well-known or sharing their regulatory policy views as among the most
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Figure 5.13: Of the following traits listed below, which three were the
most important to you when selecting a new Reserve Bank president?
The x-axis denotes the number of respondents.
As Figure 5.14 shows, directors who participated in a Reserve Bank president appoint-
ment process generally agreed that there was a relatively high degree of consensus among
directors when choosing a candidate. The modal answer was 4 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1
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In your experience participating in the selection of a new Reserve Bank president,
 how would you rate the degree of consensus among the search committee?
Figure 5.14: In your experience participating in the selection of a new Re-
serve Bank president, how would you rate the degree of consensus among
the search committee? The y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
5.2.4 Discount Rate Recommendations
Survey participants were also asked about board dynamics when recommending a dis-
count rate to the Board of Governors, which they are obligated to do by law every 14 days.
All but one respondent reported that all directors on the board deliberated and voted on
a discount rate. One respondent, a Class A director from the Chicago Fed serving in the
2000s, noted that only a committee of directors discussed the discount rate. Figure 5.15
displays directors’ responses when asked how often their Reserve Bank president or staff
proposed a course of action prior to their vote on the discount rate. Most respondents
across each of the Reserve districts said a course of action was “always” presented prior
to directors’ votes. Two respondents, a Class C director from the Atlanta Fed and one who
did not list their affiliated Reserve Bank, said the Reserve Bank president or staff “never”
suggested a course of action. That presidents and their staff largely control the discount
rate decisions is consistent with other anecdotal accounts, as well as assumptions made
in empirical studies of discount rate policymaking (e.g. Jinushi and Kuttner 2008; Meltzer
2010).10. The experiences of the two directors who responded “never”, however, suggests
10 In one example, Carl Vander Wilt, a former official at the Chicago Fed during the 1970s, noted that
the Bank’s board of directors was composed of representatives from the auto and construction indus-
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How often did the Reserve Bank president or staff propose
 a course of action on the discount rate prior to your vote?
Figure 5.15: When making recommendations on the discount rate, how
often did the Reserve Bank president or staff propose a course of action
prior to your vote? The y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
Most respondents reported that directors “sometimes” disagreed on the appropriate
discount rate policy (Figure 5.16). Two directors, moreover, responded “most of the time.”
Discount rate deliberations appear to be somewhat contentious, with directors having
different opinions over the right course of action.
tries who resisted raising discount rates. The Chicago Fed president, Robert Mayo, however, made the
final decisions and ultimately chose to submit recommendations for higher discount rates. See obit-
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When deliberating and voting on a discount rate recommendation,
 how often did directors disagree on the appropriate course of action?
Figure 5.16: When making recommendations on the discount rate, how
often did directors disagree on the appropriate course of action? The y-
axis denotes the number of respondents. The two directors who did not
list their affiliations with a Reserve Bank both responded “sometimes”
to this question.
Lastly, in Figure 5.17, directors were asked how often they had a strong opinion on
what the discount rate should be. Half of the respondents reported they had a strong
opinion “most of the time”, while another two—both Class B—said they “always” had a
strong opinion. The remaining six respondents noted they had a strong opinion no more
than half of the time; one of these respondents, a Class B director from the Boston Fed,
said “never.” These results suggest that while some directors may come into discount
rate deliberations with a firm point of view on the best policy, others may be open to
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Figure 5.17: How often did you have a strong opinion about what the
appropriate discount rate should be? The y-axis denotes the number of
respondents. The y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
5.2.5 Takeaways and Policy Preferences
The final set of questions in the survey asked directors for their general takeaways from
their director experiences and for insight into their policy preferences.
First, respondents were asked about their motivations for serving as a director in the
first place. As Figure 5.18 shows, directors from each class were most strongly motivated
by an interest in learning more about economic policymaking, the potential to represent
their company or industry in policymaking, and civic duty.11 Every Class A respondent
reported an interest in learning more about economic policymaking and the opportu-
nity to represent their company or industry viewpoint as “extremely” influential in their
decision to serve, while the other classes had respondents note they were slightly less
(“very”) motivated by these concerns. Similarly, all Class C respondents reported being
“extremely” motivated by a sense of civic duty, while the other classes has respondents
less motivated by this concern. A desire to change the Fed’s policies or Reserve Bank
11 A Class C respondent from the Minneapolis Fed noted at the end of the survey that they used their
time on the board of directors as an opportunity to bring attention to issues impacting rural areas like
the one they lived and worked in. The director notes that they managed to arrange several trips in
which Reserve Bank management visited rural areas to hear from concerned citizens.
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management were not, in most cases, influential factors motivating directors to serve. Be-
yond the factors listed, one Class A respondent cited the opportunity to better understand















































How influential were each of the following factors in your decision to serve as a director?
Figure 5.18: How influential were each of the following factors in your
decision to serve as a director? The y-axis denotes the number of re-
spondents.
When asked their primary reason for leaving the board, most directors (11 of the 16)
cited reaching their term limit (Figure 5.19). Of the three directors who cited “other”
reasons for leaving, two had moved out of their Reserve district before being term limited,
while one—a Class A director from the Chicago Fed—said they did not feel like they were









What was your primary reason for leaving the board?
Figure 5.19: What was your primary reason for leaving the board? The
y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
Figure 5.20(a) below shows that most directors “strongly” agreed with the statement
that other board members valued their input in board discussions. All three Class A di-
rectors strongly agreed with the statement, while Class B and C directors responded less
uniformly. A majority of directors also strongly agreed with the statement that Reserve
Bank presidents and staff made decisions that reflected directors’ counsel (Figure 5.20(b)).
One exception is the Class A director who said they disagreed “somewhat.” This respon-
dent was the same person who reported leaving the board because they did not feel like
Reserve Bank staff was listening to them.12
12 At the end of the survey, this respondent expressed disappointment that the Reserve Bank staff acted
“more and more like government employees year after year” and suggested that waste in Fed could
be eliminated “if a more private sector mentality existed.” The respondent also suggested that having
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Would you agree with the statement that the Reserve Bank
 president and staff made decisions that reflected directors' counsel?
(b)
Figure 5.20: In panel (a): Would you agree that other board members valued
your input in board discussions? In panel (b): Would you agree with that the
Reserve Bank president and staff made decisions that reflected directors’ coun-
sel? For each panel, the y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
The following two charts display respondents’ answers to questions that try to gauge
their policy interests and preferences. As Figure 5.21 shows, a majority of directors say
they follow policy issues related to monetary policy (such as inflation and employment)
more closely than regulatory policy issues. Another six respondents reported following
both monetary policy and regulatory policy issues equally. Just one respondent, a Class
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Figure 5.21: In general, which of the following policy areas do you pay
most attention to in your day-to-day life? The y-axis denotes the num-
ber of respondents.
Directors were more likely to say that there is “too much” or the “right amount” of
regulation of the business and financial sectors today than “too little” regulation (Figure
5.22(a)). The three Class A respondents agreed that there was “too much” regulation,
while two of the three Class C respondents said there was “too little.” The four respon-
dents who said there was too little regulation all identified as Democrats; among the
respondents who said there was too much regulation, just one identified as a Democrat
while the others identified as either Republicans or independents. Opinions were more
varied when directors were asked whether they would support a proposal to increase in-
terest rates (in early February 2018). Ten of the 16 respondents, including all three Class
A directors, reported they would “strongly” or “somewhat” support such a proposal.
One could interpret this result as potentially consistent with theoretical predictions of
anti-inflationary bias among Reserve Bank policymakers and, especially, bankers.Unlike
opinions on regulation, opinions on raising interest rates did not seem to be correlated
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Figure 5.22: In panel (a): In general, do you think there is too much, too little, or
about the right amount of regulation of the business and financial sectors today?
In panel (b): In general, would you support a proposal to increase interest rates
today? For each panel, the y-axis denotes the number of respondents.
5.3 Discussion
In this chapter, I surveyed former and sitting Reserve Bank directors about their expe-
riences serving on the board. The primary objective was to uncover details that clarify
how the boards of directors operate in practice and provide descriptive insight that can
inform the development of much-needed theoretical work in the domain of Reserve Bank
governance. While the sample of respondents was quite small and unrepresentative of
the broader population of directors serving since 1990, the results are a source of new
information that can help ground our understanding of important policymakers and pol-
icymaking processes, and, ultimately, guide future research.
Among the questions asked directors, I highlight five takeaways. First, the survey sug-
gests that director recruitment processes are highly networked: most respondents were
already acquainted with a sitting director prior to their selection, and sitting directors
routinely propose names of their acquaintances to fill vacant director seats. Second, re-
spondents perceived banking associations to play a fairly active role in selecting Class A
and B directors, even in those Reserve Banks that are not known to use nominating com-
mittees in elections. This is consistent with the analysis in the previous chapter, which
suggested that banking associations may be coordinating director elections through less
formal or observable means. More generally, a wide range of actors appears to be in-
volved in director selection at least some of the time. Third, directors think they’re most
influential in shaping Reserve Bank consensus on local economic conditions—just as they
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did in the survey by Harrison (1991)—but unlike that study they also see themselves as
influential on the formulation of monetary policy. Directors moreover did not generally
disagree with the statement that they had influence over regulatory and supervisory ac-
tivities. Fourth, respondents noted that Reserve Bank staff and presidents in most cases
suggested a course of action on discount rate policy prior to directors voting on a recom-
mendation. This confirms other anecdotal accounts and assumptions made in empirical
analyses of discount rate decisionmaking. Respondents also suggested that discount rate
deliberations were characterized by a moderate degree of disagreement. Fifth, most re-
spondents said they were motivated to serve as a director by an interest in learning more
about economic policymaking and the potential to represent their company or industry in
the policymaking process. Every Class A respondent reported the opportunity to repre-
sent their company or industry as “extremely” influential, while every Class C respondent
reported being “extremely” motivated by a sense of civic duty.
More generally, the survey illustrates that director experiences may vary consider-
ably, even within the same Reserve Bank. Though more observations are needed to draw
conclusions about relationships underlying response patterns, there appears to be a high
degree of variation worthy of future exploration.
A significant drawback to this study is its low response rate, which inhibits a more
comprehensive comparative analysis of director responses and limits its external validity.
This is a problem for qualitative studies of elites more generally and for the population
of interest specifically. As other scholars have noted, gaining access to corporate and eco-
nomic elites—who are busy and hard to reach directly—poses particular challenges for
researchers (see, for example: Useem 1995; Welch et al. 2002; Page, Bartels, Seawright
2011). This often results in low elite participation rates for survey research and inter-
views. For Reserve Bank directors specifically, preliminary discussions with a director
and with an official at the Board of Governors’ Reserve Bank Operations and Payment
Systems (RBOPS) Division—the office charged with overseeing the Reserve Banks and
their boards—foreshadowed difficulties obtaining director participation in my research.
The RBOPS official noted that director representation at the Reserve Banks had become
an increasingly sensitive issue and that directors themselves are cognizant of growing
political attention to the boards. In particular, he cautioned that directors might be un-
willing to speak even informally about their role out of fear that board activities would
be presented in a political or partisan light.
Despite these challenges, this survey could be replicated on a larger scale by devoting
greater attention to addressing nonresponse. Studies have shown that internet-based sur-
veys of elites can achieve high response rates—in the 45-70% range—if followed up with
phone or mail reminders (e.g. Fisher and Herrick 2012). A larger sample would enable
more in-depth study of differences in responses across Reserve districts, and allow one to




“It seems essential to preserve our regional Federal Reserve System, which
consists of 12 Federal Reserve banks with nine directors in each bank, together
with a Federal Reserve Board in Washington. In this particular respect, our
System is different from that of most countries because of our extensive area,
and because of our political and economic structure of States and districts,
based upon industrial, agricultural, commercial, and financial conditions and
needs which are widely different in the various parts of the United States. The
System is composed of essential parts. These parts, however, must be cohe-
sive for the best functioning of the System...To be effective, the whole Federal
Reserve System must be one.” — M.S. Szymczak, member of the Board of
Governors, 1933-1961.1
The governance of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks by boards of directors has been
the subject of persistent congressional criticism and public suspicion since the Federal Re-
serve System’s founding over a century ago. In the wake of the 2007-08 financial crisis,
this indignation reached a fever pitch, sparking public demonstrations, the formation of
interest groups devoted to Reserve Bank governance reform, and, with the passage of the
2010 Dodd-Frank Act, one of the most significant amendments to the Reserve Bank’s gov-
ernance structure since 1935. Despite these developments, no systematic social scientific
study of the Reserve Banks or their governance has been pursued.
This dissertation is a step toward addressing this lacuna. It begins from the premise
that the Reserve Banks and the boards of directors that oversee them play critical roles
in economic policymaking in the United States. The boards manage Reserve Bank op-
erations, provide input on interest rate policy, and directly appoint the Reserve Bank
presidents who go on to vote in the FOMC. Given these responsibilities, who governs
the Reserve Banks—and how they do it—has consequences for monetary and regulatory
policies that affect nearly every citizen (and arguably millions more abroad). In addi-
tion, the boards of directors provide a channel through which financial interests may
1 Statement before a subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency of the United States
Senate (June 3, 1935). In the debates leading up to the passage of the Banking Act of 1935, Szymczak
was a proponent of delegating more authority to the Reserve Banks and the boards of directors.
140
make their voice heard in the policymaking process. This is a poorly understood but po-
tentially powerful influence opportunity that is effectively only available to local banks,
which elect a majority of the nine-member boards in each Reserve district and serve on
the boards themselves. By having a formal seat at the table in the governance of important
policymaking institutions, directors and banks wield a public authority that guarantees
them a stable and protected means to pursue policy change inside the very institutions
that regulate them. Investigating the dynamics and consequences of these unique institu-
tional arrangements are thus fundamental not only to our understanding of how the Fed
makes policy, but also the myriad ways in which private interests might influence the
policymaking process. The three empirical chapters of this dissertation collectively aim
to provide such an inquiry and, in doing so, provide a starting point for future research
on Reserve Bank governance.
In Chapter 3, I investigate a product of the Reserve Banks’ system of governance: the
distribution of political ideologies on the boards of directors. I find that Reserve Bank
directors are politically engaged and relatively conservative. Directors are more likely
to donate to political campaigns, more likely to donate to Republican candidates, and
more conservative than the average campaign donor in the United States. In particular,
bankers elected by local banks (Class A directors) are more conservative than their non-
banker counterparts. Class C directors are the most ideologically diverse director class,
though their median and average ideal points lean conservative. I also document ideolog-
ical variation across Reserve districts: the directorates of the Boston and New York Feds
are significantly less conservative than the directorates of the ten other Reserve Banks.
Finally, I show that directors’ average conservatism has steadily declined over the last
40 years. Taken together, the results provide a window into the political leanings of the
private citizens who govern the Reserve Banks.
Chapter 4 digs into the election of Class A and Class B directors by private banks—the
initial entry point and key mechanism through which banks formally participate in the
governance of the Reserve Banks. Using an original dataset of director elections between
1980 and 2015, I find that most banks do not take advantage of the opportunity to nom-
inate director candidates, and that, consequently, elections are rarely contested. Among
races that are contested, the probability of winning is strongly predicted by the number of
nominations—that is, endorsements—a candidate receives. By contrast, banks do not ap-
pear to vote according to some measure of candidate quality as defined by a candidate’s
professional or educational background, nor does it appear that banks are picking up and
selecting on candidate political ideology. Directors lean conservative not because voting
banks are choosing the more conservative candidate, but because the candidates are con-
servative to begin with. I also find evidence that nomination committees composed of
regional banking associations successfully inhibit contestation. Consistent with early ac-
counts of director elections, regional state banking associations do appear to control the
nomination process.
Finally, in Chapter 5, I present the results of a survey of sitting and former directors,
which provides critical first-hand accounts of what directors do, which actor interests are
involved in director and president appointments, and how directors perceive their in-
fluence on policy. Among other findings, the survey suggests that director recruitment
processes are highly networked: most respondents were already acquainted with a sit-
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ting director prior to their selection, and sitting directors routinely propose names of their
acquaintances to fill vacant director seats. Moreover, respondents perceived banking as-
sociations to play an active role in selecting Class A and B directors, even in those Re-
serve districts that are not known to use nominating committees in elections. The survey
responses also show that directors see themselves as playing an influential role in formu-
lating monetary policy, and many did not disagree with the statement that they had some
influence over regulatory and supervisory activities at their Reserve Bank. More gener-
ally, the survey illustrates that director experiences may vary considerably, even within
the same Reserve Bank. Overall, the survey yields insight into a wide range of topics
relating to Reserve Bank governance that may serve as starting points for future studies.
6.1 Implications
This project has implications for both the academic literature and public policy. As the
first to comprehensively examine the Reserve Banks and their governance, the analysis
sheds light on a key component of the Federal Reserve System underappreciated in the
literature on the Fed and the politics of monetary and regulatory policymaking. In doing
so, it provides a more complete portrait of the Fed’s institutional character and helps con-
textualize well-established, but undertheorized, empirical findings about Reserve Bank
presidents’ voting behavior in the FOMC. Moreover, the analysis contributes to a deeper
understanding of the substance of the Reserve Banks’ “private” status, issues at the root
of more normative concerns regarding the Fed?s accountability to the public. The analy-
ses presented here may thus be relevant to longstanding debates in the discipline about
the Fed’s democratic legitimacy.
The project also bears on the literatures on elite political behavior and interest group
influence. By focusing on the Reserve Bank boards of directors, this dissertation high-
lights a unique opportunity, available to local economic elites and community leaders,
to participate directly in federal policymaking. In particular, bankers may use their par-
ticipation on the boards—both in terms of electing representatives to serve and serving
on the boards themselves—to ensure their policy preferences are represented throughout
the organization. The boards thus provide banking interest with an influence strategy
not available to other interest groups in the American political economy, and one that can
complement other strategies in their portfolio. This privilege, moreover, is built into the
Fed’s statutory design.
Through providing a detailed account of directors and the election process, this project
can also inform the current political debate over Reserve Bank governance. As demon-
strated in Chapter 3, directors tend to be politically conservative, with bankers (Class
A directors) being the most conservative of all. Proposals to remove bankers from the
boards could potentially have the effect of making the boards less conservative overall,
which perhaps might result in the selection of less hawkish presidents System-wide. Re-
lated proposals that would require the boards to earmark Class B and C seats for orga-
nized labor, community organizations, and academia (e.g. Haedtler, Levin, and Wilson
2016) might also introduce more ideological diversity into the boards, given that I find
directors from these industries are less conservative than directors from banking and
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business on average. At the same time, the appointment of Class C directors has not
obviously shifted the average ideology of the directorates leftward. Though Class C di-
rectors are the least conservative director class, they are still concentrated on the right
side of the ideological spectrum and share many of the biographical characteristics as the
banker-elected directors. Reforms targeted solely at reducing the influence of banks in the
director selection process may thus not deliver the outcome progressive activists seek.
6.2 Going Forward: A Research Agenda on Reserve Bank
Governance
The analyses presented in this dissertation are heavy on description but thin on explana-
tion. This is a significant limitation of the project but also an opportunity. If anything,
the preceding chapters underscore how little we know about Reserve Bank governance
and how many questions remain unanswered. Going forward, the empirical findings
and institutional details documented here can be leveraged to conduct more in-depth in-
vestigations of the boards, their preferences, and their influence. Pursuing these lines of
inquiry would greatly enhance our understanding of how the Fed makes policy and how
banking interests participate in the policymaking process. Below, I outline a few paths
forward, beyond some of the specific research projects suggested in the concluding sec-
tions of Chapters 3-5. I begin by discussing some general methodological approaches that
would be especially productive when studying Reserve Bank governance, then proceed
to discussion of substantive areas that are in need of more attention.
6.2.1 Methodological Approaches
Formal Modeling
The Reserve Banks are incredibly rich institutional environments to apply existing, and
generate new, theoretical models. A key goal of this dissertation was to provide some
descriptive color about the rules and processes that undergird the governance structure
to aid future theory-building efforts. Given how little attention has been paid to this area,
formal modeling could generate significant advances in our knowledge about the Reserve
Banks and more clearly define appropriate empirical strategies for studying them. There
are also nice institutional properties here that make Reserve Bank governance especially
amenable to formal modeling: e.g veto power; multiple classes of directors; different rules
governing class eligibility; bank group voting; and multiple appointers.
One promising line of research would more rigorously grapple with the selection of
Reserve Bank presidents. While Chapter 4 examined the election of Class A and B di-
rectors by member banks, there is still much to learn about how directors wield their
appointment authority once they begin their service—and how this might reflect their
own appointment by private banks (for Class A and B directors) or the Board of Gov-
ernors (for Class C directors). Formalizing the basic logic of directors’ appointment of
presidents would clarify the means by which bank preferences are channeled through
the selection process, and help elucidate the data generating process that produces the
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(conservative) ideological distribution of presidents we observe. Moreover, as president
appointments are arguably the most potent source of directors’ policymaking influence,
developing testable predictions about how this process works would be an especially
useful direction for jumpstarting a research agenda on Reserve Bank governance.
One approach is to conceptualize the appointment of Reserve Bank presidents in a
principal-agent framework, modeling the (1) selection of directors by private banks and
the Board of Governors and the (2) selection of presidents by directors as a nested process
in which forward-looking banks use director appointments as an instrument to obtain a
Reserve Bank president that will pursue their preferred monetary and regulatory policies.
A starting point could begin from the simple assumption that both private banks and the
Board (principals in the director selection process) and directors (principals in the presi-
dent selection process) aim to select agents that are ideological allies—a pattern that has
been observed in the Board of Governors appointment literature (e.g. Chappell, McGre-
gor, and Vermilyea 2005; Adolph 2013)—though there are other appointment strategies
that would be interesting to consider (see Rogoff 1985 and Schnakenberg, Turner, and
Uribe 2017, for example). Analyzing president appointments through this kind of frame-
work would yield insight into actors’ incentives—in this case, incentives for banks, the
Board of Governors, directors, and presidents—and what kinds of enforcement mecha-
nisms the appointing principals wield that might structure agents’ willingness to comply
(e.g. directors’ authority to reappoint presidents).2
Another area that might be fruitfully modeled in game theoretic terms, and one that
could formalize existing historical accounts of the Reserve Banks’ institutional develop-
ment, would be to consider the principal-agent relationship between Congress and the
Reserve Banks. One way to think about the formal inclusion of banks in the Reserve
Banks’ governance structure is as a kind of deck-stacking strategy implemented by early
20th-century banking interests and their congressional allies (McCubbins, Noll, and Wein-
gast 1987; Moe 1989).3 By this logic, Congress effectively baked in a banker-friendly,
conservative bias into the Reserve Banks and ensured that Bank presidents would, more
often than not, express conservative policy preferences. Regardless of shifting political or
partisan tides—which would likely shape the ideological distribution of the Board of Gov-
ernors into the future—banking interests and their supporters in Congress could count
on consistent pro-banker (and presumably inflation-averse) Reserve Banks.
In addition to these topics, the Reserve Bank boards are attractive institutions to ex-
plore a variety of other phenomena of interest to social scientists, including:
• Collective decisionmaking: how does the board reach decisions on the discount rate
recommendation?
• Expertise and persuasion: do directors with more expertise in banking and eco-
nomic policy dominate board decisionmaking?
2 Formally modeling the selection processes would also require a more serious evaluation of banks’
policy preferences and potential variation in preferences. For instance, do big (Group 1) banks have
different monetary and regulatory policy preferences than small (Group 3 banks)? Does their appoint-
ment strategy differ as a result?
3 As Moe (1989) writes: “Structural politics is interest group politics.”
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• Coordination: how do member banks coalesce around a single candidate when
nominating directors?
• “Intercameral” bargaining: does strategic interaction between member banks and
the Board of Governors—the two appointers of the boards of directors—shape the
boards’ composition?
• Voter turnout: what factors account for member banks’ decisions to nominate can-
didates and turnout for director elections?
• Transparency: how might greater transparency over the director and president se-
lection processes modify banks’ appointment behavior?
Qualitative Methods
The study of Reserve Bank governance would especially benefit from qualitative ap-
proaches, including interviews, case studies, and archival research. While the dissertation
utilizes some of these methods, much more work along these lines should be pursued. In
an environment so opaque and data-sparse, qualitative methods are particularly useful
for uncovering the networks operating in this space and the quiet and nearly undetectable
ways in which private actors may exert influence on Fed policymaking.
One area where qualitative work would be fruitful is nominations of Class A and
Class B directors. As the analysis in Chapter 4 showed, the nomination process in some
Reserve districts appears to be coordinated by committees composed of state chapters of
the American Bankers Association (ABA). But even in districts that do not use nomination
committees, only a small share of private banks eligible to nominate a director candidate
do so, and in most cases candidates run unopposed. One potential explanation is that
the ABA coordinates director nominations in these districts through less formal means.
Obtaining data on ABA participation to evaluate this possibility is difficult, however.
While some Reserve Banks included nomination committee circulars with the election
records I requested, the circulars do not shed light on how the committees decide on
a preferred candidate or how the committees interact with the member banks that are
eligible to vote in the election. They also do not tell us anything about why member
banks generally defer to the state banking associations or what enforcement mechanisms
the associations might have. The circulars might also understate the degree to which
nomination committees are used in elections, as it is possible that some Reserve Banks
did not forward along the nomination committee circulars as part of my FOIA request.
By contrast, interviews with regional ABA chapters, former directors, or even Reserve
Bank staff could shed light on the pervasiveness of ABA participation and how local chap-
ters coordinate private banks. Interviews of member bank managers could also illuminate
explanations for why so few banks submit director nominations. Given the difficulty of
observing interest group influence empirically, interviews and surveys would greatly im-
prove our understanding of the role the ABA and other organized financial interests play
in economic policymaking.
These interviews could be completed by case studies that take advantage of the fact
that we have a dozen Reserve districts distributed around the country. As suggested
145
in the empirical chapters, another key objective of this dissertation was to document re-
gional variation in governance dynamics. Chapter 3, for instance, showed that direc-
torate ideology varies considerably across Reserve Banks: the Boston and New York Fed
boards are composed of relatively “liberal” political donors, while the other ten boards
are characterized by different degrees of conservatism. The analysis in chapter 4 found
that director election contestation also varied: just 1% of elections at the Richmond Fed
in my sample were contested, for example, compared to about 40% in St. Louis. The
regional distribution of Reserve Banks and boards offers an opportunity to investigate
how differences in Reserve district population, economic conditions, and political envi-
ronments may shape the exercise of bank influence on Fed governance. For instance,
comparisons of Reserve districts could yield insight into the pools of director candidates
that are unique to each district, and the sectoral interests that may be influential in Re-
serve Bank politics in some areas but not others. A more systematic consideration of how
districts may vary—such as the composition of member banks, district size, and political
context—could inform explanations for the regional variation I document in the disserta-
tion, and form the basis of a theory of Reserve Bank politics more broadly.
Leveraging Other Sources of Data
Future research could also take advantage of existing data sources to contribute to a more
detailed picture of Reserve Bank governance. One route would be to analyze the corpus
of FOMC transcripts, which are released for every FOMC meeting with 5-year lag. While
the transcripts are a popular data source for studies of FOMC policymaking, they could
also be leveraged to gauge directors’ influence—or lack thereof—on the policy positions
or economic outlooks of Reserve Bank presidents. To take one example from the August
2008 FOMC meeting, the president of the Chicago Fed, Charles Evans, cited his board’s
concern about inflation—apparently so much concern that directors recommended an
increase in the discount rate, despite Evans’ advice they hold off on a rate change recom-
mendation given the economy’s precarious state—-as a reason he ultimately supported
tightening policy.4 The transcripts can thus provide insight into director influence and
how their opinions are transmitted into the FOMC.
Another potential data source, though one less comprehensive than the FOMC tran-
scripts, is directors’ public statements. While most directors do not have prominent pub-
lic positions—the New York Fed directors tend to be an exception—I did uncover several
cases of directors writing op-eds in their local newspapers and making public speeches
to local business and community organizations. In one instance, a former director wrote
an op-ed expressing opposition to the removal of confederate statutes in their state, while
another gave a speech to their local banking association decrying financial regulation.
These records are more sparse, but if assembled they could be used to supplement or
validate the political ideology scores introduced in Chapter 3. As I note in that chapter,
one drawback to CFscores is that they cannot provide insight into directors’ positions
on particular issue areas, such as social vs. economic policy. Collecting directors’ public
statements could allow for a more nuanced description of policy preferences.
4 See https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20080805meeting.pdf, pg. 106.
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Nonetheless, as highlighted throughout the dissertation, the data challenges in this
domain are formidable. This is both a reality of the institution—the Reserve Banks are
more opaque than most other policymaking institutions in the U.S. given their private
status—but also perhaps deliberate. Influence in policymaking is difficult to observe and
special interests have incentives to ensure that remains the case. The Reserve Banks may
also be reluctant to release information that exposes more about the boards precisely be-
cause they are increasingly the target of criticism. While this may present obstacles to
further study of the Reserve Banks, there are also reason to be optimistic. Over the last
few decades, the Fed has undergone a cultural shift toward greater transparency, a trend
that does not seem at risk of reversal anytime soon. The pressure from interest groups
and Congress in the aftermath of the financial crisis also seems to have played a role in
opening up the president and director appointment processes to greater public scrutiny.
The Reserve Banks’ willingness to be more transparent about their internal selection pro-
cesses bodes well for future data collection efforts.
6.2.2 Substantive Areas of Focus
The existing literature’s willingness to ignore Reserve Bank governance is often justified
by an assumption that the boards of directors don’t matter. This explanation is also of-
fered as a defense of the current governance structure and as reassurance that directors
are merely benign appendages to the System. But this assumption is largely based on
disparate anecdotal accounts, rather than on any systematic data. An important path for-
ward for a research agenda on Reserve Bank governance will be investigating the specific
ways in which directors use their authority to exert influence on policy outcomes. In
particular, future researchers should take a closer look at directors’ discount rate recom-
mendations, president appointments, and other statutory responsibilities that allow them
to have direct or indirect impacts on policy.
Focusing on the role Reserve Banks play in supervising financial institutions would be
an interesting extension of this project. While the Fed’s regulatory responsibilities have
grown significantly over the last few decades, they have not yet received much atten-
tion in the political science literature on the Fed. The Reserve Banks play an especially
important role on this front through monitoring bank compliance on the ground—a re-
sponsibility delegated from the Board of Governors. Although Reserve Bank presidents
do not have control over which regulatory policies are to be implemented, they presum-
ably have some influence over enforcement intensity or efficacy. Moreover, Reserve Bank
(Class A and Class B) directors also play a limited, but nonetheless relevant, role in en-
suring their Banks’ regulatory efficacy by determining supervisory staff compensation
(in addition to, of course, selecting Reserve Bank presidents who have responsibility over
regulatory activities). Future research could try to evaluate directors’ indirect influence
on regulatory outcomes by examining the relationship between directorate ideology and
regulatory intensity, using the number of enforcement notices a Reserve Bank issues as
a measure for intensity. Directors are expressly prohibited from weighing in on regula-
tory matters beyond personnel issues, but one interesting finding from the survey results
presented in Chapter 5 is that several directors noted they had some influence on regu-
latory and supervisory activities. Private banks that appoint directors, moreover, likely
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care a great deal about regulatory policy—in some cases, perhaps even more than they
care about monetary policy (Woolley 1984). Shining light on the Reserve Banks’ regu-
latory role and how private banks might influence those activities via directors would
be a major contribution, and would complement other research projects, like those pro-
posed in Chapter 3, that would evaluate the explanatory power of directorate ideology
for discount rate recommendations and president appointments.
Taking Reserve Bank governance seriously also offers an opportunity to think more
concretely about the relationship between the banking and business sectors in American
politics. Of the six directors that local banks elect directly, three are intended to be mem-
bers of the local business community, thereby giving representation to the “borrowers” of
credit that banks loan out. In effect, when electing Class B directors, banks are choosing
members of their customer base to serve on the boards. While much has been written
about the influence of business and finance on politics (e.g. Smith 2000; Hart 2004; Bonica
2013; Hertel-Fernandez 2018), there have been few attempts to consider where the inter-
ests and preferences of finance and industry might converge or diverge. As I show in
chapters 3 and 4, Class A and Class B directors are for the most part indistinguishable.
They have similar biographical characteristics and are politically conservative to a similar
degree. This perhaps makes sense given that banks (or banking associations) elect both
sets of directors. However, a more detailed analysis of which industrial sectors get repre-
sentation on the boards, and which business executives banks choose to represent them,
would go a long way to unpacking these results. Such an analysis could provide more
insight into how banks view industry’s compatibility with their own policy interests, as
well as the kinds of networks in which industry and bank executives are embedded.5
Attention to other institutional features of Reserve Bank governance might also be a
fruitful path forward. In addition to the boards of directors that oversee each Reserve
Bank, most of the Reserve Banks have branch offices that are governed by their own
boards of directors. These branch boards are composed of either five or seven members,
with a majority of the directors appointed by the Reserve Bank and a minority appointed
by the Board of Governors. Branch boards are cited somewhat frequently by Reserve
Bank presidents in the FOMC transcripts, which suggests that they provide a similar in-
formation provision role as the headquarter board of directors and are able to channel
their insights about the local economy into the FOMC. Examining these branches would
provide an opportunity to extend theories about the director appointment process. In
this case, rather than have banks elect directors, the Reserve Bank itself is an appointer.
Anecdotally, we also know that these branch boards are breeding grounds for the head-
quarter boards. A closer look into the branches could thus provide a better sense of the
pool of candidates from which directors are drawn. Beyond the branch boards, other gov-
ernance institutions that allow banking interests to express their views to the Fed could
be of interest of to researchers. For example, the Conference of Chairs, composed of the
twelve Class C directors who chair their Reserve Bank boards of directors, meet regularly
5 One could consider, for instance, the interlocks of industry and bank executives on private sector
directorates outside the Reserve Banks. As noted in the survey in Chapter 5, most of the respondents
were acquainted with sitting or former director prior to their own appointment. One venue where
these connections may have been forged is the boards of directors of other companies.
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with the Board of Governors. According to a respondent from my survey in Chapter 5,
the Conference of Chairs featured discussion on policy and corporate governance issues
that the respondent noted was not discussed regularly in board meetings. Focusing on
these even more obscure elements of the Reserve Banks’ system of governance could shed
more light on the Fed’s relationship with local economic and political elites, and the as-
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